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8Abstract
This study reports on the analysis of 59 in-depth interviews conducted with
people diagnosed with, or from families affected by, Spinal Muscular Atrophy
(SMA). It focuses on attitudes towards, and actual uses of, prenatal testing
and selective termination for SMA in reproductive decision making for this
group of people, in order to focus on the role of experiential knowledge of
SMA and its relationship to expert medical knowledge, within these highly
complex decisions.
Experiential knowledge has been described in the literature as knowledge
derived from experience, whether ‘embodied’ (i.e. sensory) or ‘empathetic’
(i.e. based on the experiences of others). Experiential knowledge has
frequently been positioned as being in opposition to, or even conflicting with,
medical knowledge, particularly by feminists and disability rights supporters,
for whom the tensions between experiential knowledge and medical
knowledge have political significance. However, this research found the
relationship between expert and experiential knowledge to be both fluid and
dynamic, which had important implications for the way in which SMA was
conceptualised, understood and responded to by families living with it.
Whilst participants’ accounts of SMA were thoroughly grounded in their day-
to-day realities with the condition, this knowledge always existed in and
through a relationship with expert medical knowledge of SMA.
The inherent uncertainties within and between experiential and expert
knowledge, and the ways of conceptualising SMA that emerged from them,
however, rather than alleviating, instead contributed to, and heightened, some
of the social, ethical and moral dilemmas these families experienced around
reproductive decision making. Indeed, many participants became trapped
within these ways of knowing SMA and the internal contradictions they
contained, whilst for others, the strategic privileging of one form of
knowledge as ‘authentic’ over the other became the only way to escape some
of these dilemmas, and clarify where their reproductive responsibilities lay.
9Introduction
Developments in genetic and reproductive medicine throughout the latter half
of the twentieth century have had a significant influence on the reproductive
choices available to prospective parents. Advancements in screening and
testing technologies and the development of procedures such as pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) have altered the number and nature of
reproductive decisions presented to prospective parents, and these options
appear set to increase over time as rising numbers of conditions are identified
as being of genetic aetiology (Lawson, 2001; Shakespeare, 2005, 2008a). In
line with these developments, there has been much research into how, and to
what end, these decisions are approached by would-be parents, uncovering a
range of responses and experiences. A key theme within this body of research
is related to the issue of ‘choice’, and how far, given the rise in sophistication
and social acceptability of such technologies, prospective parents are now free
to exercise choice over the reproductive options available to them. It has been
suggested that given the status and authority attributed to medical knowledge,
as well as the negative value attributed to physical impairment and disability,
prospective parents experience the use of prenatal screening and/or testing
technologies as an obligation rather than a free choice (Lippman, 1989; Press
and Browner, 1997). Indeed, there have been suggestions that the use of such
technologies can be regarded as an extension of parental obligations (The
Times, 1999; Harris, 1998, 2000; Purdy, 1996). Kenen (1994) has referred to
a sense of ‘genetic responsibility’ which has emerged alongside the expansion
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of genetic knowledge; as we come to learn more about the socially
undesirable traits and propensities within our genetic make up, so our
responsibility to prevent their transmission increases. This obligation,
however, is not experienced equally. As women are more heavily implicated
in reproduction than men, they often assume reproductive responsibility as
well as the brunt of any negative consequences associated with having a
disabled child (Steinberg, 1996: 267; Dragonas, 2001).
Whilst most of the research around the use of prenatal
screening/testing technologies has focused on the standard screening/testing
practices for conditions which are routinely tested for in most western
countries i.e. Down’s Syndrome, Spina Bifida etc., less attention has been
paid to the reproductive choices made within families affected by a known
inheritable condition (Kelly, 2009). For most families affected by inheritable
conditions, awareness of the genetic trait arises at the point of the birth of an
affected family member, or following the development of symptoms in an
existing member. The subsequent reproductive decision making of family
members in light of this knowledge has most widely been discussed in the
literature in relation to the practice of genetic counselling together with the
acceptability and uptake of testing technologies (e.g. Bryant et al., 2005;
Wertz et al., 1992). Research within the social sciences, however, has focused
on the way in which genetic risk is constructed by such family members in
contrast to medicalised perspectives (Parsons and Atkinson, 1992;
D’Agincourt-Canning, 2005), as well as how genetic information is managed
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and negotiated within social relationships (e.g. Downing, 2005; Hallowell,
1999; Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2008a).
Increasingly, however, the importance of ‘experiential knowledge’,
that is, knowledge derived from experience with a given phenomenon, of both
pregnancy and of disability is being acknowledged as an important factor in
the making of these prenatal testing decisions (Etchegary et al., 2008;
Lippman, 1999; Abel and Browner, 1998) particularly for families affected by
inheritable conditions (D’Agincourt, 2003; Kelly, 2009; Downing, 2005;
Hallowell, 2006; Cox and McKellin, 2001). However, thus far, there have
been relatively few studies that have examined how individuals with
experience of a genetic condition within their family respond to the
reproductive genetic technologies available to them, and the social, moral and
ethical dilemmas that accompany them (Kelly, 2009: 82; Ferguson et al.,
2000: 74). As Kelly (2009) points out, there has been little cross-referencing
of the literature around the experiences of childhood disability within families
and the growing literature on prenatal testing decisions, despite the relevance
such familial experiences have to the decisions individuals make about the use
of prenatal testing (Asch, 1999). Moreover, there has been even less attention
paid to the way in which the concerns highlighted by disability rights
supporters in relation to prenatal testing and the possibilities of selective
termination arise or are experienced by families affected by genetic conditions
(Asch, 2000; Shakespeare, 1999), nor how they are conceptualised and
experienced by adults with genetic impairments approaching reproductive
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decision making, although there is anecdotal evidence to suggest that these
are significant issues (Gow, 2000; Kent, 2000).
The purpose of this study, therefore, is to bridge some of these gaps in
the literature through an analysis of the influence and importance of
experiential knowledge of a particular inheritable condition, Spinal Muscular
Atrophy (SMA), on the reproductive decision making of individuals from
families affected by SMA, and those diagnosed with SMA themselves.
Previous studies have primarily focused on the experiences and reproductive
views of specific family members within families affected by inheritable
conditions, e.g. individuals diagnosed with the condition themselves (Gow,
2000), the parents of children with genetic impairments (Kelly, 2009; Wertz
et al., 1992) or their siblings (Bryant et al., 2005). However, the inclusion of
different family members (e.g. brothers, sisters, parents, grand parents) within
this study as well as those diagnosed with SMA themselves allows an analysis
of different forms of experiential knowledge and degrees of intimacy with the
experience of SMA. As well as different types of experience with SMA, I
further anticipate that this inclusive approach will allow an exploration of the
views of people at different points of reproductive decision making (i.e. those
who have not (yet) had children, those who have had children, those who have
chosen not to have children etc.), which will potentially illuminate different
perspectives and types of experience. The views elicited by this study will be
set out, throughout this thesis, in the context of broader debates on prenatal
screening and testing for genetic and other disabilities, to highlight the nature
and influence of experiential knowledge.
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Spinal Muscular Atrophy (SMA)
After Cystic Fibrosis, SMA is the most common (potentially fatal) autosomal
recessively inherited condition (i.e. a single gene disorder requiring both
parents to carry one copy of the gene each to transmit SMA), affecting
approximately 1 in every 6,000 newborns in the North West European
population (Dreesen et al., 1998; Spiegler et al., 1990). Werdnig-Hoffman
Disease, or SMA type I, moreover, is currently the most common genetically
inherited condition causing infant mortality in the UK and America (SMA
Foundation, 2009), and it is estimated that there are between 5,500-6,000
people diagnosed with SMA currently living in the UK (NHS choices, 2009).
Whilst some of the specific biological mechanisms by which SMA occurs
remain poorly understood, SMA is a condition which is nevertheless defined
by the medical profession primarily in terms of the presence of anterior horn
cell degeneration in the spinal cord. These anterior horn cells are responsible
for relaying nerve ‘messages’ from the brain to the muscles, and their
deterioration and/or death results in disruption to neural pathways. This
breakdown in the communication between brain and muscle means that the
muscles cannot be activated, and, as a consequence of lack of use/stimulation,
they gradually atrophy, or ‘waste’, leading to permanent weakness or even
total paralysis of the muscle. Whilst SMA is generally described as a
‘neurodegenerative’ disease, that is, one that progresses over time, De Groot
and De Witte (2005) have queried whether the disease progresses, or whether
the increase in symptoms over time reported by those with SMA can be
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attributed to the endurance of their symptoms causing further complications,
rather than progression of the disease per se.
SMA has been categorised by the medical profession into different
‘types’ according to the degree of muscle weakness experienced. In its most
severe form, SMA causes severe atrophy of the inter-costal muscles (those
used to support breathing) and can lead to respiratory failure and premature
death, often in the first two years of life. SMA presenting in this way in
infants has been termed ‘type I SMA’ or ‘Werdnig-Hoffman Disease’ after
the neurologists who first described the condition in the late 19th century
(Werdnig, 1891; Hoffman, 1893). Less severe forms of the condition have
been described as ‘SMA type II’ and ‘SMA type III’, although considerable
confusion exists within the medical profession as to how the types of SMA
should be differentiated from one another (Dubowitz, 1991, 2008). The age of
onset, genetic profile of the individual, together with their achievement of
certain developmental milestones (such as the ability to sit or walk unaided)
are some of the commonly used determinants of the type of SMA diagnosed,
with those able to sit but not walk being described as having type II SMA and
those able to both sit and walk being described as having type III SMA
(Dubowitz, 1995a).
The implications of SMA for those who live with it have been under
researched within the medical literature, with the notable exception of Lamb
and Peden’s (2008) qualitative study on the perspectives of adults with SMA.
This situation is mirrored in the social sciences, where the perspectives of
those living with SMA have been subsumed within broader research projects
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addressing a range of topics, including the impact of genetic disease more
broadly (Macaulay, 1996), experiences of disablement (Cardol et al., 2002),
the ethics of medical decision making (Simonds, 2005) as well as the uses of
genetic technologies (Franklin and Roberts, 2006). The relatively low profile
of SMA relative to other genetic conditions such as Duchenne Muscular
Dystrophy, Huntingdon’s Disease and Cystic Fibrosis may have contributed
to the lack of research into the perspectives of families and individuals living
with SMA. Where research from a medical perspective has explored the
experience of life with SMA, this has primarily focused on quality of life
issues (Bach et al., 2003) family and personal adaptation to stress, disability
and bereavement (Von Gontard et al., 2002b; Boyer et al., 2006; Lamb and
Peden, 2008), medical complications associated with SMA (Von Gontard et
al., 2001; Riddick et al., 1982; Carter et al., 1995; De Groot and De Witte,
2005) as well as appropriate interventions and care (Wang et al., 2007; Parker
et al., 1999). No studies thus far have explored the way in which those with
SMA in their family experience and conceptualise the condition, nor the way
in which family members and those diagnosed with SMA approach
reproductive decision making in the context of this medically defined genetic
risk.
Using the example of the perspectives of families and individuals
living with SMA, therefore, within this thesis I present an analysis of the way
in which intimate experiential knowledge of an inheritable condition, SMA, is
managed and negotiated alongside expert medical knowledge in the context of
reproductive decision making. More specifically, I explore the way in which
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these (often contradictory) bodies of knowledge are used to negotiate the
complex, and frequently incompatible, social, ethical and moral dilemmas
associated with reproduction in the context of genetic risk.
Chapter 1 presents the literature surrounding expert and experiential
knowledge more broadly, situating the prominence of expert knowledge
within ‘risk society’ theorising. Within this chapter I also consider the way in
which the validation of experiential knowledge as an ‘authentic’ form of
knowledge has become a political project for both feminists and disability
rights supporters, highlighting the epistemological assumptions of these
perspectives. Chapter 2 details the research methods that were used to carry
out the study, my approach to analysis of the data as well as a reflexive
consideration of my own values and assumptions as a researcher, considering
the various implications these factors had for the study. Chapters 3 and 4 lay
much of the groundwork for the later consideration of reproductive decision
making by presenting the fluidity of the relationship between expert and
experiential knowledge in understanding what SMA is (Chapter 3), as well as
how it is experienced in day-to-day life (Chapter 4), which form a backdrop
for reproductive decisions. Whilst genetic and clinical classifications have
suggested particular ways of ordering the experience of SMA, these chapters
demonstrate the messiness of such classifications as they are played out
through the accounts of those living with SMA; experiential and expert
knowledge both informed, but also contradicted each other in participants’
understandings of SMA, contributing to the instability of knowledge of SMA.
In Chapters 5 and 6, the way in which this knowledge is brought to bear in
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reproductive decision making is presented. Participants strategically
mobilised particular versions of knowledge about SMA, and privileged it as
‘authentic’ in similar ways, even when they arrived at very different
reproductive decisions. For other participants, however, the contradictions
within this knowledge of SMA trapped them in a state of indecision, unable to
navigate the incompatible social, ethical and moral dilemmas surrounding
reproduction. Chapter 7 draws together the analysis of the previous 6
chapters, highlighting the way in which experiential knowledge, whilst
sometimes privileged as an ‘authentic’ resource, could never be fully
disentangled from expert knowledge of SMA. Experiential knowledge
emerged as similarly inflected with the ambiguities and instabilities that
characterises expert medical knowledge of SMA, highlighting the deeply
precarious position from which families affected by SMA approach
reproduction.
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Chapter 1
The Politics of Knowledge and Risk
The emergence of SMA as a genetic disease, and the subsequent development
of testing technologies to monitor and predict its recurrence, have, according
to writers within the social sciences, occurred in a context in which the way
we think about health and illness, our identities and the way in which we
orient ourselves in our daily lives, has drastically shifted. Technological
developments, arising alongside processes of modernisation and globalisation,
have fuelled a widespread sense of insecurity and risk, which have in turn
altered the way in which we relate to one another and manage our daily lives.
Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) have argued that we now live in a ‘risk
society’, a particular type of society in which the management of risk has
become an integral part of daily life. Expert bodies of knowledge, such as
genetic and medical knowledge, play a significant role in the context of the
risk society, as it is by recourse to these professional bodies of knowledge that
we both conceptualise, and adopt, strategies to manage risk. Whilst Beck
(1992) and Giddens (1990) have pointed to the significance of expert
knowledge in the risk society, however, they have simultaneously highlighted
the paralleled development of distrust in these forms of knowledge.
Contradictions within and between bodies of expert knowledge, together with
the acknowledgement that risks can emerge out of, and through, these expert
bodies of knowledge have resulted in widespread uncertainty amongst lay
people as to what knowledge can be trusted. In more recent years, particularly
within medical sociology, there has been an increased interest in ‘lay’ or
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‘experiential’ bodies of knowledge, or knowledge grounded in everyday lived
experiences, as an alternative, or supplement, to medical knowledge (Caron-
Finterman et al., 2005; Abel and Browner, 1998; Etchegary et al., 2008;
Popay and Williams, 1996). For writers and researchers exploring these forms
of knowledge, experiential knowledge is an invaluable resource, particularly
in relation to the management of risk, as it has the potential to challenge or
displace expert accounts. For feminist writers and disability rights supporters,
the validation of experiential knowledge as a valuable alternative to such
expert knowledge has political significance, particularly in the context of
reproductive risk, where the dominance of expert medical knowledge may
have especially negative consequences for women and people with
disabilities.
This chapter contextualises my research on SMA and the management
of genetic risk through the presentation of the literature surrounding the
apparent divide between ‘expert’ and ‘experiential’ forms of knowledge.
Firstly, the literature surrounding the development of the ‘risk society’ is
presented, before moving on to a discussion of the consequences the risk
society has for the conceptualisation of different forms of knowledge,
particularly medical and genetic accounts of health and illness. Finally, the
growing literature on experiential knowledge, and particularly its relevance to
feminist and disability rights political projects, is presented.
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The Risk Society
Lupton (1999) has argued that the notion of ‘risk’ can be understood as the
attempt by societies to deal with danger, frightening events and misfortune. In
pre-modern societies, such events were explained by reference to supernatural
forces, metaphysical powers or divine intervention, powers generally deemed
to be beyond personal control. However, this form of reasoning has now
largely been surpassed. Lupton (1999) has highlighted the period of
enlightenment, in the 17th and 18th centuries, as signalling the ascendance of
the notion of controllability and measurability in relation to the natural and
social worlds; rather than behaving randomly, these worlds came to be seen as
following particular laws that were amenable to calculation, measurement and
prediction through rational thinking. It is through observation of these
developments that Beck (1992), as well as Giddens (1991), developed their
theorising around the emergence of a ‘risk society’. According to Beck (1995)
and Giddens (1998), society has now moved from pre-modern times into an
era of ‘reflexive modernity’. Beck (1995) has likened this epochal change to a
second enlightenment; the emergence of a society characterised by particular
conceptualisations of, and expected reactions to, risk. However, the risks of
reflexive modernity to which Beck (1995) and Giddens (1998) refer are unlike
the risks from the natural world which troubled pre-modern societies. Instead,
risk in reflexive modernity has evolved out of the combined processes of
modernisation, industrialisation, globalisation and the associated expansion in
human knowledge. More specifically, the development of nuclear, chemical
and genetic technologies have brought with them new insecurities,
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uncertainties and manufactured risks; they are the unintended by-product of
humanity’s accumulated knowledge and increasing attempts to control the
natural world (Giddens, 1998). As well as the prevalence of risk, a further key
feature of the risk society as set out by Beck (1992) is the emergence, and
predominance of, expert bodies of knowledge. As the risks confronting us in
the risk society are no longer natural dangers, but instead emerge out of
technological and scientific developments, expert knowledge is required to
identify, and manage risk.
Genetic risk is a key example of a risk that has emerged out of, and is
managed through, expert techno-scientific knowledge. Whilst notions of
hereditary and biological relatedness have long shaped conceptualisations of
kinship (Featherstone et al., 2006), expansions in genetic knowledge and
associated technologies have introduced the notion of genetic risk to the
sphere of reproduction, and impacted on forms of identification between
individuals (Rabinow, 1996). For Novas and Rose (2002) this dominance of
expert knowledge about risk has led to new forms of identity and personhood;
the genetically ‘at risk’ individual is a form of personhood which has arisen
out of these social conditions, and is associated with particular obligations
and socially acceptable behaviours, more specifically, the obligation to
manage genetic threats (Novas and Rose, 2000). Recourse to expert
knowledge is a key means through which this management is undertaken.
Through the identification of mutations on specific genes, geneticists and
researchers not only have the technological capacities to diagnose genetic
diseases, but they may also ascertain the probabilities an individual has of
22
developing a specific condition/impairment, or of being a carrier for it, and
thus the likelihood of its transmission to future offspring. Thus, the
emergence of genetic counselling services, where individuals may obtain
information regarding their genetic risks and strategies to manage them, can
be regarded as an example of such expert knowledge with reference to which
individuals can calculate and manage their genetic risks (Polzer, 2002).
Whilst expert knowledge is set out as an important resource by risk
society theorists, and as a means by which risks can be managed, these bodies
of knowledge, are not always accepted as infallible by those who use and are
subject to them. The paradox of the risk society, Giddens (1990) argues, is
that whilst expert knowledge may offer us the means by which to manage the
risks which impinge on our daily lives, these bodies of knowledge have
simultaneously generated the very risks we seek to manage. As our capacities
to identify and manage risk have increased, so, with that knowledge, have the
number of risks, and potential risks, in our lives increased: risk has now
become an overwhelming feature in our lives. The number of risks to our
health, for example, as Flynn (2006) has argued, may be experienced as ‘all-
embracing and ever-extending’ (Flynn, 2006: 79) so that any behaviour or
activity may come to be defined as a health risk at any given point. For
example, in a context in which people are now less vulnerable than in
previous eras to certain types of infectious diseases, and are consequently
enjoying better long term health and longer life expectancies, there is
increasing scepticism amongst the lay population as to how ‘real’ health
threats actually are, and which should be accepted as so (Flynn, 2006). Whilst
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risk society theorists such as Beck (1992) have approached an analysis of risk
from the ontological standpoint that risks are pre-social and pre-existing
phenomena, and in this sense have an objective existence outside our
descriptions of them, he also acknowledged the importance of social and
cultural factors in contributing to risk perceptions; what society considers to
be a risk and in need of managing at any given point reveals social and
political judgements, what Beck refers to as ‘cultural disposition’ (Beck,
1995: 47).
In terms of how people respond to risk, this contextual and socially
constructed character of risk has facilitated a weakening of trust in the
capacities of experts to define risks, and studies have demonstrated the way in
which lay people, rather than unquestioningly accepting, make judgements
about the trustworthiness of expert knowledge in the context of competing
knowledge claims (Wynne, 1989; William and Popay, 1994). Knowledge
may indeed be derived from a variety of sources, including one’s own
experiential knowledge, which is then factored into, and weighed against,
expert knowledge, in determining risk perceptions. Whilst risk society
theorists may thus prioritise the role of expert knowledge in the joint
processes of generating and managing risks, studies have revealed that this
dominance is nevertheless highly contested, and trust in this knowledge is
incomplete.
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Expert Knowledge: Geneticization
The dominance of expert knowledge in the risk society takes a variety of
forms, and much has been written about the particular character this
dominance has taken in relation to genetic knowledge. Indeed, since the
completion of the human genome project in 2000, the status and implications
of expert genetic knowledge has frequently been the centre of media attention,
controversy and speculation. The appeal of the new genetics to the public
imagination is reflected in the wealth of articles, books, public debates and
films that have been produced on this topic which consider the implications of
developments within this field for our freedoms, identities, health as well as
society, both present and future. In line with, and fuelling, this burgeoning
interest in genetics has been a growing tendency to attribute a wider range of
behaviours and health states to genetic status. Claims that scientists had found
the ‘gay gene’ (Conrad and Markens, 2001; BBC News, 2004) or the ‘obesity
gene’ (BBC News, 2007) all reached the headlines in the past decade and
point to the range of human experiences that have been framed in terms of
expert genetic knowledge. The completion of the first draft of the human
genome project was presented in the media and to the general population as a
working draft of the ‘book of life’ (Nerlich et al., 2002). Replete with
religious references, the conceptualisation of this expert knowledge as an
information system containing definitive explanations for particular forms of
illness and health, and even our very ‘humanness’ (Nerlich et al., 2002),
exemplifies the power attributed to genetic knowledge in prescribing and
dictating life itself (Kay, 2000; Nelkin and Lindee, 1995). Thus, upon
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completion of the human genome project, the benefits this expert knowledge
offered in terms of improving the human condition were extolled, and whilst
some concerns were raised in the public domain about the dangers of genetic
determinism, the completion of the project was nevertheless overwhelmingly
presented as a breakthrough to be celebrated (Nerlich et al., 2000; Juengst,
2000). The gene emerged not only as a vessel of information passed between
individuals, but as a ‘cultural icon’ (Duden and Samerski, 2007), containing
within it the means by which to understand our relationships, behaviours and
social problems, illnesses and diseases (Ten Have, 2001).
Abby Lippman (1991), through an analysis of the evolving status of
genetic knowledge, has coined the termed ‘geneticization’ (p. 64) to describe
this vast expansion in genetic knowledge as it occurred towards the end of the
20th century, with the use of genetic explanations to account for a broad range
of experiences and physical states. Building on the previously defined notion
of ‘medicalisation’, developed by Zola (1975, 1977) and Illich (1990) in the
1970s to theorise the extension of the dominance of expert medical
knowledge into different facets of life together with the attendant negative
implications of this, the concept of ‘geneticization’ refers to a similar process
of colonisation, but in this case of the idea that genetic knowledge can explain
a broad range of physical and behavioural phenomena. As Lippman notes,
‘geneticization’ refers to:
The ever growing tendency to distinguish people one
from another on the basis of genetics; to define most
disorders, behaviours and physiological variations as
26
wholly or in part genetic in origin. It is both a way of
thinking, and a way of doing, with genetic technologies
applied to diagnose, treat and categorize conditions
previously identified in other ways.
(Lippman, 1991: 64)
The concept of geneticization has been taken up by writers in different fields
since the 1990s to explore the various ways in which expert genetic
knowledge has become the dominant means through which to tell stories of
health, illness and behaviour, and the implications this has for our identities,
interpersonal relationships as well as the way in which we perceive, and
respond to, risk.
Related to, and emerging out of the concept of ‘geneticization’ is that
which Holtzman (1999) and Fleising (2001) have referred to as ‘genohype’, a
term that has been used to describe the over-inflation of expectations and
promises of genetic knowledge that have accompanied geneticization. As
Nightingale and Martin (2004) have argued, expectations of, and investments
in, the promises of genetic technologies (both financial and emotional), have
far outstripped the reality of progress in this area. In spite of media and
researcher claims in the late 1980s and early 1990s for example, that the
discovery of the gene responsible for Cystic Fibrosis (CF) would bring about
the possibility of developing gene therapies to cure the condition within
twenty years, such a cure remains elusive (Stockdale, 1999; Wailoo and
Pemberton, 2006). Indeed, the very development of the concept of genes as a
form of therapy and cure can be viewed as part of the process of
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geneticization; treatments and cures become conceptualised in terms of the
altering of our DNA rather than previously accepted treatments. As Kakuk
(2006) and Raab (1993) have argued, this notion supports the promise that,
through the manipulation of our genetic make up, many of the major diseases
afflicting humanity will be alleviated or, better yet, cured. Despite these
hopes, however, many of the gene therapy trials over the past two decades
have failed to produce viable treatments for debilitating and life-shortening
conditions such as CF, which has been accompanied by an increased
scepticism towards such scientific claims by the lay population (Kakuk, 2006;
Nightingale and Martin, 2004).
A further key implication of the dominance of expert genetic
knowledge relates to the ontological status of diseases. Yoxen (1982) has
argued that it is in a particular social milieu wherein genetic explanations for
disease comply with the ‘institutional, professional and conceptual structural
constraints of the modern health-care system’ that they become acceptable, or
even desirable (Yoxen, 1982: 148). Hedgecoe (2003) and Kerr (2000) have
highlighted this process through their respective analyses of the construction
of CF as a genetic disease. Kerr (2000) has noted that the acceptance of
genetic explanations for CF, and the use of language to support this definition
(e.g. the transformation of genetic codes into pathogens by use of the
language of ‘mutation’) have, rather than tightening the boundaries of CF,
instead facilitated the inclusion of associated syndromes into a CF diagnosis
(Kerr, 2000; Wailoo and Pemberton, 2006). Through the identification of
‘mutant’ genes present both in men experiencing infertility and those
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experiencing CF, certain forms of male infertility came to be re-classified as a
form of CF, and subsumed within this diagnostic category, highlighting the
power of genetic explanations for a given disease in defining the very
boundaries of it. Kerr (2000) notes however, that whilst genetic explanations
of disease may be appealing as a means by which to more clearly mark out
disease boundaries and offer definitive diagnostic testing, the apparent fixity
of genetic accounts can mask the ‘dynamism’ of genetic disease categories
and the uncertainties inherent therein (Kerr, 2000: 870). As Kerr (2000) has
argued, the inclusion of male infertility into the diagnostic criteria of CF is of
questionable value to the men so-diagnosed and their families, particularly
when treatment options are limited (Kerr, 2000: 871). Thus, whilst scientific
pursuits to pinpoint genes deemed responsible for particular conditions are
widely regarded as progressive and paving the way for future treatments or
even cures, the work of Kerr (2000) and Hedgecoe (2002, 2003) has pointed
to some of the complexities associated with this process of geneticization. In
the case of CF, the introduction of genetic explanations has not brought with
it the anticipated clarity and confirmation of medical classifications, but rather
a far messier picture of the interplay between genotype and phenotype
(Stempsey, 2006). Such studies point to the importance of geneticization in
accounting for the ways in which genetic explanations for disease come to be
singled out as the single underlying causal factor in spite of these
uncertainties, and the complications that arise from this (Hedgecoe, 2002;
Stempsey, 20026).
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As well as the shifting ontological status of diseases, the changing role of
expert genetic knowledge in the diagnosis and management of disease has,
furthermore, had implications for understandings of identity, personhood
together with interpersonal relationships. At a very basic level, the study of
genetics is a study of groups of similar individuals, defined in biological terms
(Yoxen, 1982), and thus the practices associated with genetic technologies
mean that the biological basis of family and kinship has the potential to be
attributed greater importance (Featherstone et al., 2006; Finkler, 2001;
Richards, 1996a). Not only may the boundaries of family groupings be altered
and redefined by genetic information, both in legal terms (e.g. the importance
attributed to biology in defining what constitutes a parent) as well as social
ones, but new social roles, expectations and obligations may be forged by
such genetic knowledge. As Novas and Rose (2000) have argued, the
increasing reliance on genetics to explain health and illness occurs in a
context in which identity practices have shifted. They argue that increasingly,
individuals are encouraged to adopt ‘life strategies’ that maximise their life
chances (Novas and Rose, 2000: 487), but which are simultaneously imbued
with ethical responsibilities to others. An example of this new form of identity
has emerged alongside genetic knowledge; the person ‘genetically at risk’ is
associated with particular subjectivities, more specifically, the duty to act in
accordance with one’s ‘genetic responsibility’ (Kenen, 1994). ‘Genetic
responsibility’ is a term that refers to the impetus to act in the present in
relation to genetic information in order to manipulate potential futures (Novas
and Rose, 2000: 486), and highlights the way in which the effects of
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geneticization may be felt beyond the conceptualisation of diseases, informing
the way in which we understand our own identities and our relationships to
others.
Various studies have explored experiences of genetic risk and
responsibility and its management within families and communities
(Hallowell, 1999; Kerr, 2003; Schaffer, 2008; Polzer et al., 2002; Novas and
Rose, 2000; Richards, 1996a; Merz, 1987), and further, the gendered ways in
which this responsibility is experienced. It has long been acknowledged that
women take primary responsibility for ‘kinship work’ in family groups (Di
Leonardo, 1987), and, moreover, assume responsibility for the family’s health
(Graham, 1979). However, Lippman (1994), Reed (2009) and Hallowell
(1999) have argued that these forms of responsibility are both heightened and
reinforced by genetic knowledge, and further, they can operate to constrain
the autonomy of women. The assumption of ‘genetic responsibility’ (Kenan,
1994) may dictate not only the management of women’s own genetic status
(for example overriding their right not to know about their genetic status in
order to facilitate the genetic knowledge acquisition of other family members
(Hallowell, 1999; Downing, 2005)), but also the management of the genetic
status of their offspring, through a sense of obligation to undergo invasive
prenatal testing (Lippman, 1994). Moreover, the management of the genetic
status of other family members, for example through surveillance or the
recruitment of family members into screening or testing practices may be felt
and experienced as an obligation rather than a choice (Downing, 2005;
Hallowell, 1999; Featherstone et al., 2006). Thus, as Beck (1992) has
31
acknowledged in relation to the risk society, expert information on risk, and in
these instances, genetic risk, is experienced differently across social groups,
and such groups may have unequal access to resources with which to manage
such risk. For women, expert genetic information confers on them particular
forms of responsibility and obligation that, in some instances, prove to limit,
rather than expand the choices they are able to make.
Whilst Lippman’s (1991) study of geneticization, and the work of
those who have taken up her concept, point to the range of implications
associated with the encroachment of genetics on an ever increasing number of
facets of life, both actual and imagined, the notion has nevertheless been
critiqued and adapted (Ten Have, 2001). Some of these critiques have focused
on the methodological difficulties associated with researching the concept
(Hedgecoe, 2001; Ten Have, 2001), whilst others offer more substantive
insights, concerned with the usefulness of the concept. In light of evidence of
extensive public debate on the new genetics, Ten Have (2001) has argued
that, at least to some degree, expert knowledge is not automatically accepted
but is instead reflexively considered by those who may use such information.
Further, Novas and Rose (2000) have argued that the undertones of
colonization inherent in the concept overlook the active and creative
responses of individuals to geneticization, and the possibilities within this
process for resisting the dominance of expert knowledge. Rather than passive
recipients of genetic discourse who accept the fatalism of their inheritance and
the self-identities it suggests, Novas and Rose (2000) argue that individuals
engage actively with the new ‘molecular optics’ (Novas and Rose, 2000: 487)
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to intervene in, manage and manipulate their potential futures (e.g. Abel and
Browner, 1998). Moreover, those who have, are at risk for, or who may be
carriers of, a range of genetic disorders are now questioning the relevance of
genetic information to their lives, and are bypassing testing when it is offered
( e.g. Cox and McKellin, 1999; Qian et al., 2001; Tibben et al., 1992). This
rejection or avoidance of genetic information suggests that there may be more
possibilities for resistance to expert knowledge than the geneticization thesis
suggests; that people do not always accept genetic practices and information
to be useful, relevant and valuable in their lives in an unproblematic way.
Rather, this information is interpreted in different ways in the context of their
own lives.
Cox and Starzomski (2004), in a study of Autosomal Dominant
Polycystic Kidney Disease (PKD), a kidney condition generally understood to
be linked to specific genes and for which genetic testing is available, for
example, have argued that this refutation of genetic knowledge by both lay
people and health care professionals mitigates the process of geneticization.
They argue that health care providers and those living with PKD see little
need or use for genetic testing for PKD, a finding that they link to the
availability of treatment options for the condition. The clinical management of
those affected by PKD generally focuses on the monitoring, prevention and
treatment of renal failure rather than the inheritance of PKD per se. Cox and
Starzomski (2004) suggest that the hope and sense of control offered by the
availability of treatments for those affected by PKD contrasts sharply with the
fatalism associated with genetic explanations of the disease, and works to
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prevent its acceptance as a genetic condition. This irrelevance of the genetic
aetiology of PKD is further reflected in the lack of a disease specific support
group for PKD (Cox and Starzomski, 2004: 162). The families who took part
in Cox and Starzomski’s (2004) study, for example, instead participated in
groups that offered support to those affected by generic kidney disease such
as the US based ‘Kidney Foundation’. Thus, unlike the support groups
explored by Rapp et al. (2001), such as Little People of America (LPA),
where a strongly geneticized identity existed, those affected by PKD were not
a group self-defined by their genetic status. Indeed, it can be argued that those
diseases which appear most highly geneticized are amongst those for which
treatments are primarily palliative rather than curative, or are largely
ineffective, such as those offered for Tay-Sachs, Huntingdon’s Disease (HD)
and Duchenne Muscular Dystrophy (DMD). The degree to which genetic
information is accepted and used by those experiencing different conditions
therefore varies according to the status of the disease and whether effective
treatments or cures are available.
Meiser and Dunn (2000) have further noted that a sense of fatalism, a
factor that Cox and Starzomski (2004) suggest accompanies geneticization,
can also compel those at risk for non-treatable progressive conditions such as
HD to avoid pre-symptomatic testing and information, on account of the
distress such genetic information could generate (Meiser and Dunn, 2000;
Wright, 1996; Madigan, 1996). The possibilities for psychological distress
and ‘ethical problematisations’ (Novas and Rose, 2000: 488) that emerge
from the application of genetic knowledge may thus also contribute to the
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lack of acceptance of the information. The health care providers in Cox and
Starzomski’s (2004) study, for example, reported reluctance in discussing the
genetic/hereditary aspects of PKD with their patients on account of the
potential they have to generate fear or distress, and indeed the association of
genetic conditions with shame, guilt and stigma has been widely documented
in the literature (Dragonas, 2001; Ettore, 2002; Chapple et al., 1995; Arribas-
Ayllon et al., 2008a; Hallowell et al., 2006; Markel,1992). These findings
highlight that the degree to which genetic information about a condition is
accepted is highly contingent; the availability of effective treatments for the
given condition as well as the likely psychosocial impact of knowledge
genetic status are key factors which mitigate against the acceptance of genetic
explanations for a condition (Cox and Starzomski, 2004), but which, however,
may not indicate a direct subversion of geneticization. For conditions such as
HD, where acceptance of genetic testing is low, for example, there is still
widespread acceptance of the genetic aetiology of the condition, suggesting
that whilst personal genetic information may not be used, genetic explanations
still largely shape the way in which particular diseases are conceptualised. A
rejection of genetic information, therefore, does not necessarily imply a
resistance to the genetic status of the disease, nor the incomplete domination
of expert genetic knowledge, but rather points to the varying ways in which
this knowledge is responded to in the everyday reality of people’s lives.
Thus far, geneticization, or the prominence given to genetic
explanations for disease over and above others, has been presented as an
example of the significance attributed to expert knowledge in what Beck
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(1992) and Giddens (1990) refer to as the ‘risk society’. The implications this
expert knowledge has, in terms of the hopes and expectations it perpetuates
for the treatment of debilitating conditions, and the shifts it produces in terms
of identities, personhood and disease boundaries have all been presented in
order to contextualise my own research on SMA. Indeed, SMA is a condition
that has, over the past 50 years, come to be understood through this lens of
expert genetic knowledge. However, as both Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990)
have acknowledged, whilst expert knowledge may be given precedence in the
context of the risk society, this knowledge can nevertheless be resisted,
challenged or discounted in various ways, as acceptance of the infallibility of
such knowledge has decreased. The rejection of genetic information on
account of the emotional consequences or ‘ethical problematisations’ (Novas
and Rose, 2000) that it suggests for those who encounter it, as well as its
relationship to treatment options have all been suggested as factors which may
mitigate the dominance of such expert knowledge. One area of literature
where the relationship of lay people to expert knowledge has been extensively
explored is in the area of risk perception. As risks are both produced by, and
managed through, expert knowledge in the risk society, the way in which
risks are conceptualised and responded to by individuals is an arena in which
the contested status of expert knowledge may be played out.
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Expert Knowledge and Risk Perception
A body of literature has emerged documenting, and accounting for, the
reactions of individuals to expert knowledge and their conceptualisations of
this knowledge, in the context of risk across a variety of disciplines (Slovic,
2000). Health risks, in particular have received much attention; as Lupton
(2006) and Flynn (2006) have highlighted, health risks are frequently the
subject of media and public concern, and the way in which they are
conceptualised by individuals is of particular interest to the medical
profession in order to account for adherence (or otherwise) to health
promotion strategies and treatments.
Within the psychological and scientific literature, perceptions of, and
responses to, genetic risk have received considerable attention with a view to
documenting the disparities between lay and professional accounts of genetic
risk and uncovering how and why lay people understand and reproduce
genetic risk statistics (Evers-Kiebooms, 1992; Edwards et al., 2002; Evers-
Kiebooms and Van den Berghe, 1979). Studies within this field have also
sought to document the factors which influence decision making and
subsequent behaviours in the context of genetic risk, in particular, to account
for the uptake or avoidance of health services and information (Shiloh, 1996;
Wertz et al., 1992; Vleck, 1987). Such studies have taken as a starting point a
definition of risk which situates it as a pre-determined objective fact; risks are
‘real’ in the sense that they exist independently of our interpretation of them,
and expert knowledge is viewed as a resource which may be used to
circumvent and manage such risks. Studies utilising this approach to an
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analysis of risk have pointed to a variety of factors which affect the way in
which genetic information is retained and used by the lay population
(Hallowell and Richards, 1997); these factors include reproductive intentions
(Ekwo et al., 1985), the timing and presentation of the genetic risk
information (Sorenson et al., 1979), familiarity with genetic disease as well as
subjective interpretations of risk (Pearn, 1973).
One of the critiques of this approach to analysing genetic risk,
however, is its focus on assessing the way in which lay people produce
‘faulty’ accounts of expert knowledge. As Polzer et al. (2002) have argued,
this approach can be seen as pathologising the choices lay people make about
the risks which confront them and privileging the knowledge claims of
experts in defining and managing risks. Social theories of risk, rather than
defining risks as pre-existing phenomena to be communicated to lay
populations by those with expert knowledge, have instead sought to
demonstrate the way which risks are collectively constructed and experienced
within a broader socio-cultural context. Instead of examining the ‘faulty’
nature of lay accounts of risk, those empirical studies that have taken up Beck
(1992) and Giddens’ (1990) approach to risk instead seek to demonstrate the
way in which lay people make judgements about the trustworthiness of
professional knowledge in the context of other competing knowledge claims,
for example knowledge derived from their own everyday lives (e.g. Wynne,
1989; William and Popay, 1994). Studies of risk perception utilising this
approach have therefore moved beyond an analysis of the match between lay
and professional accounts of risk, to explore the way in which individuals
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make sense of risk through recourse to different bodies of knowledge.
However, whilst Beck (1995) and Giddens’ (1990) approach to an analysis of
risk and its relationship to expert knowledge has highlighted the way in which
risks are, at least in part, socially constructed, it has nevertheless been argued
that such macro theories of risk and risk perception overlook important
aspects of the way in which risk is experienced by individuals and groups, and
further, how widely accepted definitions and understandings of risk may even
be rejected or reconstructed (Wynne, 1996).
Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) made reference to ‘reflexive
practices’ to document the way in which individuals reflexively evaluate
which interpretations of risk they will accept. An interpretive approach to an
analysis of risk perceptions, however, moves beyond these strategies to
account for the various ways in which individuals actively and reflexively
construct and respond to risk in relation to their situated knowledge and
circumstances. Expert knowledge is evaluated by social actors, not in a
vacuum, but instead in the context of their own complex biographies, life
experiences, relationships and sense of embodiment, and it is by reference to
these cumulative stocks of knowledge that professional definitions of risk are
processed, and responded to. Experiential knowledge is thus key to this
interpretative approach to an analysis of risk perceptions.
Experiential Knowledge
The term ‘experiential knowledge’ has been used by various authors to
account for the ‘experiential and particularistic’ (Abel and Browner, 1998:
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310) forms of knowledge which inform perceptions of risk and relationships
to expert knowledge in a variety of contexts (Etchegary et al., 2008;
D’Agincourt-Canning, 2005; Lippman, 1999). More recently, its role in
informing decision making in prenatal care, testing and screening decisions
has been explored (Etchegary et al., 2008; Lippman, 1999; Abel and Browner,
1998). Experience with a condition, furthermore, has been suggested as a
factor in shaping how people arrive at genetic testing decisions and
conceptualise genetic risk in relation to cancer (Hallowell, 2006; Werner-Lin,
2007; Kenen et al., 2003; Babb et al., 2002; D’Agincourt-Canning, 2005;
Burgess and D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001), Huntingdon’s Disease (Downing,
2005; Cox, 2003; Burgess and D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001; Cox and
McKellin, 1999), X-linked conditions (Parsons and Atkinson, 1992; Kay and
Kingston, 2002) and CF (Wertz et al., 1992; Evers-Kiebooms et al., 1988),
demonstrating the relevance, and uses of, experiential bodies of knowledge
across a wide range of conditions in the evaluation of expert knowledge.
The term ‘experiential knowledge’ has been used differently by
researchers. Caron-Finterman et al. (2005) who have used the concept do not
substantively distinguish it from ‘lay knowledge’, a form of knowledge
already much researched within medical sociology (Wynne, 1996; Popay,
1996). Indeed, Caron-Finterman et al. (2005) simply use the term
‘experiential knowledge’ as a means by which to rebuff any suggestions of
inferiority imbued in the term ‘lay knowledge’, which is defined primarily
through its relationship to medical or scientific knowledge. Borkman (1976;
1990), however, suggests that experiential knowledge has two defining
40
characteristics: firstly, it is knowledge based upon the experiences of an
individual, and secondly it is highly valued by the individual and deemed to
be ‘authentic’, as it has been acquired through this individual’s direct
interaction with the physical, social and intellectual world. In addition to these
defining characteristics, Borkman (1976) also emphasises the pragmatic uses
of experiential knowledge: it is translated into strategies and methods for
living with a particular problem, which is then pooled with the experiences of
others, typically in the context of a self-help organisation (Borkman, 1976:
450).
More recent research, however, has moved away from a definition
of experiential knowledge as a template for action, instead emphasising its
contextual, subjective and emotional properties, as well as the different forms
of experiential knowledge which exist. When defining experiential
knowledge, Abel and Browner (1998) differentiate between two distinct types
of knowledge: embodied knowledge and empathetic knowledge. Embodied
knowledge refers to personal perceptions of bodily experiences and
sensations (e.g. pregnancy), whereas empathetic knowledge is derived from
close association with others living through a particular experience (e.g. care-
giving). Thus, ‘one derives from direct sensory experience, the other from
close emotional ties between individuals’ (Abel and Browner, 1998: 315).
Abel and Browner’s (1998) definition of experiential knowledge differs from
that of Borkman (1976) in that they conceptualise such knowledge as a
process rather than strategy, and one that is in an endless state of flux;
continually accumulated and subject to revision across different social
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contexts. Whilst Borkman’s (1976) definition furthermore sets out
experiential knowledge as an abstract end product or ‘personal insight’, which
is of strategic use to people living with long term health conditions, Abel and
Browner’s (1998) definition incorporates those aspects of experience which
may not have been subject to rational thought and processed into a
prescription for action. Rather, experiential knowledge, according to this
definition, includes unconscious awareness of bodily experiences, or even
experiences acquired indirectly, for example, through the body and
subjectivity of another person. D’Agincourt-Canning (2003), taking up this
distinction of experiential knowledge set out by Abel and Browner (1998),
has used it to separate the experiences of those family members who live
alongside a relative who has cancer, from those who have cancer themselves.
Whilst D’Agincourt-Canning (2003) recognises the possibilities of these two
forms of knowledge becoming ‘intertwined’ as individuals may experience
caring for a relative with cancer whilst simultaneously having the condition
themselves, this distinction is nevertheless used to mark out two different
ways in which people come to know cancer, which, she suggests, should be
regarded as equal in status. Indeed, whilst it might be assumed that those
diagnosed with cancer themselves are ‘closest’ to the experience of cancer,
D’Agincourt-Canning (2003) is keen to emphasise that empathetic knowledge
can be just as ‘poignant’ or ‘real’ as embodied knowledge of cancer (p. 151).
In their respective analyses, both Etchegary et al. (2008) and
D’Agincourt-Canning (2003) have further expanded on this primary
distinction of experiential knowledge, developing sub-categories of
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experiential knowledge within ‘embodied’ and ‘empathetic’ knowledge.
Etchegary et al. (2008), for example, have employed a quasi-visual metaphor
to explore ‘vivid’ (personal), and ‘vague’ (more distant) forms of empathetic
knowledge that pregnant women mobilise in their decisions about the uses (or
otherwise) of prenatal screening and testing technologies. ‘Vivid’ forms of
empathetic knowledge include having experience of caring for a child who
has the disability which is being tested for, whereas ‘vague’ knowledge could
refer to knowledge about the condition or the screening process gleaned from
the media or the stories of more distant acquaintances (Etchegary et al.,
2008).
For D’Agincourt-Canning (2003), ‘empathetic knowledge’ could be
further sub-categorised into what she refers to as ‘tangible knowing’ (or the
knowledge derived from physically living with someone affected by cancer),
but also ‘recent’ and ‘accidental’ knowing, which account for the more
distant ways in which people come to know about cancer in their family, e.g.
through stories about unknown relatives. The concepts of ‘distance’ and
‘closeness’ in empathetic knowledge, moreover, have been outlined in the
work of Kay and Kingston (2002) in their exploration of the reproductive
decision making of female carriers of X-linked conditions. Through
conducting interviews with women who had ‘close’ relatives (e.g. first degree
relatives) with an X-linked condition and comparing the accounts of their
reproductive decisions with women who had more ‘distant’ relatives affected
by an X-linked condition (e.g. cousins, uncles), they suggest that proximity to
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the experience of disability may be associated with higher levels of guilt and
anxiety around reproductive decision making.
The different forms of experiential knowledge identified by various
writers, determined in part by ‘closeness’ and ‘distance’ from a particular
phenomenon, suggest that, in a similar way to expert knowledge, experiential
knowledge may be subjectively appraised and accepted to varying degrees
according to its perceived authenticity. The studies that have used the concept
have asserted that experiential knowledge is an important resource through
which expert knowledge is assessed and framed as well as challenged or
resisted. However, the privileging of experiential knowledge as an alternative
to, or site of negotiation, of expert knowledge, has also been critiqued. In the
first instance, Abel and Browner (1998) have argued that a focus on everyday
stocks of knowledge as an alternative to, or challenge to, expert biomedical
knowledge, can be seen as romanticising the uses of experiential knowledge.
Indeed, by emphasising the legitimacy of experiential knowledge as an
alternative to expert knowledge, as Prior (2003) has argued, there is a danger
of overstating its value. Through an analysis of the emergence of the ‘lay
expert’ in relation to medical knowledge, Prior (2003) has argued that
knowledge based on an individual’s experience of a given condition is
necessarily limited and idiosyncratic; restricted to the specifics of that
person’s situation, and can simply be ‘plain wrong about the causes, course
and management of common forms of disease and illness’ (Prior, 2003: 45) .
Whilst we may refer to experiential and lay knowledge as separate from
expert knowledge, moreover, the two forms of knowledge may not
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necessarily be clearly distinguishable (Markens et al., 2010). Through their
study of pregnant women’s decision making processes around prenatal testing
for conditions that are routinely screened for such as Down’s Syndrome (DS),
Markens et al. (2010) have argued that a refusal of testing does not
necessarily imply a rejection of expert biomedical knowledge and an
acceptance of experiential knowledge, as many studies have suggested. Whilst
some women in their study cited an embodied sense of their pregnancy being
fine or ‘safe’ as a justification for by-passing testing, Markens et al. (2010)
have argued that these women’s very conceptualisations of a ‘safe’ pregnancy
were imbued with expert medical knowledge about the nature of pregnancy.
Experiential knowledge may thus be a means of appraising medical
knowledge even as this expert knowledge frames and contributes to it in a
‘synergistic’ process, suggesting that it may never be possible to fully
disentangle experiential and expert forms of knowledge in a meaningful way
(Markens et al., 2010).
Issues around the status of different sorts of knowledge have further
been debated extensively within the feminist epistemological literature
(Hartstock, 1983; Hekman, 1997; Ramanzanoglu and Holland, 1999; Code,
1991). In particular, for feminist standpoint theorists, the epistemological
basis for, and status of, experiential knowledge, has political implications.
Experiential knowledge, within the feminist literature, has been strongly
correlated with women’s ways of knowing and being in the world, in contrast
with the ‘abstract and universalistic’ masculine ways of knowing associated
with expert knowledge (Abel and Browner, 1998: 310; Code, 1991). The
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status accorded to this knowledge is thus of political significance for feminist
writers. Feminist standpoint theorists, following the work of Hartstock in the
early 1980s, have argued that women, through their subjugated position in
society, can offer unique insights into the experiences of oppression
inaccessible to those not in this position as they offer a ‘true’ account of the
internal workings of patriarchy. Consequently, the accounts of women should
be prioritised in feminist research as authentic and valuable (Hartstock,
1983).
Whilst feminist standpoint theory has been criticised both from within
and without feminism on the basis of the privilege it attributes to certain
perspectives over others instead of acknowledging knowledge from different
standpoints as simply different (Haraway, 1988; Tuana, 1993), the value and
status of women’s experiential knowledge, particularly in the negotiation of
expert knowledge and risk, has political implications. These implications are
presented below in relation to feminist debates around prenatal testing and
screening.
The Politics of Experiential Knowledge
Feminism and Experiential Knowledge
As Beck (1992) and Giddens (1990) have argued, a defining feature of the
risk society is the prominence of technology and expert knowledge, which
have both created, but also provided us with the means by which to manage
risk in various ways. In terms of reproduction, the development of maternal
serum screening and ultrasound screening technologies amongst others, have
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now become a routine part of prenatal care in modern western societies
(Bankier and Cram, 2008). In line with these developments, new groups of
women have come to be considered ‘at risk’ of having babies affected by
particular conditions; women over the age of 35, those with a family history
of an inheritable condition and those who have a positive (i.e. abnormal)
screening result are now all considered ‘at risk’ of having a child with a
condition or disability. Such women are thus encouraged to obtain, and make
use of, expert advice and technologies to manage this risk, primarily through
means of prenatal testing and selective termination.
For feminist writers, this move towards technological and expert
intervention in child bearing has been responded to in different ways. Whilst
some have argued that the availability of technology and expert knowledge
extends the reproductive control and freedom of women, particularly in a
context in which the responsibility for raising a disabled child falls primarily
to women (Sharp and Earle, 2002; Brookes, 2001; Wertz and Fletcher, 1996),
for others, the dominance of expert knowledge over, and intervention in,
pregnancy has been viewed as a site of disempowerment for women.
Much of the feminist literature offering a critical evaluation of
reproductive technologies, particularly as their use became more widespread
from the 1970s onwards, has focused attention on the way in which the
gradual encroachment of technological medical interventions into the sphere
of reproduction has altered the way in which power and control over
pregnancy are negotiated (Squier, 1994; Rowland, 1984). In particular,
feminist writers have called into question the rhetoric of ‘choice’ which often
47
surrounds prenatal testing (Lippman, 1993), by highlighting the various ways
in which the use of reproductive technologies, and compliance with expert
medical knowledge, may be experienced as an obligation for pregnant
women, rather than a choice. Indeed, feminist writers have argued that in a
society in which women have historically been held primarily accountable for
pregnancy outcomes and conceptually positioned as the ‘gene transmitters’
(Steinberg, 1996: 267; Dragonas, 2001; Rapp, 1999), the argument that
prenatal testing is a free ‘choice’ is difficult to sustain. Responsible behaviour
in pregnancy is primarily defined by the submission of pregnant women to
medical surveillance, together with adherence to dietary and other restrictions
(Ivry, 2007; Charo and Rothenberg, 1994), and for writers such as Rapp
(1999) and Lippman (1991), it is in this context that prenatal testing comes to
be experienced as an obligation (Franklin and Ragone, 1997; Farrant, 1985;
Bailey, 1996). The ‘technological imperative’ of prenatal testing, created by
virtue of its existence and availability, together with its offer by experts who
may be considered to possess authoritative knowledge (Markens et al., 2010),
may impose on women a ‘burden of not doing enough’ (Lippman, 1991: 28)
to ensure the wellbeing of their pregnancy, as Clarke (1993) notes:
…an offer of prenatal diagnosis implies a
recommendation to accept that offer, which in turn
entails a recommendation to terminate a pregnancy if it
is found to show any abnormality.
(Clarke, 1993: 1000)
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Indeed, despite aspirations of non-directive counselling, there is evidence that
the attitudes of health care professionals themselves may further reduce the
choices of women being offered prenatal testing (McLaughlin, 2003; Marteau
et al., 1994). Brookes’ (2001) research discovered, for example, that whilst
obstetricians aimed to be non-directive in their recommendations, many held
firm beliefs that women should only have an amniocentesis test (see
Appendix V for a description of amniocentesis) if they intended to terminate
in the event of a ‘positive’ (i.e. abnormal) diagnosis, a belief that was
communicated in subtle ways to participants in her study.
Abel and Browner (1998), in their study of women’s experiences of
pregnancy, have argued that this dominance of medical knowledge and
technology, and the framework it provides for women through which to
interpret their experience of pregnancy, directly contributes to the shape and
nature of that experience (Squier, 1994; Corea, 1985; Katz Rothman, 1986;
Arditti et al., 1984). Women adapt to the testing schedule of doctors, and
moreover, come to distrust their own experiences of their bodies, in favour of
medicalised reassurances (Lippman, 1991, 1999; Abel and Browner, 1998).
For Katz Rothman (1986; 1985; 1984), this process fundamentally alters the
way in which women experience their pregnancies, as they are encouraged to
orient themselves around medical readings of their bodies, and thus may
relate to their pregnancies only as ‘tentative’, and suppress their embodied
experiences of the pregnancy, until medical validation of the quality and
safety of their foetus is secured.
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For some feminist writers, therefore, the encroachment of medical
technologies and expert medical surveillance into the sphere of reproduction
is regarded as having particularly negative consequences for the autonomy
and reproductive freedoms of women. The reproductive choices available to
women are seen as being constrained by the perceived obligation to undergo
various forms of testing and intervention to manage reproductive risk, which
can, in turn, have negative health implications for women, and have been
regarded by some feminist writers as contributing to a relegation of women’s
bodies to the role of ‘foetal containers’ (Squier, 1996; Jordanova, 1985;
Petchesky, 1987; Martin, 1989, 1998).
It is within this context that women’s experiential knowledge of their
bodies and their pregnancies has political value, and an assertion of women’s
rights to define such experiences on their own terms rather than through the
lens of expert medical knowledge can be been regarded as a political project.
Studies such as that by Markens et al. (2010), Abel and Browner (1998),
Dragonas (2001) Lippman (1999) and Etchegary et al. (2008) have paid
particular attention to experiential accounts of pregnancy, and more
specifically, the way in which knowledge accumulated from women’s
everyday stocks of knowledge, and more specifically, embodied experiences
of their own pregnancies, and those of other women, are used to inform
prenatal testing decisions. Typically, as Markens et al. (2010) have argued,
studies have emphasised the way in which such experiential knowledge has
become an alternative source of knowledge to biomedical knowledge, and a
means of resisting authoritative expert knowledge of pregnancy. Through
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trusting their own interpretations of their bodies and the experiences of those
around them, reliance on experiential knowledge has come to be interpreted
as a form of resistance to biomedicine’s domination of pregnancy and an
assertion of women’s autonomy. Whilst, as has been stated previously,
concerns have been raised within the feminist epistemological literature as to
whether feminist writers should be concerned with which forms of knowledge
are more ‘accurate’ than others, Hartstock (1997) has argued that there
nevertheless may be ethical, social or political justifications for the privileging
of particular vantage points over others, in certain contexts (Hartstock, 1997).
By this, Hartstock (1997) had in mind the possibility of setting aside such
objections to standpoint epistemology if it is possible that more equal social
relations could be envisaged. As the encroachment of medical expert
knowledge and technologies in reproduction may have particularly negative
consequences for women, it is within the feminist literature that experiential
knowledge, as a means to contest and challenge expert authority, has political
dimensions. Whilst Beck (1992) has acknowledged within his theorising on
the risk society that not all social groups experience risk equally, or have the
same access to resources by which to manage risk, the gendered consequences
of the elevation of expert knowledge and technological dominance within the
sphere of reproduction highlights the ways in which the everyday realities of
life within the ‘risk society’ may reproduce traditional ideas about gender.
However, feminist writers have drawn attention to the way in which the
intersection of risk with the sphere of reproduction has created an arena in
which negotiation of these concepts may simultaneously take place.
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Disability Rights and Experiential Knowledge
Feminist writers, however, are not the only group concerned with the way in
which ideas of risk have entered the sphere of reproduction. Disability rights
supporters have also raised concerns about the implications of the
introduction and routinisation of prenatal testing and screening practices for
the lives of disabled people. In particular, they have highlighted the
problematic context in which this testing occurs by pointing to the
(predominantly negative) way in which the lives of disabled people are valued
and represented in wider society (Parens and Asch, 2000). The ever-
increasing number of conditions and impairments that are being tested for,
and thus the expanding number of pregnant women deemed to be ‘at risk’ of
having a child with an impairment, moreover, has meant that medical
professionals are frequently being called upon as a source of expert
knowledge. This knowledge concerns not only medically defined risks to
future offspring, but also the nature and severity of the condition in question,
in order to support prospective parents’ informed decision making. The
responses of disability rights supporters to this situation have coalesced
around two central concerns: firstly, whether the practices surrounding
prenatal testing and selective termination can be understood as ‘eugenic’, and
secondly, whether prenatal testing communicates a negative valuation of what
it means to be a disabled person. The experiential knowledge of disabled
people has been validated by some disability rights supporters as a
particularly valuable political tool within the context of these debates
(Fletcher, 2002) as it is this source of knowledge which poses the most
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fundamental challenge to the perceived restrictive medical model
representations of disability which are deemed to be perpetuated by expert
medical knowledge. Indeed, a resistance to such ‘medical model’ thinking
about disability has formed the backbone of much of the theorising of
disability rights supporters and writers as well as the grassroots political
activity of the disability rights movement, in the form of the ‘social model of
disability’, which is presented below.
Within the disability rights literature, there is a strong division
between what has been termed ‘social model’ thinking about disability, and
‘medical model’ thinking (Oliver, 1990). Whilst writers such as Shakespeare
(2008a) have suggested that these binary divisions may be overly simplistic as
there is more overlap between the two models of disability than the terms
imply (and indeed, many internal contradictions within the models
themselves), these two models of disability nevertheless remain largely
distinct in much of the literature on disability, and at the very least serve a
symbolic or heuristic function to differentiate between two polarised
conceptions of disability. On the one hand, supporters of the medical model of
disability (which is regarded as the traditional and dominant model of
disability, and one espoused and supported by expert medical knowledge)
define disability as the malfunctioning of an individual’s body and deviation
from perceived normal functioning. Oliver (1996a) has aligned the medical
model of disability with a narrow and inherently negative interpretation of
disability; disability is perceived as a ‘tragedy’ that has befallen a person, and
an experience which is largely negative. In line with this reasoning, supporters
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of this approach to disability have viewed medical interventions as the most
appropriate means by which to manage disability, more specifically, curative
and therapeutic medicine (Oliver, 1990; Shakespeare, 1996). Social
conceptions of disability, however, emerging out of grassroots disability
activism during the 1970s and theoretically articulated through the work of
Mike Oliver (1990), transformed many of the medical model notions of
disability, instead defining disability as the social product of a society which
fails to meet the needs and rights of disabled people. Disability came to be
viewed as a social product that occurs when inaccessible environments and
prejudicial social attitudes prevent disabled people from full participation in
society. Through a separation of the ‘impaired body’ from the socially created
‘disability’, social model of disability theorists asserted that disability, and not
impairment, is inherently problematic and should be remedied through social
transformation (Shakespeare, 2006). For many people with disabilities, this
move of the locus of the problem of disability from the impaired body onto
society was experienced as liberating, as the onus was shifted from disabled
people onto society to remove experiences of disablement (Morris, 1991).
The sharp contrast between social and medical models of disability,
however, has contributed to the suspicion and hostility that many staunch
supporters of the social model of disability feel towards medical approaches
to disability (Shakespeare, 2008). Expert medical knowledge is deemed to
belong to an oppressive and outdated conceptualisation of disability, which
should be resisted and challenged in order to envision a society free of
disablism. The responses of some disability rights supporters to the
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introduction of prenatal testing and screening technologies which detect
particular types of disability have thus mirrored this broader distrust of
medicalised approaches to disability. Rock (1996) for example, has argued
that such practices can be understood as a form of modern eugenics (p. 121),
designed with the goal of eliminating disabled people as a social group. As
the impaired body is deemed to be the problem, as opposed to social
conditions, the removal of disabled people through screening and testing has
opened what Duster (1990) has referred to as a ‘back door’ to eugenics,
whereby the gradual elimination of people with specific impairments is being
normalised through technological interventions.
Objections to prenatal testing and screening on the basis of their
eugenic origins are not arguments, however, widely accepted by disability
rights supporters. Writers such as Shakespeare (2008a) for example, have
favoured a more graduated interpretation, suggesting that eugenic outcomes
may be an ‘emergent’ or unintended consequence of screening practices,
rather than regarding them as part of a straightforward ‘hunt and destroy’
mission of modern medicine (Shakespeare, 2006: 88; Sparrow, 2008;). The
arguments put forward by Shakespeare (2006, 2008a) and Sparrow (2008)
highlight that the issues surrounding screening and testing practices are
complex, and there are suggestions within the literature that these practices
are responded to very differently by different groups of disabled people (e.g.
Gow, 2000; Guillemin and Gilman, 2006; Asch, 1999, 2000). Indeed, there
has been extensive debate within the disability rights literature as to the
meaning and consequences prenatal testing and selective termination have for
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disabled people (Parens and Asch, 2000). The term the ‘expressivist
objection’ (Asch, 1999, 2000) for example, has been developed to refer to the
objection some disabled people hold to the negative valuation of disability
deemed to be communicated by prenatal screening, testing and selective
termination (Asch, 2000). By focusing on disability as the singularly most
important characteristic of an unborn foetus, Asch (2000) has argued, and to
make judgements about the potential quality of the child’s life based solely on
this characteristic is to reaffirm medical approaches to disability. Within such
medical approaches, disability is considered to be a wholly negative trait,
leading to lives governed by ‘pain, burden and personal tragedy’
(McLaughlin, 2003: 300; Hubbard, 1996; Morris, 1991; Wendell, 1996;
Kaplan, 1993). For Asch (2000) moreover, prenatal testing practices attribute
not only a negative valuation of the particular foetus being tested, but of all
disabled people, as it communicates the idea that it would have been
preferable had they not been born at all. For Asch (1999), such an evaluation
of disability is based on ignorance and overlooks the predominately positive
experiences of childhood disability that are reported in the literature (e.g.
Ferguson et al., 2000).
The expressivist objection to prenatal testing, however, has been
critiqued both from within the disability rights movement and without
(Sparrow, 2008; Shakespeare, 2008; Edwards, 2004). In particular, as
Shakespeare (2008a) has argued, a distinction should be drawn between
overtly prejudicial or ignorant attitudes towards disability and the, often
constrained, social contexts in which prospective parents make decisions
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about having a disabled child. Indeed, he argues, it is feasible that an
individual may positively value the lives of disabled people whilst
simultaneously acknowledging that they do not have the personal and/or
financial resources required to adequately care for a disabled child who may
remain permanently dependent on them (Shakespeare, 2008:97). Sparrow
(2008), furthermore, has suggested that the arguments championed by
supporters of the expressivist objection focus too narrowly on the decisions
and decision-outcomes of would-be parents facing prenatal testing, as
opposed to the policies from which these decisions emerge. Rather than
framing the critique of prenatal testing in terms of the relationship of
prospective parents to their future children, Sparrow (2008) proposes a shift in
critique to the relationship between disabled people and the (largely) non-
disabled people who make decisions about research findings and testing
policies; in short, he has argued that the debate about prenatal testing and
disability rights should be recast as a critique of relations between social
groups rather than an issue arising in and through the relationship between
prospective parent and child (Sparrow, 2008).
In spite of these critiques of the expressivist objection to prenatal
testing and selective termination, however, there is evidence that this response
to the practices can nevertheless cause particular emotional, ethical and social
dilemmas for disabled people in various forms (e.g. Gow, 2000; Kent, 2000;
Saxton, 1984; Atkinson, 2008; Bowler, 2006). Whilst theoretical
inconsistencies within the expressivist objection to prenatal testing argument
have been highlighted by different authors, the accounts of disabled people
57
who have encountered prenatal testing in different ways within their own
lives, suggest that emotional responses to it are rarely formed through the lens
of theoretical abstraction, but are rather grounded in everyday experience and
subjective interpretation (Kent, 2000; Saxton, 1984; Atkinson, 2008; Bowler,
2006).
The political concerns raised by disability rights supporters around
prenatal testing, including expressivist and eugenicist objections, have given
leverage to the calls by some disability rights supporters for the greater
inclusion of the perspectives of disabled people in the practices surrounding
testing and counselling (Fletcher, 2002; Asch, 1999; Alta Charo and
Rothenberg, 1998; Saxton, 1999). Given that the value of life with disability
is one of the factors prospective parents are encouraged to assess when
making decisions about the uses of prenatal testing and selective termination,
disabled people, it is argued, are in a unique position to contribute their
experiential knowledge of life with that disability, to counter-pose or
supplement medical expert knowledge (Shakespeare, 1998: 673). Indeed,
Williams et al. (2002) have argued that there has been a tendency within the
medical profession to focus primarily on the medical complications
associated with particular disabilities, rather than other aspects of life with the
condition when presenting information to prospective parents. Similarly,
Kelly (2009: 82) and Asch (1999) note, there has been little crossover of the
literature on prenatal testing and the growing literature which challenges
many of the commonly held assumptions about the experiences of disability
within families (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2000; Ali et al., 2001). Whilst there have
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been some moves to incorporate experiential accounts of life with disability
into the information provided during prenatal testing and screening through
website resources such as www.antenataltesting.info (a web resource set up
so that prospective parents may access interviews with, and accompanying
photographs of people living with the conditions for which prenatal testing is
currently available in the UK), there remains little evidence that these
accounts are being included in medical advice and information, and medical
models of disability continue to dominate prenatal testing consultations
(Williams et al., 2002).
Whilst the validation of experiential knowledge as an alternative
source of knowledge has political significance for disability rights supporters
in a society in which expert professional knowledge dominates, however, the
status of experiential knowledge within the broader political project of the
social model of disability has been contested. Indeed, as Paterson and Hughes
(1991) Morris (1991) and Crow (1996) note, social model of disability
theorists have traditionally excluded from their analysis experiential aspects
of impairment (i.e. what it feels like to live in an impaired body) in favour of
an analysis of the social and economic constitution of disability. To
acknowledge impairment effects, such as pain and fatigue, it has been
suggested, is to risk confirming medicalised conceptions of disability; that the
problem of disability had been impairment all along, rather than inaccessible
social and physical environments. Oliver (1996a) has tentatively suggested
the development of a ‘sociology of impairment’ as an arena in which to
interrogate these experiential aspects of impairment, including pain,
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discomfort and malaise whilst retaining a critical distance from the medical
model of disability which has traditionally been concerned with them (Oliver,
1996a: 49). Paterson and Hughes (1999), taking up this work, have attempted
a politicization of the experiential aspects of disability by developing a
sociology of impairment through a phenomenological lens, demonstrating
that oppression is not only located in the fabric of society, but also in the
‘flesh and bones’ of disabled people; oppression is an embodied experience
(Hughes and Paterson, 1999: 606).
Whilst the value of experiential knowledge as a means by which to
challenge dominant forms of knowledge has thus been a highly contested
topic within disability politics, and to a higher degree than within the feminist
literature presented previously, over the past two decades, there has been an
increased acceptance of the political significance of such knowledge (Morris,
1991; Paterson and Hughes, 1999). Indeed, the disability rights response to
prenatal testing is a key example of an arena in which such knowledge has
political significance, and, despite its exclusion from mainstream social
model theorising, has been suggested as a means by which to challenge the
same medical model conceptions of disability that social model theorists seek
to overturn.
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Conclusions
In conclusion, I have set out within this chapter some of the bodies of
literature that surround and inform this study, in order to contextualise and
locate my own research. I have presented Beck (1992) and Giddens’ (1990)
theorising around the development of a ‘risk society’, which has suggested
that we now live in a society in which the management of risk has become
imperative. The combined processes of globalisation, industrialisation and
increased use of technologies have not only brought risk into our everyday
awareness, but the technologies themselves have also been suggested as a
means by which to manage these risks, in conjunction with specialised expert
knowledge. The increased importance attributed to genetic codes in
explaining a broad range of behaviours, traits and impairments may be
regarded as a key example of the way in which such expert knowledge, in this
instance, genetic knowledge, and associated technologies, has come to
dominate the way in which we account for a plethora of states and conditions,
particularly those which are deemed to be problematic by society. Lippman
(1991) has coined the term ‘geneticization’ to refer to this domination of
expert knowledge, which has impacted not only on the way in which diseases
are defined and responded to, but has also given rise to new forms of
personhood and ‘genetic responsibility’, as we are called upon to manage
genetic risks to our person as well as those to our (future) kin (Novas and
Rose, 2002; Kenen, 1994). Whilst new responsibilities and ways of
understanding, and responding to, health states have been suggested by the
domination of genetic knowledge, however, this is not to say that such expert
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knowledge has not been contested. Indeed, Giddens (1990) has argued that in
the context of reflexive modernity, individuals are in a position not only to
think reflexively about the forms of knowledge they accept, and those they do
not, but also to critically evaluate different knowledge claims. Whilst expert
knowledge claims may dominate the way in which particular phenomena are
defined and approached, risk society theorists have also highlighted that this
knowledge is not infallible, and may be open to challenge and contestation
from different sources.
Experiential knowledge, or knowledge derived from the everyday
stocks of knowledge, subjective interpretations and meanings accumulated by
individuals through their daily realities has been highlighted in the literature
as one site in which expert knowledge has been challenged and even
subverted (Wynne, 1996; Abel and Browner, 1998). Using an interpretive
perspective, which has been acknowledged as providing the theoretical
structure by which to interrogate subjective experiential accounts, a broad
range of literature has emerged, particularly within medical sociology,
wherein the possibilities for experiential accounts of health and illness to
provide a critique of medical knowledge has been emphasised, and lay
accounts validated as an alternative source of knowledge (Gabe, 1995).
Reproductive decision making, particularly in the context of medically
defined genetic risk, is an arena in which many of these contestations and
negotiations between expert and experiential knowledge take place. Indeed,
the feminist literature has highlighted the way in which the domination of
expert medical knowledge can have a negative impact on the way in which
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women experience and relate to their pregnancies (Katz Rothman, 1986;
Lippman, 1993), and that in this context, experiential stocks of knowledge
may be called upon by which to process, challenge or subvert such
knowledge (Etchegary et al., 2008; Abel and Browner, 1998; Lippman, 1999;
Markens et al., 2010). Similarly, experiential accounts of disability have been
posited by disability rights supporters as offering an alternative reading of
disability within the context of reproductive decision making and genetic risk,
and a means by which to challenge medical model thinking about disability,
which currently dominates (Fletcher, 2002; Asch, 1999). There has, however,
been little crossover of the feminist and disability rights literature on prenatal
testing, and indeed, some have argued that there may be ‘irreconcilable
differences’ (Sharp and Earle, 2002) between these two perspectives, as a
woman’s rights to determine her reproductive future has been posited as
incompatible with disability rights supporters’ assertions that termination on
the grounds of disability represents a devaluing of that particular impairment,
and of disabled people as a whole.
The internal tensions, within, and contradictions between these two
perspectives, as well as the way in which they are negotiated alongside expert
genetic knowledge in the context of reproductive decision making will
provide the grounding and backdrop to my own research. By focusing on the
experiential knowledge of families affected by an inheritable condition, and
the way in which this knowledge conflicts, and intersects, with medical
knowledge, my study will explore some of the internal tensions highlighted
by feminist and disability rights supporters. As Kelly (2009) and Gow (2000)
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have argued, the experiential accounts of families and individuals living with
conditions which can now be prenatally tested and screened for, and the way
in which these accounts inform approaches to reproductive decision making,
have been relatively under-researched. Where such experiences have been
explored, there has been a tendency to focus on those conditions where there
is a traceable family ‘legacy’ or recurrence of the condition within the family,
such as cancer or HD, from which individuals accumulate their perceptions of
the condition and perceptions of risk (Hallowell, 2006; Werner-Lin, 2007;
Kenen et al., 2003; Babb et al., 2002; Kelly, 2009). Far less attention,
however, has been paid to the value of experiential knowledge in families
where there is not a long family history with a particular condition, such as
SMA, where most parents did not know they were carriers for SMA until they
had an affected child, and thus must negotiate the ‘epistemic shock’ (Kelly,
2009: 94) of having an (unanticipated) seriously impaired child, or
developing a serious condition themselves in adult life.
Where experiential knowledge has been the focus of studies on
reproductive decision making, the emphasis has furthermore either been
placed on those who have ‘empathetic’ experiential knowledge of the
condition or impairment being tested for (e.g. Etchegary et al., 2008; Parsons
and Atkinson, 1993; Kay and Kingston, 2002), or those who have been
diagnosed with it themselves (e.g. Gow, 2000). Very few studies have
explored the intersection between these perspectives (D’Agincourt-Canning,
2005), or the reproductive decision making of those who have an inheritable
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condition themselves (Gow, 2000), in order to explore the evaluation of
knowledge claims from different standpoints.
This study will therefore draw together these different strands of the
literature at the point at which experiential and expert knowledge, in their
various forms, intersect, conflict and challenge one another through use of the
example of reproductive decision making for families affected by an
inheritable condition, SMA.
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Chapter 2
The Research Methods
This chapter will outline the main aims of the study as well as detailing the
research process through its various stages, from the initial research design to
the practicalities of fieldwork, the analysis and finally, the reporting of the
data. Particular attention will be paid to the theoretical, practical and ethical
issues which arose during the course of the research and how these various
concerns were addressed and managed. Not only are the claims of research
important, but also the processes through which these knowledge claims are
acquired and interpreted (Altheide and Johnson, 1998). The chapter will
therefore also include a reflexive account of my own role as a researcher and
the way in which my identity, biography and values additionally informed the
development and direction of the research process, thus ‘writing myself’ into
the research process in an attempt to render these structuring influences
transparent (Seymour, 2001a).
Aims
The main aim of the study is to examine the influence and importance of
experiential knowledge of SMA in the reproductive decision making of those
from families affected by SMA. Through an analysis and comparison of
family members’ accounts of the impact of SMA on their lives, the study
considers the role of personal involvement with SMA as well as the level of
severity of the SMA in shaping experiential knowledge of the condition to
consider how this confirms or conflicts with medical knowledge of SMA.
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Such an analysis will be undertaken in order to trace the way in which
experiential knowledge affects family members’ interpretations of and
responses to the widely documented social and ethical dilemmas associated
with selective reproduction practices that are available to families affected by
inheritable conditions.
Research Questions
Whilst addressing the broad question of:
In what way does experiential knowledge of SMA inform conceptualisations
of genetic risk and reproductive decision making in families medically
defined as ‘at risk’ of transmitting SMA to future generations?
The study also examines the following secondary research questions:
1. What are the main concerns and challenges faced by families and
individuals affected by a diagnosis of SMA?
2. Is SMA perceived differently by those with a diagnosis of SMA, in
contrast to the perceptions of their family members?
3. How do families and individuals affected by SMA relate to medical
definitions of SMA?
4. To what extent are the concerns of disability rights activists about
prenatal testing and selective termination reflected in the views and
concerns of families affected by SMA?
5. How do families and individuals interpret the value of medical
knowledge vis-à-vis their experiential knowledge in reproductive
decision making?
6. How are notions of reproductive and relational responsibility
negotiated in the context of experiential and medical knowledge of
SMA in reproductive decision making?
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Methodological Considerations
I decided to adopt a qualitative approach to the research in order to capture, in
depth, the viewpoints of individuals living with SMA in terms meaningful to
them. Qualitative research has been recognised as being particularly well
suited to these ends in terms of allowing an analysis of detail and depth with
an emphasis on meaning and understanding (Bryman, 1988). As May (2001)
has pointed out, however, it is important to note that the approach taken to
research necessarily reflects underpinning epistemological and ontological
assumptions as to the nature of the reality of the phenomenon under study. As
the aim of the study was to capture the way in which SMA is experienced and
understood by those who live with it, a theoretical approach to research was
required that regards individuals as active agents who ‘construct the meaning
and significance of their realities’ (Jones, 2004: 257), rather than assuming
shared understandings. An interpretative approach, and one closely associated
with qualitative methodology, is particularly well suited to these ends. This
approach, following the theorising of Max Weber (1949) takes the subjective
constructions of reality espoused by social actors as the starting point for
research. Rather than exploring pre-determined theoretical constructs, those
working within this paradigm derive their understandings of the social world
directly from the everyday life worlds of individuals (Schutz, 1979).
‘Common-sense’ understandings of the social world are viewed as worthy of
analytic attention from an interpretive perspective as they are deemed to
reveal much about the way the social world is co-created in an inter-
subjective process between individuals, rather than existing as an objective
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and pre-determined phenomenon. Everyday understandings and
interpretations are thus deemed to constitute the social world, and an
interpretive perspective is thoroughly grounded in these subjectivities
(Garfinkel, 1967).
The use of an interpretive approach has implications for the choice of
methods, particularly for analysis. As social actors are deemed to actively and
creatively construct the social worlds around them, a grounded theory
approach to data collection and analysis is often employed (Charmaz, 2003a).
Based on the theorising of Glaser and Strauss (1967), a grounded theory
approach emphasises the emergent, constructed nature of reality, thus data
analysis strategies using this approach are inductive, allowing concepts to
arise out of the data themselves, and theoretical frameworks to be constructed
from them.
Whilst an inductive approach to data collection and analysis has been
critiqued for its atheoretical nature (Scambler, 1987), for an exploratory study
with an aim of understanding the way in which families affected by SMA
experience their lives and the meanings they attach to reproductive genetic
technologies, an approach which allowed such concepts to emerge from the
data rather than through the researcher’s preconceived ideas of what it means
to live with SMA was deemed most appropriate. Whilst Thomas and James
(2006) point out that it may never be entirely possible to ‘bracket off’ one’s
preconceived ideas about what the data contain, the adoption of a grounded
theory interpretive approach and a close analysis of the data enabled me to
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think reflexively about what I brought to the analysis as a researcher and to be
open to the challenging of these preconceptions.
Practical Considerations
SMA was chosen as a condition to study as it is the most common recessively
inherited condition in the UK after CF, and a condition for which carrier
testing, diagnostic testing, prenatal testing and PGD (Pre-Implantation
Genetic Diagnosis) is currently available. SMA, furthermore, has a wide
variety of presentations, which means that comparative analysis could be
undertaken, particularly of the different diagnostic subcategories of SMA
(types I-III). Unlike other common genetic conditions, such as CF and DMD,
however, SMA has been under-researched in the social science literature.
Indeed, I was only able to identify one previous qualitative study from the
field of rehabilitation medicine which specifically focuses on the experiences
of those living with SMA (Lamb and Peden, 2008). As Gow’s (2000)
attempts to contact women with CF were hampered by her discovery that
young people with CF had already been ‘much researched’ (Gow, 2000: 111),
I speculated that an absence of previous research might positively impact on
participants’ willingness to participate in the study.
Through preliminary research into the condition, together with prior
knowledge of SMA through having a close friend with the condition, I
identified the possible routes of sampling families and individuals affected by
SMA as being through dedicated neuromuscular clinics, or through the
national charity for SMA in the UK, the Jennifer Trust for SMA (JTSMA).
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However, after making some initial enquiries with the head of the Dubowitz
Neuromuscular Centre, London, (the largest neuromuscular clinic in the UK
with a specialist interest in SMA), I was advised that the clinics run for SMA
are primarily paediatric, and that adults with SMA have far less contact with
clinicians. As I wanted to include both families with young children, but also
adults living with SMA in the study, the JTSMA (a national charity which
currently supports approximately 2,000 families and individuals affected by
SMA) was contacted, informed about the proposed research, and readily
agreed to offer support (JTSMA, 2010).
As well as methodological and theoretical considerations when
designing the study, the practical considerations associated with having a
neuromuscular condition myself, as well as researching others affected by
neuromuscular disease had to be accommodated. As the JTSMA is a charity
based in a town near to my institution, with its annual conference held within
easy driving distance, this was particularly well suited to my own mobility
restrictions, as well as the management of other impairment effects such as
fatigue and pain which are exacerbated by travel. As members of the JTSMA
are geographically dispersed, many with young children or managing a
condition resulting in complex needs, the means of interviewing needed to be
as flexible as possible. For this reason, participants were offered a choice of a
face to face, e-mail or telephone interview depending on their needs,
preference and abilities. There was also flexibility over when the interviews
took place, to allow for care needs and family commitments, and
consequently many took place late in the evening or at weekends.
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The Interviews
In-depth interviews were chosen as a means of producing data. In-depth
interviews have been documented as offering researchers the means of
obtaining ‘deep understanding’ (Johnson, 2001), particularly when
researching lived experiences. As Johnson (2001) has noted, in-depth
interviews allow the researcher to:
…explore the contextual boundaries of that experience or
perception, to uncover what is usually hidden from
ordinary view…or to penetrate to more reflective
understandings about the nature of that experience.
(Johnson, 2001: 106)
Whilst in-depth interviews are typically unstructured in nature, I aimed to
generate both ‘thick description’ (Geertz, 1973, 1988) of life with SMA, but
also participants’ perspectives on very specific issues, such as their views on
the availability of genetic testing for SMA and their thoughts and feelings
about having children. Four pilot interviews were conducted with three
personal contacts (one participant was interviewed twice) who had experience
of SMA to elicit feedback and discussion around the type of interview
questions that would generate the sort of data I hoped to analyse. This proved
to be a productive exercise as it highlighted relevant issues to those living
with SMA, and helped me develop a more informed and sensitive interview
guide.
Following the pilot study, the interview questions were refined so that
after demographic information (age, gender, ethnicity, disability, geographical
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location, occupation) was noted and introductory questions, or ‘ice breakers’,
were asked (e.g. ‘can you tell me a bit about yourself?’), all participants were
asked the question, ‘can you tell me the story of how your life has been
affected by SMA?’. This open-ended question allowed participants to direct
the interview to the issues they felt were significant, in terms meaningful to
them, which has been documented as one of the main advantages of using
unstructured interviewing techniques (Bryman, 1988). Participants were
encouraged to explore topics that they felt were particularly important to their
experience of life with SMA, which elicited broad discussions, however,
during the second half of the interview, an interview guide (see appendix III)
was used to prompt for answers to specific questions. In many instances, the
stories told of life with SMA led into the topics set out in the interview guide
without need for prompts. However, where this was not the case, participants
were asked specific questions on their views on the severity of SMA, their
feelings about the availability of genetic testing technologies (both for SMA
and other conditions) and their ideas about reproductive decision making in
the context of prenatal testing for SMA. Whilst an interview guide was used,
the interviews were flexible enough to accommodate participants’ diversions
into different topic areas, and further, the use of hypothetical scenarios to
broach sensitive topic areas proved to be a useful strategy, particularly in
situations where participants were not comfortable discussing their own
experiences directly.
In total, 59 interviews were completed with 61 participants which
lasted on average 1 hour and 10 minutes each, with the shortest being 45
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minutes and the longest 2 hours and 57 minutes. The interviews via e-mail
took place over periods lasting from three weeks to eight months. All
interviews were tape recorded and transcribed verbatim and for e-mail
participants, e-mail communications were gathered and compiled into single
documents. All names and specific place names (e.g. names of towns or
hospitals) were removed or changed during transcription to avoid
identification. However, names of countries, where referenced, were left in to
highlight the different national contexts in which SMA was experienced. Care
was taken to ensure that all interviews were transcribed within two weeks of
completion of the interview and the transcripts were annotated with my
observations and thoughts from the interview. Most of these supplementary
reflections had been recorded in my research diary, but some were noted
during the process of transcription itself. Notes were also taken during the
process of transcription, recording the themes and patterns that I felt were
emerging from the data as the interviews evolved.
Consent to undertake the interview and a reiteration of their rights to
withdraw and withhold information during the interview was agreed with all
participants prior to the interview taking place. A consent form (see appendix
II) was signed by all participants who took part in a face to face interview,
whereas for e-mail participants this was done by a typed ‘signature’, and a
verbal acknowledgement by those who took part in telephone interviews (this
will be returned to later). Once the interviews had been carried out, the audio
files and e-mails were removed from my computer and transferred to discs
which were stored, together with completed transcripts and the names and
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addresses of participants, in a lockable cabinet to which only I had access, to
ensure as far as possible, the confidentiality of participants.
Table 1: The Interviews
Type of Interview Number of Participants
Telephone Interview 44
E-mail Interview 10
Face to Face Interview 5
Total 59**
** Four interviews were joint interviews, and one participant was interviewed twice: first alone and then with
their sibling.
Telephone interviewing has been shown to offer many advantages over face
to face interviewing; including logistical and economic benefits (Rhode et al.,
1997; Sturges and Hanrahan, 2004) and the potential to include those who
may have been hesitant to participate in a face to face interview, an issue
which may be particularly relevant for sensitive research projects (Fenig and
Levav, 1993). As Sturges and Hanrahan (2004) have argued, it is equally as
possible to develop rapport during in-depth interviews conducted over the
telephone as it is in face to face interviews. However, this method of
interviewing, in practice, presented me with particular technological
difficulties. Firstly, there were problems in ascertaining the quality of the
sound recording prior to the interview, and despite stopping and re-starting
the interview to check the recording (in itself a disruptive exercise), five
interviews had to be repeated due to unintelligible recordings. Secondly, as
Creswell (1998) has argued, in the case of telephone (as well as e-mail
interviewing), the loss of nonverbal communication can pose difficulties in
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interpretation. It was difficult to know, for example, how to respond
appropriately when participants fell silent during a telephone interview and to
accurately detect emotional distress.
Difficulties with reading emotional responses, and in particular being
attentive to signs of emotional distress, can also pose problems for e-mail
interviewing as auditory cues (e.g. sighs, hesitation) are further absent.
McCord and Schwaber Kerson (2006) however, through their interviews with
women who had undergone termination of pregnancy for foetal anomaly,
have argued that the disadvantages of e-mail interviewing, such as the
invisibility of visual cues, are outweighed by the advantages they offer,
including the obviation of transcription and travel costs. For example, e-mail
interviews can be conducted over several months, introducing a longitudinal
element to studies and asynchronous communication allows participants to
respond in ‘instalments’, at times and dates convenient for them, which works
particularly well for research on topic areas that are potentially emotionally
demanding, or for participants with time constraints. In the case of my study,
the flexibility this format permitted was useful as the majority of participants
were managing complex disabilities and/or had young children. Rather than
obtaining a ‘snapshot’ of their lives, furthermore, the e-mail interviews
allowed me to gain more insight into participants’ perspectives over several
months. In three instances, the interview period covered a time of major
upheaval and distress in their lives. Whilst these participants were offered the
opportunity to withdraw from the study, all three opted to continue the
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interview and reflected on the changes in their lives in their responses to my
questions.
As Kivits (2005) has noted, however, the timescales involved in e-
mail interviewing can make it harder to draw a close to the interview upon
completion, a situation which has been described as commonplace across
sensitive research projects (Dickson-Swift et al., 2008; Lee, 1993; Hubbard et
al., 2001; Warren, 2002; Burr, 1995). Unlike the telephone and face to face
interviews, the protracted length of my relationship with the ten e-mail
respondents, and our continued communication (in some cases, through
traumatic life events) led to difficulties in breaking off the e-mails. These
difficulties have been noted in the literature, particularly in relation to
sensitive research, and researchers respond differently to these situations
(Cannon, 1989; Stebbins, 1991; Burr, 1995). In all instances, I still received e-
mail communication from participants (to which I responded) for up to four
months after the completion of the interview.
Once all of the transcripts were written up, participants were sent a
copy to verify the accuracy of the transcription and to make amendments to
the text where they felt appropriate (Gershick and Miller, 1995). As Pahl
(1995) discovered, the practice of returning transcripts is useful in terms of
offering participants the opportunity to make amendments to the text, but also
for further comments. In practice, most transcripts were approved following a
brief scan or were not read. However, seven participants used this opportunity
to remove sections or revise words they felt, on reflection, to be too personal
to include in the research, and four participants added further comments and
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insights to their transcript. Returning transcripts to participants a short time
after their interview further provided me with an opportunity to ‘check in’
with the participants in the study and to conclude my contact with them by
offering them the opportunity to discuss any concerns or reflections they had
on the interview process itself.
Access and Sampling
The JTSMA were the primary gatekeepers and facilitators of my research.
Once ethical approval of my research project had been obtained from them
(which will be returned to in the ‘ethics’ section), access to and sampling of
participants occurred through a variety of different channels, a strategy
commonly recommended for sensitive research (Lee, 1995).
Firstly, individuals were approached at the JTSMA’s annual
conference, held every summer in the Midlands and attended by many
families and individuals living with SMA, as well as health care professionals.
The annual conference provides the means by which families and individuals
can meet to discuss SMA, and thus the conference was a useful opportunity
for me to introduce myself and the research to those in attendance. A leaflet
outlining the research aims and the implications of participating were
distributed (see Appendix I), and the details of those who agreed to participate
were taken down to be contacted at a later date. The response to this approach
was overwhelmingly positive, and all 16 individuals who were approached to
participate agreed to do so. Whilst it has been argued that sampling for
research should be theoretically informed (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; Denzin,
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1970), due to the small population size and the exploratory nature of the
study, strategies for sampling were kept broad initially with a view to
recruiting as many people as possible with a later refinement of the sampling
strategy. One of the difficulties with approaching individuals to request
participation in a research study is the possibility of researcher bias. Arber
(2001) has highlighted the concern that researchers may consciously or
unconsciously only approach those individuals who they perceive to be
friendly and accommodating, and indeed, as I was introduced to some
families by JTSMA staff, it is likely that they may have selected families who
they anticipated would be likely to respond positively. Whilst the possibility
for such bias in sampling strategy is largely unavoidable, the use of further
sampling strategies accommodated for some of this bias.
Further sampling strategies that were employed included the
placement of an advertisement about the research in the JTSMA’s newsletter,
together with snowball sampling. The advertisement, which briefly stated the
purposes of the research and what it would include was published in the
JTSMA’s quarterly newsletter as well as the electronic newsletter which is e-
mailed to members. A small advert was also placed on the JTSMA’s website
and remained there for several months. A dedicated research telephone
number was available for participants to contact me if they wished, and four
participants made use of this option. Whilst there are issues associated with
sampling through electronic means, as computer use is both a classed and
gendered phenomenon (Hewson et al., 2003), this bias was addressed through
the use of alternative sampling methods.
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In total, 17 individuals responded to the advertisements placed (5 to
the printed newsletter and 13 to the electronic one) and agreed to be
interviewed. Two participants were excluded from the study, one on account
of the fact that her child was affected by a different condition to SMA and the
other due to inappropriate communications. All participants recruited from the
conference and newsletters who took part in these first 32 interviews were
asked if they could recommend a family member or another person living
with SMA who might be interested in taking part. Biernacki and Waldorf
(1981) have argued that snowball sampling, or ‘chain referral’ sampling is
particularly well suited to studies where populations are small and insider
knowledge is advantageous, and this technique expanded the group of
participants by a further 22. Those who agreed to participate out of this
snowball sample were primarily the family members of the original
participants, although some were their friends or acquaintances.
To my knowledge, the majority of those who were asked by friends or
relatives to take part agreed to do so, and I was only informed of two refusals.
The first was due to lack of interest in the project, and the second due to
feelings that the nature of the study was too personal to discuss with a
researcher. However, nothing can be known about the participants who may
have asked their friends or relatives to participate, but subsequently lost
contact with me after the interview.
Biernacki and Waldorf (1981) have referenced some of the difficulties
of enlisting participants as what they term ‘de facto research assistants’
(Biernacki and Waldorf, 2001: 153) in the practice of snowball sampling,
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which include a loss of control over the communication of the research’s
goals and procedures to would-be participants. Little can be known about the
way in which the research was presented between participants, and further, I
had no control over which individuals the participants chose to approach
about the study. Whilst they were asked to recommend those who they
thought might be interested, there was evidence that some participants
interpreted this to mean those people who had a particular story to tell, as one
participant commented ‘I’ll ask my friend, she’s been through an awful lot
with it so she’ll have a good story for you’ (Abi, mother of child diagnosed
with type II SMA). These forms of bias that are introduced through the use of
snowball sampling are difficult to avoid and necessarily impacted on the
composition of the sample. Whilst ‘understanding’ rather than
representativeness is regarded as one of the main goals of qualitative enquiry
(Mays and Pope, 1995), it has been argued that researchers should attempt to
achieve a sample that is as unbiased and representative of the population
under study as possible. For this reason, different sampling strategies were
also attempted.
Whilst my initial sampling efforts yielded an overwhelmingly positive
result, I acknowledged that people may not identify with one another on the
basis of a diagnostic category such as SMA (Anderson and Bury, 1988), and
that charities (such as the JTSMA), are sometimes avoided by people with
disabilities on account of the medical model of disability often espoused by
such groups (Drake, 1996). For these reasons, I felt that it was important to
sample outside of the JTSMA, to give voice to those individuals living with
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SMA who might not have been a member of the JTSMA, for various reasons.
Sampling outside of the JTSMA was attempted through the following routes;
firstly, personal websites set up for those affected by SMA (e.g. for the
purposes of blogging, fund-raising, awareness) were located through search
engines. Specifically, personal web pages which were not linked to the
JTSMA and those based in the UK were identified. Only two such pages that
did not reference the JTSMA were identified, and the page creators for these
sites were contacted. One page creator did not respond, while the second, a
mother of two young children diagnosed with SMA, responded and agreed to
participate. Further to this, opportunistic recruitment of individuals was
achieved through two disability-orientated organisations. The first,
Motability, a national charity for disabled people of which I am a member, ran
a feature article in their newsletter on a person living with SMA. Following
contact with Motability, my details were passed on to this individual, who
responded stating their agreement to participate in the study. Two further
individuals were identified through their participation on an online forum on a
website for an organisation supporting disabled parents. Recruitment through
online resources, however, raises particular ethical issues (Berry, 2004). More
specifically, it has been argued that the taken-for-granted boundaries between
‘public’ and ‘private’ life are blurred in the context of internet research
(Bakardjieva and Feenberg, 2001), and it cannot be unproblematically
assumed that websites and forums are considered public domains by those
who post their information on them. Such issues of privacy raise particular
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concerns for researchers wishing to recruit participants, and the ethical issues
related to this sampling strategy will be returned to in the ‘ethics’ section.
As analysis of the interviews progressed, further sampling was
informed by the analysis, a process Glaser and Strauss (1967) have referred to
as ‘theoretical sampling’. I became aware of particular perspectives that were
missing from the study, such as experiences of parenthood of those diagnosed
with severer forms of SMA. One participant was therefore purposively
included in the study on account of the fact that she had received a diagnosis
of type II SMA and was the mother of a young child. She was contacted
through an existing participant who was aware of her experiences. Efforts
were also made to include those who had known, through prenatal testing,
about their child’s SMA before birth, and decided to continue with their
pregnancy. A call for participants was placed on the JTSMA’s website online
forum where participants were actively discussing this issue, and the JTSMA
also forwarded letters to members they believed to fulfil this criterion,
inviting them to participate. However, there was no response to these
strategies. Herring (1996) has argued that online forums and chat rooms are
attractive research spaces due to their accessibility and ease of use. However,
it has been noted that ethical guidelines for internet research are not as well
developed as for other forms of research (BSA, 2002), and thus particular
care needs to be taken when using online methods of research. The purpose of
online forums for JTSMA members, for example, is for participants to offer
informal support and advice to one another as well as swapping stories and
experiences. Whilst these forums were readily accessible to me, therefore, I
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also acknowledged that individuals who posted on them may well have been
doing so with the expectation that they were addressing an exclusive audience
(Berry, 2004). There has been much debate about the extent to which
researchers can use data posted on the internet for research purposes. Herring
(1996) has argued that if a user chooses a public forum to post comments,
then this makes them available for research purposes on account of the fact
that more private forms of communication are available. However, as Bassett
and O’Riordan (2002) have argued, it simply may not be possible to know a
user’s intentions when posting in forums and chat rooms, or even to know
how they conceptualise the virtual space they inhabit, which raises ethical
concerns for researchers. Thus, rather than approaching directly the individual
forum members who appeared to meet the recruitment criterion on the basis
of their posts, an advertisement was placed on the forum with the prior
approval of the JTSMA, announcing the research and inviting participation.
As this advert attracted no responses, none of the postings, whilst relevant to
the research, were treated as data as consent could not be obtained (AoIR,
2002). Grinyer (2007) however, has argued that whilst such data may not be
treated as primary data, it may be regarded as contextual data, framing the
researcher’s understanding of a particular topic. In this instance, despite the
lack of response to the advertisement and letters sent, the existence of the
forum posts confirmed that several JTSMA members continued with their
pregnancies following a prenatal diagnosis of SMA, even though their
perspectives and experiences are missing from the study. The absence of this
particular group from the study highlights the way in which those who
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participated in the research can be understood as a self-selecting population in
the sense that participation may have been more appealing to those
individuals who felt able to talk about their experiences, or whose stories
conformed to prevailing norms and expectations (Landsman, 1998). As the
issues with which my research is concerned may be considered sensitive with
the potential to evoke strong feelings, the research may only have appealed to
participants who were clear in their views or who felt comfortable with the
issues it raised.
Table 2: Sampling Strategy and Number of Participants
Sampling Strategy Number of Participants
Recruited Through Attendance at JTSMA Conference 16
Responded to Electronic or Postal Newsletter Advert. 16
Snowball Sampling 22
Disability Organisations 3
Personal Contacts 3
Websites 1
Total 61
The Participants
At the start of each interview, each participant was asked to offer a brief
description of themselves including their age, occupation (if any) and a
description of their ethnicity in order to provide some demographic data. Out
of the 61 participants who were interviewed, 13 were male and 48 were
female. The over-representation of women in the sample may be attributed to
a variety of factors. In the first instance, it was apparent that participants in the
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study perceived the subject matter of the interviews to be the concern of
women, who bear the brunt of the responsibility for childbearing and raising.
Ideas about gender which position women as both the ‘gene transmitters’
(Steinberg, 1996: 267) of genetic conditions, but also as responsible for the
family’s health more generally reinforce the notion that reproductive decision
making in the context of SMA is primarily a female domain (Graham, 1979;
Ruddick, 1989). Further, all but three of the mothers of children with SMA
who participated in the study had left work or reduced their hours following
their child’s diagnosis in order to care for them. This assumption of care work
by women is a finding supported by the literature (Finch and Groves, 1983;
McLaughlin, 2006) and reinforces the notion that both childbearing and child
rearing, around which the study is based, is primarily the domain of women.
The method of sampling may also have influenced the number of
women who participated in the study. As participants were asked to
recommend friends or family who might be eligible and interested in taking
part, women tended to suggest their female friends and relatives. There was
evidence that there existed networks (primarily) of mothers of children
diagnosed with SMA who were in regular contact with one another and who
knew each other’s experiences in great detail. Schaffer et al. (2008), through
their study of mothers of children with genetic conditions using the internet,
have argued that women take responsibility for networking and participating
in ‘genetic communities’ (p.156) in order to learn from the experiences of
others in the management of their child’s condition, and indeed, it appeared
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that in this study women were the primary networkers and information
gatherers on SMA.
All participants were asked to describe their ethnicity at the start of the
study. Fifty-two (82%) described their ethnicity as white British and 8 (13%)
described themselves as belonging to an ethnic minority group; one as
Iranian, two described themselves as having mixed heritage, one as Indian,
two Irish, one Romanian and one as white European. Whilst the JTSMA is a
UK charity, not all participants were living in the UK at the time of interview;
one participant was interviewed living in France, one in the Republic of
Ireland, one in Nepal and one in Switzerland. The remaining participants were
geographically dispersed throughout the UK- in Scotland, Wales, Northern
Ireland and across 22 different counties in England. Seven British participants
had had the SMA diagnosed in their family during a time when they were
living outside of the UK (in Australia, Italy, Spain and Holland), but had
returned to the UK upon diagnosis.
The ages of participants ranged from 9 to 63 with an average age of
37. Whilst the study set out to interview participants exclusively over the age
of 18, one child, (aged nine and the able-bodied sibling to a six year old with
SMA) requested to be interviewed following her mother’s participation in an
interview. A separate guide was prepared for this interview which focussed on
the child’s experiences of having a sister with a disability and how it impacted
on her family’s life. This interview was arranged through the child’s mother
and upon completion of the transcript, it was returned to her mother who read
it through with her. Whilst interviewing a child posed particular ethical
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dilemmas, more specifically the risk of emotional harm, or of unsettling the
relationship between the siblings, Eder and Fingerson (2001) have
nevertheless argued that interviewing children can give voice to their unique
interpretations of reality ordinarily inaccessible to adults. Indeed, as the initial
interviews highlighted the importance of childhood experiences of disability
in informing participants’ (adult) perspective on SMA, it seemed important to
include a child’s perspective that had not been reinterpreted retrospectively
but was grounded in the present- the everyday reality of growing up with
disability in the family, which was so central to the research.
The participants varied in terms of the diagnosis within their family,
but also in their relationship to the person diagnosed with SMA. Such
diversity enabled a broad range of perspectives to be explored within the
study, and is reflected in Tables 3 and 4.
Table 3: The Participants
Participants Numbers Gender
Female Male
Diagnosed with SMA 25 21 4
Sibling of person with SMA, without SMA
themselves
7 4 3
Parent of person diagnosed with SMA 24 21 3
Grandparent of person diagnosed with SMA 1 1 0
Son or daughter of person diagnosed with SMA 2 1 1
Partner or spouse of person diagnosed with SMA 2 1 1
Total 61 49 12
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Table 4: The Diagnoses of SMA
Diagnosis Number of
Participants with
Diagnosis in their
Family
Gender
Female Male
Spinal Muscular Atrophy Type I 12 11 1
Spinal Muscular Atrophy Type II 32 25 7
Spinal Muscular Atrophy Type III 11 10 1
Spinal Muscular Atrophy with Respiratory Distress 3 2 1
Spinal Bulbar Muscular Atrophy 2 1 1
Autosomal Dominant Spinal Muscular Atrophy 1 0 1
Total 61 49 12
Whilst there is little published information on the prevalence of different
types of SMA, estimates suggest that anywhere between 50 and 70% of
diagnosed cases of SMA are type I (Brichta et al., 2003:2481; Swoboda et al.,
2007). However, within my study, those diagnosed with SMA type I in their
family comprised only 20% of the sample, with a much higher representation
of those diagnosed with type II (52%). As severer forms of SMA are
associated with a greatly shortened life expectancy (around 18 months), it is
unsurprising that the majority of adults with SMA who were interviewed and
whose families also took part were diagnosed with intermediate or milder
forms of SMA; only one adult with a diagnosis of SMA type I was
interviewed.
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Ethical Considerations
The Risk of Emotional Harm
It was decided early on in the project that the subject matter of the research
warrants its definition as a ‘sensitive’ research topic. Lee (1993) defines
sensitive research as covering topics that pose either intrusive threat, political
threat, or the threat of sanction to participants (Lee, 1993: 4-9). The term
‘intrusively threatening’ research refers to research which involves deep
invasion into participants’ personal or emotional lives. My research indeed
invoked stories covering a range of emotive and personal issues, including
participants’ experiences of living with a life-limiting chronic illness or
disability, experiences of bereavement, experiences of, and attitudes towards,
selective abortion and/or involuntary childlessness, as well as ideas about the
prevention of lives of people with disabilities. These topic areas are highly
personal and potentially emotionally charged, and it was acknowledged that
discussing them with a researcher could induce a range of emotional
responses including stress, grief, guilt, shame and anxiety. A key concern in
the study of sensitive topics is the possibility of psychological harm to
participants through the very process of addressing difficult issues.
Shakespeare (2008b), for example, has highlighted the way in which
discussions around the existence of genetic technologies may raise difficult
issues specifically for people with genetic impairments, as it may invite them
consider whether or not their parents would have used these technologies if
they had had knowledge of them or access to them. Such thoughts may be
deeply unsettling or threatening as they suggest the possibility of one’s own
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non-existence, and indeed, several participants reported such thoughts and
ideas. Similarly, various studies have highlighted difficult emotional
responses to the knowledge of a genetic condition within a family. Guilt, for
example, has been a well documented response of parents to children with
inherited conditions (Kessler, 1989) as is the experience of ‘survivor guilt’ in
siblings to people with inherited conditions (Madigan, 1996). The risk of
emotional harm was therefore one of the most troubling ethical considerations
of my research project. Although participants generally articulated their
experiences of emotional distress in matter-of-fact ways and appeared to have
anticipated the emotional implications of the research, some participants
nevertheless became distressed during the interview, and one person refused
to participate on account of the emotional difficulties the research could raise
for them. Measures were therefore put in place, to minimise, as far as was
possible, the risk of emotional harm.
One way of managing emotionally sensitive interviews has been
described by Brannen (1988) who argues that topics likely to provoke
emotional responses should be allowed to develop gradually over the course
of the interview, rather that being approached directly early on. This
technique proved useful in practice as it allowed me to gauge the emotional
response of the participants and to end a line of questioning if it was apparent
that the participant was experiencing distress. It further allowed the
participant an opportunity to set the boundaries of which topic areas they were
happy to talk about and which they were not, and four participants steered the
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interview in this way and closed down topics of conversation that they were
not happy to discuss.
A further means of minimising emotional distress in research that has
been noted in the literature is the practice of allowing the participant to
‘debrief’ after the interview, or talk about the aspects they found particularly
difficult or challenging (Rodham, 1998). Whilst this technique has been
criticised for further blurring the (often) hazy line between interviewing and
counselling (Etherington, 1996), and also for assuming that this form of
support ‘works’ or is desirable (Hubbard et al., 2001), it was felt that it would
be equally unethical to deny research participants the opportunity to discuss
the effects the interview had on them after it had taken place. In practice, this
debriefing often occurred spontaneously with participants offering me their
immediate reflections once the interview had ended. However, for others,
reflections on the interview did not occur immediately after the interview, but
rather emerged after the participant had time to reflect on the event. As
contact was made with all participants within two weeks of the completion of
their interview to provide them with their transcript, this offered an
opportunity for participants to discuss any effects the interview had for them.
Only five participants took up this opportunity. However, all of them
indicated that the interview had been an illuminating or even cathartic
experience, which has been noted in other research on sensitive topics
(Pillow, 2003; Hutchinson et al., 1994; Lee, 1981). In addition to the
opportunity to express reflections on the interview, participants who
expressed distress during the interview were further advised of the availability
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of other forms of professional support, such as counsellors and outreach
workers based at the JTSMA whom they could contact for further assistance.
A further ethical concern regarding emotional harm to participants is
the potential effects the research could have on family dynamics and family
relationships. Genetic conditions necessarily implicate other family members,
and as my interviews often involved interviewing more than one family
member, I frequently found myself in a position similar to that experienced by
D’Agincourt-Canning (2003) when she completed her doctoral thesis on
breast cancer: one of holding more information on the decisions and
perspectives of their family members than participants appeared to have
themselves, and there was evidence that the research did raise some issues
around familial relationships. Two participants from different family groups
stated that the interview had sparked family discussions about SMA and
genetic testing (which they stated had been productive) whereas three
participants expressed concern about how their family members had
answered, as one commented:
I would recommend you interview my brother…but then
there’s a danger with that that I might not like what he
says…I don’t think he would, but he could have a very
different perspective on SMA to me and that might be
hard for me…to [pause] um… accept.
(Gill, diagnosed with type II SMA)
The potential for tension between family members, brought to the surface by
the interviews was therefore a very real concern. In order to circumvent or, at
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the very least, minimise damaging effects to familial relationships, great
sensitivity was required to protect the interviewee, but also any of their family
members who had participated. All participants were reminded prior to the
interview that their family members or partners need not be recruited into the
study if they felt this would be problematic or would raise difficult issues for
them. Further, it was emphasised that interviewees’ anonymity could not be
guaranteed in situations where members of the same family were interviewed.
Even if names were removed, the personal and unique nature of individuals’
stories could render them recognisable to other members of the same family
(LaRossa et al., 1981). Further, as I recruited through the JTSMA, I was
aware that it was possible that participants could recognise other JTSMA
members’ stories. As there are many close knit networks within the JTSMA,
and the ethos of the JTSMA is to encourage its members to share their stories
with one another as a form of mutual support, during the course of the
interviews, I became aware that many of the participants knew each other, or
knew of each other, including their stories with SMA. Indeed, some recounted
these stories during their interview in order to highlight and reinforce the
point they were making. This familiarity between JTSMA members, whilst
facilitating snowball sampling and introducing the possibility for comparative
analysis of the accounts (i.e. comparing the stories participants told with the
way in which they were told by other participants), also had the potential to
render participants’ stories recognisable to one another. These limits to the
anonymity of participants meant that relationships could be disrupted both
within family groups and also friendship circles. Whilst it was recognised that
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it may be difficult, if not impossible, to anticipate the existence or even the
nature of such potential relational difficulties, obtaining informed consent
could not absolve me of responsibility for these unintended consequences of
the research (Lee, 1993). Whilst no evidence of relational difficulties were
brought to my attention however, nothing can be known about the experiences
of participants with whom contact was lost after completion of the interview.
Risk to Researcher
It has been argued that an area often neglected in a discussion of ethics is the
risks the research may pose to researchers themselves, not only in terms of
physical risk (Jones, 1991), but also in terms of the psychological and
emotional consequences of the research (Hubbard et al., 2000; Dickson-Swift
et al., 2008 ). If ethically responsible research is characterised by its
avoidance of harm to those involved in it, then it follows that this should
apply to the researcher who is deeply embedded within the research for a
much longer time frame than the participants themselves.
It has been argued that personal safety in the research field is often
treated like a ‘non-issue’ for social researchers, with relatively few studies
addressing this concern directly. As Keynon and Hawker (1999) have argued,
it is often assumed that researchers will use common sense and intuition to
avoid potentially risky situations, and restrict their research to ‘safe’ areas
such as public spaces and conduct their interviews at ‘safe’ times such as
during office/daylight hours. Assumptions about which temporal and spatial
situations are ‘safe’ and which are not, however, are highly cultural (Furedi,
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1998), and indeed it may be impossible for researchers to predict where and
when dangerous or threatening situations may emerge. My own research
involved one-to-one interviews with strangers, in two instances in their
homes, although the remainder of the interviews were conducted over the
telephone or via e-mail. Whilst Kenyon and Hawker (1999) recommend the
planning of ‘quick and easy’ escape routes when conducting interviews, my
physical impairment (which necessitates the use of a wheelchair), combined
with the inaccessibility of participants’ homes meant that such routes were not
available to me. In order to minimise the safety risks to me, I was therefore
careful to ensure a procedure of ‘checking in’ either with a friend, relative or
colleague before and after the interview.
An additional issue relating to the possibility of harm to researchers
concerns emotional wellbeing. As Lee (1993) has argued, interviews have an
effect not only on respondents, but also on researchers themselves who may
react emotionally to their data, particularly when the issues under discussion
relate to their own lives and experiences. As someone living with a
neuromuscular condition myself, the issues addressed by my research
sometimes resonated with my own experiences. Furthermore, I frequently
encountered harrowing stories, particularly of grief and loss, which had a
great emotional impact on me and required what Dickson-Swift et al. (2008)
have referred to as ‘emotion work’, or the active management of feelings.
This ‘emotion work’ was done primarily through accessing the support of
friends and colleagues which facilitated the more emotionally demanding
aspects of the research (Brannen, 1998).
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Reflexivity
Reflexivity, or reflection on the way in which our selves and our identities
impact on the knowledge our research produces, has been considered a crucial
part of the research process (Seymour, 2007). Whilst Patai (1994) has argued
that discussion of the researcher’s identity can be considered egocentric or
even self-indulgent, Seymour (2001a) and Ellingson have countered this
argument by suggesting that to write oneself out of the research project is to
overlook a critical part of the research process and leads to ‘deceptively tidy’
accounts of research (Ellingson, 2006: 299). Whilst reflexivity has been
acknowledged as an (often) uncomfortable part of writing up process (Ryan-
Flood and Gill, 2009), it may nevertheless present opportunities to explore
what initially may have been invisible to us: that is, the influence of our
identities and selves on the research (Finlay, 2002). Acknowledgement needs
to be made not only of the way in which participants respond to the interview
questions that are asked, but also of the way in which they react to the
researcher, and how the researcher themselves impacts upon the interview
situation. As the values, insights and preconceptions of the researcher
invariably feed into the research process at different points of the research
process and in subtle ways, there have been calls for careful reflective
thinking on the part of researchers about how this situation informs the overall
shape of the research, or even the advantages it may offer (Goodley et al.,
2004).
As well as their interpretations of the research, the participants’
personal reactions to, and assumptions about, the researcher may additionally
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inform the shape of the study and influence the version of the stories that are
told, and hence the data that are collected. Much of the literature exploring
these so-called ‘interviewer effects’ have focused on the possible benefits of
‘matching’ researcher/researched identities in terms of gender (Oakley, 1980;
Oakley, 1981; Finch, 1984), ethnicity (Kohler Riessman 1987; Edwards
1990;), culture (Song and Parker, 2005) or sexuality (Platzer and James
1997), as a means of facilitating rapport and trust building in the context of
the interview. However, far fewer studies have explored the influence of a
disabled identity (Barnes 1992; Oliver 1996b; Vernon 1997) or the influence
of the impaired body on the interview or the research process more broadly
(Ellingson, 2006). In the case of my own research, my identity as a female in
my mid twenties with a visible disability invariably shaped the research
process in a myriad of ways.
As Dickson-Swift et al. (2008) have noted, researchers frequently
gravitate towards research projects that explore aspects of their own
experiences and subjectivities (p. 91). This closeness to the research project,
or even shared experiences with research participants, can facilitate rapport
building in the interview context through mutual sharing and self-disclosure
(Dickson-Swift et al., 2008). However, it may also make researchers more
sensitive to stories that resonate with their own experiences and perceptions,
and to overlook, or attribute less importance to, those which do not; the stories
we are able to hear may thus be informed by our subjective experiences and
values. My own experiences of living with a disability have inevitably fuelled
my academic interest in disability, as well as in the social implications of
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reproductive genetic technologies. In this way, my personal experiences both
influenced my interest in the topic of the research, but also called for me to
pay greater attention to the way in which my pre-existing beliefs, values and
potential prejudices stemming from theses experiences could shape the
research process (Ribbens and Edwards, 1998). Reflexive thinking,
undertaken at all stages of the project, aided by the maintenance of a research
diary in which personal reactions and thoughts were recorded and reflected
upon, facilitated sensitivity to these more subtle influences on the research.
As well as informing the design of the research, my visible disability
informed participants’ responses to me. Four participants who were
themselves wheelchair users, reported feeling more comfortable talking to me
as disabled person:
…I’m so glad that it’s a disabled person doing this
research, it makes it a lot easier to talk about things. I
thought you were going to be able-bodied.
(Megan, diagnosed with type II SMA)
Seymour (2007) and Andrews (2005) have noted the way in which the shared
experience of disability can signal the ‘right’ to research disability, as well as
facilitating rapport and trust building in the interview context (Seymour,
2007: 1193). As my research addressed issues around the way in which
disability is perceived and valued in the context of prenatal testing, it may be
that participants felt more able to discuss these issues openly with a disabled
researcher, and indeed many readdressed the interview questions back to me,
suggesting that they felt these issues were relevant to my own life as well as
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theirs. Whilst there may be benefits to not sharing a disabled identity with
participants, indeed Gow (2000) notes the way in which the women in her
study positioned themselves as the ‘experts’ on their respective conditions and
thus may have gone into more detail in explaining their experiences to her as
an ‘outsider’ (p. 118). In my study, having a shared disabled identity often
provided the opportunity for reciprocity which has been acknowledged as a
means of addressing power differentials between researchers and the
researched (Harding, 1987; Coterill, 1992; Tregaskis and Goodley, 2005).
For the interviews conducted with the able-bodied parents of children with
SMA, however, my disability appeared to have a different influence. I was
concerned that such parents might feel unable to discuss their feelings about
having a disabled child with me on account of the fact that I am a disabled
person, and there was some evidence that parents felt uncomfortable with this,
as one woman commented:
J: Um it’s very hard to um comment on the test
[prenatal test for SMA]…because I mean [pause]
you’ve got a disability yourself, haven’t you?
F: Yes
J: Yeah well you see…I wouldn’t want to offend
anyone…you know it’s not like saying disabled
people are bad or anything, but I think that it could
still be considered offensive to disabled people really,
and I don’t want to offend anyone.
(Jessica, mother of child diagnosed with type I SMA)
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The potential offense that disabled people can take to prenatal testing has
been documented in the literature (Asch, 2000), and it appeared that through
reading my identity as a disabled person, Jessica was reluctant to discuss her
feelings about testing and selective termination. Due to the methods of
sampling used in the study, however, the extent to which participants had
access to knowledge about different aspects of my identity varied and thus the
impact was hard to ascertain.
Data Analysis and Reporting
As the aim of this study was to better understand the experiences of those
living with SMA and the relationship of these experiences to perceptions of
genetic risk and reproductive decision making, an inductive approach was
taken to data analysis. Rather than testing pre-existing hypotheses, a grounded
theory approach was taken to the data, which allows theoretical concepts to
emerge from the data itself (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Charmaz (2003b) has
noted that there are two central approaches to grounded theory data analysis,
constructivist and objectivist approaches, each with different epistemological
assumptions. Objectivist approaches to grounded theory analysis treat data as
pre-existing facts that represent a reality readily accessible to the researcher
through participants’ accounts. Constructivist accounts, however,
acknowledge that the data are accounts co-produced by researchers and
participants, located in ‘time, place, culture and context’ (Charmaz, 2003b:
313) and constructed through the interpretive lens of both the researcher and
the researched. As discussed in Chapter 1 in relation to risk, an interpretative
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approach to the research has been adopted; writers supporting this theoretical
perspective acknowledge that risk perceptions are constructions that emerge
out of, and through, the everyday meanings and experiences of those who
encounter them. Thus, a constructivist grounded theory approach to data
analysis, which accommodates this role of interpretation, was the most
appropriate for data analysis.
Analysis of the transcripts was a long process, begun early on in the
research (during data collection), and one which did not follow clearly
defined stages. Upon completion and transcription of the first seven
interviews, manual coding was undertaken of the transcripts, so that every line
of text was attributed a code. Memos were written during the process of
coding to document thoughts and reflections on the data, including those
recorded in my research diary. In this way, the analytic process of interpreting
and making sense of the data began at an early stage. Gibbs (2007) has argued
that this process of ‘open coding’ of every line of transcript text is a
particularly important aspect of grounded theory analysis as it keeps
researchers close to the data. Whilst the suspension of all preconceived ideas
about the data, with the researcher acting as a ‘tabula rasa’ during analysis,
has been acknowledged as an unrealistic expectation of those undertaking
grounded theory analysis (Bulmer, 1979), close reading and re-reading of the
texts ensured that as far as possible, concepts that emerged from the data were
‘data driven’ rather than ‘concept driven’ (Gibbs, 2007). Initially, the codes
attributed to the first seven transcripts were largely descriptive and derived
from participants’ own phrases, referencing the topic areas under discussion
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e.g. ‘getting to a diagnosis of SMA’, ‘managing SMA in daily life’. As
Ritchie et al. (2003) have noted, this initial ‘sorting and sifting’ of data into
descriptive codes is particularly useful to aid later finer analysis as the data
are organised into manageable sections.
As one of the aims of the research was to examine the importance, and
uses of, experiential knowledge of SMA in the context of reproductive
decision making, participants’ descriptions of their experiences with the
condition were not interpreted literally during analysis, but rather as accounts
presented and interpreted in continuous relationship to these decisions. Stories
of life with SMA were thus not treated as objective facts but rather as
contextually bound accounts subject to different presentations and forms of
justification at various points.
As the number of interviews increased, coding was transferred to
Nvivo 7 and the codes were organised hierarchically into ‘coding trees’ to
categorise and sub-categorise the emergent concepts according to their
relationship to one another. The use of coding trees added a further dimension
to the analysis (Bazeley, 2007); by the appearance of the same sub-code under
different ‘parent codes’, I was able to explore how particular experiences or
instances were talked about in the context of different topics, which facilitated
the identification of conceptual relationships not only within codes, but also
between them. Proponents of grounded theory analysis support the use of
what has been termed the ‘constant comparison’ method of data analysis
(Pidgeon, 1996) as a means of developing theory from the data. The
comparison of codes, and texts within each code, specifically enabled me to
103
identify contradictions and inconsistencies both within, and between,
participants’ accounts. These contradictions were treated as significant as they
highlighted ways in which different versions of life with SMA were presented
at different moments, which in turn led to the refinement of emergent
concepts. Once this process of analysis had been undertaken on half of the
interviews, written summaries of the ‘parent codes’ were completed which
highlighted missing perspectives in the study and pointed to areas where more
data were needed to extend and modify the emerging picture. This process of
coding, the refinement of concepts through data interpretation followed by re-
coding and further sampling, which are central features of grounded theory
analysis, were carried out over a period of eight months until ‘theoretical
saturation’ (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), or the point at which no new concepts
are emerging from the data, had occurred.
The writing up of the research, as has been described, started during
the analysis of the coded transcripts, and these written summaries of the
emergent themes went on to become the basis of the drafts for Chapters 3-6.
As it was discovered that the boundaries between diagnostic categories of
SMA are far more blurry than medical classifications suggest (as will be
discussed in Chapters 3 and 4), I decided to present participants’ experiences
thematically rather than stratified according to type of diagnosis, reproductive
status or relationship to a person with SMA. However, where quotations from
participants are used, the type of SMA diagnosed within their family is
included with the quotation. This decision was taken because whilst many
participants were generally critical of the medical classifications of SMA,
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these classifications nevertheless provided a framework through which they
evaluated their experiences of SMA. Through knowledge of the prognosis
associated with diagnostic categories as well as the experiences of those with
the same diagnosis, participants assessed their own abilities and those of their
family members. Furthermore, the accounts of some participants, who
articulated specific concepts particularly clearly or had certain types of
experience with SMA, reappear in several chapters, e.g. Fraser.
Limitations of the Study
One of the main limitations of this study is the possibility of the sample of
participants being unrepresentative. By recruiting through the JTSMA, my
sample was limited to those individuals who identified themselves with this
organisation, its aims and its ethos, and thus may have excluded the
perspectives of those who do not identify in such a way. The potential
exclusions this recruitment strategy may have brought about are set out
below.
Whilst the JTSMA was cited as an invaluable resource by the vast
majority of participants, there were nevertheless some participants who saw
the objectives and strategies of the JTSMA as having less relevance to their
lives than others. As Epstein (1996) as well as Stockdale and Terry (2002)
have noted, patient organisations are often formed by white, middle class
individuals, and, disproportionately, by wives and mothers (Rapp, 1999; Rapp
et al., 2001). It is these individuals who have the financial, cultural and
practical means at their disposal to become educated about ‘their’ condition
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as well as to mobilise resources in the formulation of self-help groups. A
consequence of this is that people from ethnic minority or working class
backgrounds are under-represented in organisations such as the JTSMA, as
well as those individuals who prefer to access other forms of support (Rapp et
al., 2001).
In addition, the JTSMA’s focus on cure and medicalised approaches
to SMA may serve to alienate some people living with the condition and
preclude their attendance at JTSMA events. As Stockdale (1999) has noted in
relation to the Cystic Fibrosis Association, a focus on ‘cure at all costs’ by
medical charities can actually lead to an oversight of the ‘many ways people
live with and experience the disease’ and lesser importance being attributed to
areas that make a real difference to the everyday lives of people living with
CF (Stockdale, 1999: 594). Shakespeare (1999) has posited these contrasting
approaches in terms of medical and social discourses around disability and
genetics. Medical discourses around genetics and disability which position
the use of genetic technologies as a means of avoiding the ‘tragedy’ of the
birth of a person with an impairment may be more closely aligned with the
approach of medical charities such as the JTSMA and in stark opposition to
disability rights approaches (Shakespeare, 1999: 673). Whilst the ‘tragedy’
approach may be used primarily to generate funds for charities (Stockdale,
1999), for those who favour social approaches to disability, the agenda of the
JTSMA may be experienced as alienating or patronising. Andrew, in his late
40s and diagnosed with SMA commented that he did not have extensive
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involvement with the JTSMA as their priorities did not match what he felt
was important to his own life as an adult with SMA:
I had some [contact with JTSMA] in the past, I just haven’t
had much currently and I think it’s an interesting….I mean
I’ve been to their conference a couple of times and it’s an
interesting space for a lot of people, particularly kids with
SMA coming together. I think that the absence of a space for
people with SMA, particularly adults, to get together and
share different bits of our lives…that would be useful and
the Jennifer Trust don’t really do that…we have different
concerns, particularly around access to…I know that people
with SMA, a lot of people, don’t very often come into
contact with disability politics themselves and sometimes
that interaction and that understanding of what might be
possible sometimes isn’t there at the Jennifer Trust.
(Andrew, diagnosed with type II SMA)
Despite these criticisms levelled at the JTSMA by some of the adults living
with SMA, the JTSMA emerged not as an organisation designed to affront
disability politics, but rather one founded by the able-bodied parents of young
children with SMA and has retained its focus as a ‘family’ charity; its annual
conferences are primarily attended by able-bodied parents and children with
SMA leaving adults with SMA largely outnumbered. The consequence of this
focus on the needs and concerns of able-bodied parents and children with
SMA has been the under-representation of adults with SMA, many of whom
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drift out of the JTSMA as they ‘age out’ of its target age group, a finding also
recorded by Gow (2000) in her attempts to access women aged between 18
and 25 through the Cystic Fibrosis Trust. Indeed, eight of the adults
interviewed with SMA stated that after frequent contact with the JTSMA as
children they now rarely get involved with its activities. Whilst three of these
adults made specific reference to a lack of engagement with disability politics
by the JTSMA as a reason for their lack of identification with them, the
remaining five simply stated that the JTSMA became less important as they
grew up with SMA. This may relate to the under-representation of issues of
importance to them within the JTSMA’s activities or it could be that the
JTSMA is particularly important for families and individuals at ‘critical
points’ (Bury, 1982) such as diagnosis, but has less relevance as people with
SMA gain experience and knowledge of how to live successfully with the
condition.
Despite these potential limitations to the study, however, a broad range
of individuals living with SMA agreed to participate, and actively and
thoughtfully engaged with the research, as their accounts in the following
analysis chapters reveal.
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Chapter 3
What is SMA?
SMA is a condition which is associated with a broad spectrum of
presentations and experiences, and thus is not easily described or defined.
Despite all being attributed the same diagnostic label, the families and
individuals who took part in this study all had very different experiences of
SMA; some had lost children in early infancy, some had been unable to walk
since birth, whilst others had experienced being able-bodied well into adult
life at which point they began to experience increasing muscle weakness. This
diversity in presentation and severity of muscle weakness has been identified
as a major contributing factor to the documented confusion within the medical
literature on SMA, particularly around its definition and the categorization of
variant forms (Dubowitz, 1991). Indeed, Dubowitz (1995a) has described
SMA as having the widest variety in presentation out of all of the
neuromuscular disorders of childhood. Despite the identification of the
5q11.2-13.3 chromosome in 1990, which has been described as being
involved in the causation of most forms of ‘classical’ SMA (i.e. SMA
displaying all of the features traditionally associated with it) (Melkin et al.,
1990), uncertainty remains as to where the diagnostic boundaries of SMA lie,
and how the different ‘types’ of SMA may be differentiated from one another.
This concern has further been exacerbated by the apparent discontinuity
between genotype and phenotype expression of the condition (Wirth et al.,
2006). Nevertheless, the ability to identify different ‘types’ within a diagnosis
of SMA, has been considered a particularly important exercise from a medical
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perspective, not only to understand the biological mechanisms by which SMA
occurs, but also in terms of offering a useful diagnosis and prognosis to
families and individuals experiencing SMA. Indeed, the division of SMA into
‘types’ is commonly regarded by the medical profession and those living with
SMA as a shorthand to describe the severity of muscle weakness and
anticipated life expectancy of those with different forms of the condition.
For families and individuals living with SMA, therefore, the development of
specialist medical knowledge around SMA over the course of the 20th century
has been highly significant. Its emergence as a genetic condition and the
uncertainties and inconsistencies inherent within the medical knowledge
around it, have inevitably shaped the way in which it is experienced,
conceptualised and responded to as a condition. As this chapter presents,
participants’ accounts revealed that there was not always an easy ‘fit’ between
expert knowledge of SMA and the way in which it was experienced, and lived
with, in daily life; families negotiated different forms of knowledge from
contrasting sources to construct their definitions and understandings of SMA
and to formulate their responses to it.
The focus of this chapter, therefore, is on some of these negotiations
of expert and experiential knowledge as they occur through the definition,
diagnosis and geneticization of SMA. The contradictory, yet also
interconnected, relationship between these two forms of knowledge will be
emphasised, with a consideration of the consequences this has had for the way
in which families and individuals relate to the condition. This setting out of
how SMA is understood, as well as how it is lived with (in Chapter 4), will set
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the scene for a later presentation, in Chapters 5 and 6, of the meaning these
conceptualisations took on in the context of reproductive decision making.
Defining and Describing SMA
Defining SMA
SMA is a condition which has been attributed within the medical literature to
a genetic mutation of the SMN1 (survival motor neuron) gene on
chromosome five. The genetic mutation is widely understood to have
occurred during the evolution of the human genome from that of apes (Fortna
et al., 2004). However, the condition was not systematically described by the
medical profession until the 19th century. Guido Werdnig (1891), Johan
Hoffman (1893, 1897) as well as others around this time (e.g. Beevor, 1902;
Thomson and Bruce,1893) described patients who experienced severe muscle
weakness in the first months of their lives and died in early infancy, for which
they coined the term ‘Spinal Muscular Atrophy’, also known as ‘Werdnig-
Hoffman Disease’. It was not until later in the 20th century however that
debates began to emerge as to where the diagnostic boundaries of SMA
should lie, given its similarities with other conditions, such as Muscular
Dystrophy and Motor Neurone Disease. The SMA described by Werdnig
(1891) and others in the 19th century was an early onset form of SMA that
resulted in premature death. However, over the course of the 20th century,
clinicians and researchers came across individuals whose symptoms mirrored
those of the early cases reported by Werdnig, but who nevertheless achieved
developmental milestones (such as the ability to sit or walk unaided) or
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experienced prolonged survival, beyond infancy. A doctoral thesis describing
SMA produced by Brandt in 1950, for example, described both a ‘severe’
type of SMA, but also an ‘intermediate’ type, with those so-affected capable
of sitting and surviving infancy (Brandt, 1950). Further, the work of
Dubowitz (1964) and Byers and Bankers (1961) in the 1960s pointed to the
various different forms SMA could take, even within sibling groups.
From the 1960s, therefore, clinicians and researchers began to
speculate about the possibility of an SMA ‘continuum’ (Dubowitz, 1967) with
the most severe infantile forms of the condition at one end (associated with
poor life expectancy), and the milder juvenile, or adult onset, forms at the
other end, with various other presentations in between. However, where the
dividing lines between these types should be positioned continued to be
debated within the SMA medical community through the 1970s and 1980s.
Pearn (1980), in an English study of 240 people affected by SMA, for
example, suggested that seven different SMA syndromes could be identified,
caused by 13 different genetic mutations, whereas Fried and Emery (1971)
argued for the existence of three clinically differentiated forms of SMA,
defined by the age at which symptoms first appear, and associated with
different genetic mutations.
The range of biological explanations offered by the medical profession
to make sense of the experience of SMA, and the movement of its boundaries
over time has had a considerable influence on the prognostic and diagnostic
information given to individuals experiencing SMA over the past fifty years.
Indeed, all participants in this study who were diagnosed with SMA in the
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1960s and 1970s reported being offered conflicting biological explanations
for their condition as a consequence of these shifts in definitions of SMA.
Five participants, for example, were initially diagnosed as having Duchenne
Muscular Dystrophy (DMD) at a time when SMA was poorly understood, and
described the devastating emotional consequences this had.
Matilda is 63 years of age and was initially suspected of having Polio
due to an epidemic of the disease in the late 1940s. However, she was later re-
classified as a Muscular Dystrophy patient before finally having her
experiences reclassified by a doctor who went on to write a definitive paper
on type III SMA based on her experiences in the late 1960s (Hausmanova-
Petrusewicz et al., 1968). Matilda recalls the mental anguish this initial
uncertainty and diagnosis caused herself and her family, as a consequence of
being at the centre of shifting disease boundaries:
…I think it was in 1947 there was a Polio epidemic and I was
sort of lumped together with the other children who had
Polio. One of my earliest memories is my mother arguing
with the consultant… that she’d talked to the other mums in
the waiting room and their children who had Polio had been
ill and I’d never been ill…but you know they thought at the
time that doctors know best and mums don’t have a clue.
Then I think when I was 18 they used a situation to come up
with a condition, I had deteriorated considerably and then
they diagnosed me with Muscular Dystrophy and they said
I’d be dead within a couple of years-that I’d die before I was
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21…and it was completely… devastating…for everyone.
[pause] It was at a time when they were beginning to
separate out the atrophies and the dystrophies but it
[SMA]was a completely unknown quantity in the early
1960s…I mean they knew about SMA type I, but not II or
III. And one of the doctors who wrote one of the definitive
papers on SMA talked um about a 19 year old with these
symptoms um and that was me. So that’s when I found out
what I had.
The shifting nature of disease categories in line with changes in scientific
understanding over time is of crucial importance to people who are the
subjects of such classificatory systems (Hedgecoe, 2002; Bowker and Star,
1999). Medical diagnostic categories are significant not only in terms of their
impact on individuals’ identities, but also their subjective experiences of their
reality, their imaginings of their future as well as their entitlement to services
and support. However, as Hedgecoe, through his analyses of the emergence of
Cystic Fibrosis (2003) and Diabetes Mellitus (2002) as disease categories has
noted, despite their appearance of fixity, disease boundaries are socially
constituted in that they represent ‘compromises’ within and between medical
communities and are never devoid of inconsistencies, uncertainties and
ambiguities (Hedgecoe, 2003: 55). These uncertainties, as Matilda’s account
highlights, can have catastrophic consequences for those who are the subjects
of such medical classifications. The emotional impact of being diagnosed with
a terminal condition, only to have this prognosis displaced a year or two later
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can have serious implications for psychosocial wellbeing, as well as feelings
of trust in the stability of medical knowledge. Indeed, a similar account to that
of Matilda is explored in the autobiographical film ‘39 pounds of love’
(Menkin, 2005), which tells the story of an American born Israeli man whose
ambition it becomes to confront the doctor who diagnosed him with SMA and
predicted a certain death before the age of two, which later proved to be
inaccurate, highlighting the distress associated with these medical
uncertainties.
As well as the impact shifts in medical knowledge can have, Matilda’s
account further highlights the way in which the experiential knowledge of
individuals living with SMA can, in itself, play a role in challenging medical
knowledge. Recollections of the various processes around getting to, and
receiving, a diagnosis of SMA for many participants in this study, for
example, were accounts of fighting, perseverance and the challenging of
health care professionals for their symptoms of SMA to be taken seriously.
The diagnostic process frequently took participants on a ‘medical merry go
round’ (Peterson, 2006: 35) of undergoing invasive tests and procedures
before what was often described as a ‘lucky’ encounter with a health care
professional who had some knowledge of SMA.
As early signs of SMA may be experienced as ‘floppiness’ and
difficulties with feeding in babies, delays in walking and crawling in infants
and the onset of muscle weakness and fatigue in adults, symptoms can be
confused with late development (in children), or the onset of age-related
fatigue (in adults), which can contribute to some of the obstacles to diagnosis
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experienced by those living with SMA. Mothers of young children who are
experiencing symptoms of SMA appeared to be at the forefront of many of
these battles; in total, 17 mothers of children with SMA were interviewed and
10 specifically mentioned having their concerns about SMA dismissed,
particularly by health care professionals, before a diagnosis of SMA was
established. For such mothers, there was a fine line to be trodden between
being regarded as a ‘good mother’, who assumes responsibility for promoting
her child’s health, and being a ‘neurotic’ mother (Graham, 1979), the
suggestion of which being the basis on which many mothers had their
concerns about SMA disregarded (e.g. Macaulay, 1996: 41).
Liz is the mother of a (now 28 year old) daughter, Cara, who was
diagnosed with SMA type II at the age of 4 (considered medically as a ‘late’
diagnosis for SMA type II). She described her experiences of having her
concerns invalidated in the following way:
Cara was minded whilst in school by a very close friend
who has many other young children of her own and
through family friends, so Cara grew up amongst many
other cousins and small children. And we were aware from
about a year that perhaps she didn’t move as fast as others,
she didn’t crawl, she bottom shuffled, and the GP always
said she was fine, I asked about it several times. At two, we
were still worried so we went to…initiated by us…to a
specialist who said that ‘she was short and fat like her
mother’ and that was why she couldn’t turn her head
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enough and that I was a ‘fussy’ mum and nothing else was
picked up until she was four. It was hard to keep pushing
for information when I got responses like that from them,
but it’s your child’s health and as a mother you’ve got to
put it first…you know, I knew there was something not
quite right… call it mother’s instinct [laughs].
Avdi et al. (2000) have explored the role of parents’ knowledge in the
diagnosis of children with autistic spectrum disorders. They have suggested
that parents’ input is central in ascertaining an accurate diagnosis on account
of the fact that parents can be regarded as the true ‘experts’ on their children.
For Liz, the responsibility that mothers, in particular, assume for this expertise
is naturalised through the notion of a ‘mother’s instinct’. By virtue of being in
a close and intimate relationship with Cara, Liz could both detect a problem
and contribute expert knowledge to the diagnostic process that was
inaccessible to health care professionals. As Avdi et al. (2000) argue, medical
knowledge may be deemed fallible by such parents as it is rooted in
seemingly abstract concepts and language rather than ‘infallible’ everyday
sensory experiences by which they come to know their child’s condition
(Peters et al., 1998). For Avdi et al. (2000) therefore, the process of diagnosis
is a ‘meeting of experts’ where medical and experiential knowledge combine,
intersect and interrogate one another in order to produce an explanation for
the child’s behaviour or symptoms which is acceptable to both parent and
doctor. Whilst experiential knowledge was thus a valued resource to parents,
and could be used to reject the diagnoses or dismissals of health care
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professionals, the very perseverance of parents to obtain what they considered
to be the ‘correct’ diagnosis for their child nevertheless points to the
significance medical knowledge retained in spite of these issues. Obtaining a
medical diagnosis of SMA was indeed an important point of validation for
such parents and offered them a socially sanctioned framework through which
to interpret their experiences, as well as hope that something could be done
for their child. Experiential knowledge may therefore be understood as a key
driver in the processes of arriving at a diagnosis of SMA, but as knowledge
that was also interpreted in continual relation to medical knowledge. A sense
of there being ‘something wrong’ for parents was indeed grounded not only in
intimate knowledge of their child, but also in (largely) medically defined
notions of child development and normality.
Describing SMA
Whilst many participants were certain in their knowledge that ‘something was
wrong’ prior to a diagnosis of SMA in their family, when asked how they
would define or describe SMA, there was a diversity of responses.
Participants used a combination of medical, subjective and functional
descriptions of the effects of the condition. The key biomedical feature which
was present in all of the participants’ descriptions of the condition was muscle
weakness, sometimes referred to as ‘muscle atrophy’ of varying degrees.
Understandings of the biological mechanisms through which this muscle
weakness occurred, however, were far less clear. Participants explained the
aetiology of SMA in very different ways and had contrasting ideas about the
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biology underpinning their experiences. SMA was described as a
miscommunication between nerve and muscle, as the failure of muscles to
grow properly, as a wastage of the nerves supplying the muscle, as a failure of
the brain to produce certain proteins required for healthy muscle function, or
in terms of genetics, either as a ‘deletion’ of a particular gene or the ‘breaking
down’ of the gene responsible for muscle growth. Whilst medical terminology
and explanations were thus used to describe SMA, this particular
conceptualisation of the condition was interpreted alongside, and through,
experiential knowledge of living daily with the condition. Trisha is in her
thirties has a seven year old daughter, Joanna, who was diagnosed with type I
SMA in infancy, and feels that the medical descriptions of muscle atrophy to
explain her daughter’s decrease in ability over time do not tie in with her
observations of her daughter’s development, nor discussions with others who
experience SMA:
When I describe SMA what I normally say to people
is…when you’re born the neurons in the spine usually die
off…but in SMA, too many die, therefore you lose the
ability to walk and you lose the start to the nerves that
causes the innovation to the muscle. And um as people get
older the muscles kind of get weaker as they get more
pressure on them, as the body gets bigger, there is more
pressure. I don’t actually believe that the muscles waste as
such. I don’t think I can believe that, from seeing Joanna
grow up and watching her and just from listening to
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different people’s discussions… it’s not progressive; it’s
just that the more weight on the muscles the less they’re
able to do because there is more weight.
For Trisha, medical descriptions of muscle atrophy were negotiated alongside
her personal interpretations of her daughter’s disability; medical knowledge
became re-interpreted in the face of her experiential knowledge. Whilst Trisha
privileged her experiential knowledge in forming her view of the nature of the
condition, this knowledge was nevertheless imbued with medical language
and descriptions. In challenging dominant medical conceptualisations, Trisha
both mobilised medical knowledge but also recast it in terms of her subjective
interpretations of SMA. Markens et al. (2010), in their study of women’s uses
of expert and lay knowledge in decisions about the use of prenatal testing
decisions, have similarly argued that the relationship between experiential and
medical knowledge in this context may not be oppositional, as it has
frequently been described in the literature, but rather dynamic and synergistic.
Whilst some of the women they interviewed used their experiential
knowledge to challenge medical definitions of their reproductive risk, this
same medical knowledge was also used to validate and interpret their
experiential knowledge. Similarly, for participants living with SMA,
experiential and medical knowledge could not always be separated in a clear
way when defining SMA, but rather were interpreted, challenged and revised
through one another. A challenging of medical descriptions of SMA, as Trisha
demonstrated therefore, did not necessarily imply a rejection of medical
definitions of SMA more broadly, but rather the selective acceptance of
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knowledge that tallied with her own subjective interpretations of her
daughter’s experiences.
Aside from discussions around what are considered to be the ‘classic’
features of SMA, some participants further noted additional characteristics
which they assigned to the diagnostic category of SMA, but which are not
ordinarily offered as part of medical descriptions of SMA. These were derived
both from medical sources but also from lived experiences with the condition.
The possibilities of those diagnosed with SMA having heightened
intelligence, together with an outgoing, sociable personality were among such
features. Whilst some medical researchers have attempted to demonstrate the
association of SMA with enhanced cognitive ability through the use of Binet
and Wechsler IQ scales (Ogasawara, 1989) and more recently through
multidimensional tests such as the Kaufman Assessment Battery for Children
(von Gontard et al., 2002a), these have failed to demonstrate that intelligence
is related to SMA. However, they have suggested than children with SMA
may have some heightened cognitive abilities when conducting certain tasks
due to environmental factors. It is argued that children with SMA develop
cognitive skills to ‘compensate’ for their lack of physical abilities, as a
positive resource for coping with their ‘adversity’ (Von Gontard et al., 2002a:
134). Whilst these studies are problematic in that they are based on the
concept of ‘IQ’ (intelligence quotient) as an objective and measurable
phenomenon (Lezak, 1988) as well as an assumption that SMA is experienced
by those who live with as an ‘adversity’ to be overcome, for twenty
participants in the study, heightened IQ and an outgoing, confident and
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sociable personality were as much a feature of SMA as low muscle tone.
Dave and Fiona are the foster parents of an 8 year old boy diagnosed with
SMA type II and took part in an interview together. They described their
son’s strong personality and intelligence, which have been attributed by the
medical profession to his diagnosis of SMA:
You know he’s such a happy boy, he always comes in with a
smile, he’s always pleased to see you and he learns things
every day, he’s learning and you know he comes home and he
delights in showing us that he’s learnt something, and to us,
that’s fantastic…and he’s a comedian, you know, ever since a
young age, he’s always wanted to make people laugh…and
this is not just us, this is to everybody…anybody who’s
around, he wants to see them smiling. He has this positive
energy, much more than anyone else I’ve ever known. And
that’s part of SMA children, because I know a couple of other
children with SMA who are exactly the same, and it’s linked to
the SMA, we’ve been told this, we asked Dr [name] about it
and he said ‘yes that’s part of the SMA condition’. Intelligent,
outgoing, lovely children really, yeah.
These personality and intelligence features of SMA, however, were not
universally described by all participants. Some participants described feeling
very negative and withdrawn as a consequence of their experiences with
SMA. This is not to say that these participants did not have outgoing or
positive personalities, but rather that the perception supported by some
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participants- that people with SMA necessarily have positive responses to
their situation by virtue of their condition- did not tally with the realities
described by some participants. Four participants with SMA, all with
different forms of the condition and different ages of onset, for example,
reported experiencing depression, suicidal thoughts or had even attempted
suicide, in response to the implications SMA had for their lives. The
experiences that were described as contributing to this were not only
embodied experiences of SMA, but were also social and environmental; two
of these participants had lost their jobs as a result of their decreasing physical
abilities and one had experienced institutionalisation. These different forms of
experience with SMA will be returned to in Chapter 4.
The often contradictory accounts about what SMA is, including the
key features of the condition, suggest that SMA was experienced and defined
by those who live with it in markedly different ways in line with different
knowledge sources, and within a particular social context. The personal and
community investment, for example, in medical speculations about
personality and intelligence traits associated with SMA, point to the need to
affirm the value of the lives of those affected by SMA in the eyes of others, in
turn highlighting the devalued status of the lives of people with disabilities in
society more broadly. Different conceptualisations of SMA, moreover, were
derived as much from living intimately with the condition as they were from
medical knowledge of SMA, highlighting the way in which medical
definitions and descriptions of SMA were not straightforwardly accepted, but
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instead came to be challenged, revised or reinterpreted through experiential
accounts.
One area of medical knowledge of SMA which has been particularly
contested, both within and without the medical profession, is the way in
which SMA’s diagnostic sub-categories are ordered, and prognoses offered to
families. As has previously been stated, the diagnostic boundaries of SMA
have been chronically contested within the medical profession (Munsat and
Davies, 1992), and current classification systems do not offer enough
information for prognosis (Zerres et al., 1997). The degree of muscle
weakness to be expected over the life course, the susceptibility to chest
infections, the likelihood of premature death and the extent of anticipated
disability are all highly uncertain following a diagnosis of SMA. The medical
profession’s response to this situation has been the sub-categorisation of SMA
into ‘types’ to differentiate between different clinical trajectories. The
resulting clinical classification system (Munsat, 1992) has had a big impact on
those diagnosed with SMA, as it is on this basis that diagnosis and prognosis
are ascertained. However, as will now be discussed, participants’ lived
experiences with SMA often contradicted or transcended this typology,
leading them to revise their conceptualisations of SMA in line with this
knowledge.
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The Categorisation of SMA: Diagnosis and Typing
In 1991, an SMA Consortium meeting convened in New York to address,
amongst other issues, the ‘diagnostic quandary’ around SMA (Munsat and
Davies, 1992). There were debates between those who preferred descriptive
classifications of SMA (i.e. dividing those affected by SMA into those who
cannot sit unsupported, those who can sit but not walk, and those who can
walk), and those who preferred a numerical system for marking out the
boundaries of the different types of SMA. However, by the end of the
consortium, a consensus was reached for the classification of the childhood
SMAs, together with inclusion and exclusion criteria for a diagnosis of SMA
(Munsat and Davies, 1992). The classification system drawn up is represented
in table 5 below, as well as the ages at which participants in this study
received their diagnostic classification, in table 6.
Table 5: Spinal Muscular Atrophy: Clinical Classifications
Type Onset Course Age at Death
1 (Severe) Birth to 6 months Never sit Usually <2
years
2
(Intermediate)
<18 months Never stand >2 years
3 (Mild) >18 months Stand alone Adult
From: International Consortium on SMA (Munsat, 1991)
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Table 6: Timing of Diagnosis for Participants Diagnosed with SMA
Age at Diagnosis Number of Participants
< 5 21
5-10 1
10-20 1
20-30 0
30+ 2
Total 25
The classificatory system in table 5, together with molecular analysis,
continue to be the most common means by which diagnosis and prognosis are
reached for SMA today (JTSMA, 2010). The inclusion and exclusion criteria
associated with them have further contributed to the differentiation of
‘classical’ SMA from its variant forms, such as Autosomal Dominant Spinal
Muscular Atrophy (ADSMA), Spinal Muscular Atrophy and Respiratory
Distress (SMARD) and Spinal Bulbar Muscular Atrophy (SBMA) (La Spada
et al., 1991) (see Appendix VI for a description of these variant forms of
SMA). Whilst sharing similarities in clinical presentation, these conditions
have nevertheless been demonstrated to have contrasting genetic aetiology
and patterns of inheritance to classical SMA and thus are considered to be
separate forms of the same condition.
As well as distinguishing SMA from its variants, research following
the establishment of the 1992 classificatory system has attempted to show that
the different severities of SMA are linked to different genotypes. As Lefebvre
et al. (1995) and Roy et al. (1995) have argued, the extent of the deletion in
the 5q-region of the gene deemed responsible for SMA, and the dose of the
compensatory SMN2 gene (the so-called ‘rescuer’ gene as it is understood to
126
compensate for deletions on SMN1- the ‘SMA gene’) appear to influence the
clinical course of SMA, so that SMA type I is associated with the largest
deletions in the 5q-region and with fewer copies of the rescuer SMN2 gene,
and the milder SMA type III with smaller deletions and higher copy numbers
of the SMN2 gene. Thus, this form of genetic diagnosis of the type of SMA
became incorporated into diagnostic procedures from the 1990s (Dubowitz,
1995a).
Despite this classificatory system and molecular analysis being widely
accepted and used to diagnose and classify different forms of SMA, the
shortfalls of these methods have been documented in the medical literature on
SMA. The considerable variability in presentation and abilities within each
classificatory type of SMA (Dubowitz, 1991; Hausmanowa-Petrusewicz et al.,
1992), together with examples of incongruence between genetic and clinical
findings (Cuscó et al., 2006), have raised questions about whether more genes
might be involved with SMA causation than originally thought (Zerres et al.,
1997). Indeed, one participant in this study found herself classified under two
diagnostic brackets on the basis of contradictory genetic and clinical findings:
‘They say I’m type II, because I’ve got all the signs of type II, but then
genetically I’m type III, so it’s quite confusing’ (Beth).
The range of muscle weakness experienced by those within one
diagnostic category of SMA as well as the variable age of onset, and also age
at death, within these groupings have led to some further attempts within the
medical SMA community to expand on the 1991 classificatory system. Zerres
and Rudnik-Schöneborn (1995), for example, have suggested an expansion to
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include a type IV SMA, with an onset after age 35 and involving relatively
mild weakness, whereas Dubowitz (1999) pointed out the possibility of SMA
occurring in utero and has thus supported the creation of another diagnostic
category, ‘type 0 SMA’, defined primarily by a prenatal onset. In 1995,
Dubowitz (1995b) also tentatively suggested the introduction of a decimal
point system, so that each type of SMA could be further sub-categorised on a
scale between .1 and .9, depending on severity in order to more accurately
capture some of this diversity in abilities and muscle weakness whereas
Zerres et al. (1997) suggested a less discriminating sub-category system,
between a type I SMA ‘a’ and ‘b’. However there remains little evidence that
these systems have been implemented diagnostically, and no one who took
part in this study reported being given a diagnosis whereby the type was sub-
categorised.
Attempts to produce an accurate categorisation system for SMA
within the medical profession have been further hampered by contextual
factors. Given that the only fatal component of SMA is reduced respiratory
function (due to weakening of the muscles needed to support breathing),
improvements in ventilatory support technology and the widespread
availability of antibiotics to treat chest infections have meant that many more
children diagnosed with severe SMA are surviving infancy, beyond their
anticipated age of death, as set out by the 1991 classificatory system; 32% of
infants diagnosed with Type I SMA are now surviving past age 2 (Zerres et
al., 1997) and type II SMA, whilst once understood to be a life-limiting
condition has now been re-classified as many people so-diagnosed are now
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experiencing far longer than anticipated life spans. This ‘prolonged survival’
has been attributed in the medical literature to increased knowledge about
maintaining appropriate nutrition, posture and respiratory function in this
group of individuals (Zerres et al.,1997; Willig et al., 1995; Gilgoff et al.,
1989). These compounding factors further highlight the difficulties of
predicting the disease trajectory on the basis of genetic and clinical
evaluations alone.
For families and individuals keen to obtain an accurate diagnosis and
prognosis for SMA, the diagnostic sub-types of SMA may therefore offer
parents and individuals an estimate of the likely degree of muscle weakness or
respiratory difficulties to be experienced by the individual. However, as
Nicole et al. (2002) have argued, the typing system that emerged out of the
1991 SMA consortium is best understood as a loose guide for both clinicians
and families diagnosed with SMA (p. 4), and there remains no thorough and
reliable indicator of the disease trajectory to offer those diagnosed with SMA.
Experiencing the Diagnosis
The arrival at a diagnosis of SMA for the participants in this study typically
marked a particularly important point in participants’ accounts of living with
SMA, and was the point around which many of their descriptions of life with
SMA began. As Jutel (2009) has argued, the power of diagnosis rests in its
ability to ‘sort out the real from the imagined, the valid from the feigned, the
significant from the insignificant’ (Jutel, 2009: 279), and for participants who
had experienced the dismissal of their concerns by other family members or
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health care professionals, the diagnosis of a recognisable medical condition
provided a validation of their experiences; it was the confirmation that
something was ‘really’ wrong. For parents of children who were diagnosed
with type I SMA, however, the diagnosis of SMA typically did not follow a
protracted search for answers, but rather was the result of a fraught period of
rapid tests following a dramatic decline in health of their child, sometimes
only over a few hours. Shannon is 37 years old and was living in Australia at
the time she received a diagnosis of SMA type I for her daughter, Millie,
following the sudden onset of feeding difficulties at just 6 weeks of age. After
spinal x rays and a brain scan failed to identify an explanation for Millie’s
feeding difficulties, a consultant ordered blood tests:
[Dr’s name] looked at her lack of movement in her legs and
said that he wanted to take blood and he was testing for
Spinal Muscular Atrophy. It was then that it started to
become a reality. [Dr’s name] said that he wanted the blood
tests to rule out SMA, but the best case scenario for Millie
was that she would have some kind of Muscle Dystrophy
and require a wheelchair. Aidan [husband] and I took
Millie home and once she was asleep we spent the whole
night crying. The following day [Dr’s name] phoned us at
home to see how we were and obviously we were
distraught. He asked us did we want a second opinion to
which we said yes. Unfortunately this day was a Friday and
he couldn't get anyone to see us until Monday at 5.15pm.
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We had to wait the whole weekend which seemed like a
lifetime. Eventually the Monday came around and we saw
a neurologist who examined Millie and very bluntly told us
that he agreed with [Dr’s name] that Millie had SMA. I
was stunned but because he was so cold and blunt I didn't
cry until we were out of his room. On leaving the hospital I
called [Dr’s name] on his mobile and said what the
neurologist told us and the likelihood of the blood test
coming back negative ...he said very unlikely. I felt like my
heart had been pulled out of my body and squashed on the
floor. And that’s how it was diagnosed because the test
came back positive.
The importance of biomedical information in shaping the experience of
Millie’s SMA is evident in Shannon’s comment that it was at the point that
testing began that SMA ‘started to become a reality’, despite the feeding
difficulties beginning prior to this. The diagnosis of a serious disability in the
family has been described as ‘family crisis’ in the literature and one
frequently surrounded by reactions of horror, dismay, guilt, grief and disbelief
(Ellis, 1989; Fortier and Wanlass, 1984; Buchanan et al., 1979; Ferguson,
2002). In such ‘critical situations’ (Giddens, 1979: 127), taken-for-granted
assumptions about reality are disturbed and individuals are thrown into a state
of confusion and displacement (Bury, 1982). Such reactions were reflected in
the accounts of other participants in the study; the diagnosis of SMA was
described as a situation in which the ‘world was turned upside down’ (Trisha,
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mother of girl diagnosed with SMA type I). Young et al. (2002) in their
studies of mothers of children with cancer and borrowing from the work of
Bury (1982), have argued that the point of diagnosis for parents of children
with serious conditions represents a point of ‘biographical disruption’,
‘signalling their transition from mothers of a ‘healthy’ child to mothers of a
child in crisis’ (Young et al., 2002: 1837). Bury (1982) coined the term
‘biographical disruption’ to refer to a multi-faceted effect of, and response to,
chronic illness. The onset of a chronic and debilitating illness can pose
fundamental challenges to individuals’ life worlds, exposing them to
experiences and realities that were hitherto incomprehensible (Bury, 1997).
Whilst Bury (1992) had in mind the onset of a long term illness or disability
in adult life when considering biographical disruption, Young et al. (2002)
have extended the concept to mothers of children who are diagnosed with
cancer. For such mothers, Young et al. argue, the diagnosis of cancer marked
a period of major transition where roles, identities and meanings were
fundamentally challenged and renegotiated (Young et al., 2002: 1825).
Indeed, such mothers had to redefine their caring responsibilities and roles as
mothers to incorporate their child’s (often intensive) treatment regime and to
adjust to a changing relationship with their child, which involved new forms
of ‘emotion work’ and altered conceptions of childhood (Young et al., 2002:
1841). A similar sense of ‘biographical disruption’ was reported by the three
participants who received their diagnosis past the age of ten. For two of them,
this occurred well into their adult lives, at a point when they had full time
jobs and dependent children. For Brian who was diagnosed with SBMA in his
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late forties, the diagnosis marked a point in his life where he had to re-
evaluate his life, values and sense of self: ‘I had to really work to put my life
back together again after that point [diagnosis] because it was just
shattered…absolutely shattered. I wasn’t who I used to be, and I never could
be again’. The diagnosis of SMA, therefore, whilst on the one hand, marking
a point at which participants could establish a socially legitimated reading of
their experiences, was simultaneously a point at which previously taken-for-
granted roles, identities and relationships were fundamentally challenged.
After this, participants often invested large quantities of energy and resources
to ‘normalise in the face of disruption’ (Bury, 1982: 177) and come to terms
with the changes the diagnosis meant for their lives and those around them.
Type and Prognosis
The type of SMA diagnosed was described as a particularly significant aspect
of the diagnostic process for many families and individuals, as it provided an
outline of the anticipated course of the disease. As Rachel, whose daughter
was diagnosed with type II commented ‘…it lets you know what you’re up
against’.
All participants who took part in this study except four were aware of
the type of SMA diagnosed within their family, and described it as belonging
to one of the ‘classic’ three types (I-III) or its variants, SBMA, SMARD or
ADSMA (see Appendix VI for descriptions). From the four participants who
reported that they were unaware of the type of SMA within their family, three
stated that they were not interested in knowing a great deal of medical
133
information about SMA as they felt it to be irrelevant, and the fourth could
not recall what type of SMA their sibling had been diagnosed with in the
interview.
Despite the apparent importance attributed to diagnostic categories at
the point of diagnosis however, as many families reported, there was often an
imperfect match between the prognosis offered for a particular diagnosis of
SMA and the way in which the condition was actually experienced in day-to-
day reality. The classification system and the inconsistencies within it, as
highlighted by Matilda’s account previously, had implications not only for
families’ expectations and hopes for the future, but also for their present
identities. Trisha, whose daughter, Joanna, was diagnosed with type I SMA
described how Joanna’s survival beyond the life expectancy assigned to her
diagnosis had implications for Trisha’s sense of belonging amongst others
with SMA:
T: When she was diagnosed, she was diagnosed with type I and
we were told she wouldn’t see her second birthday, as you
are…And obviously, well she’s 8 in April, so clearly for her that
was the wrong clinical decision…and they won’t re-classify her,
as they say that clinically she is type I.
F: What sort of impact has that had on you?
T: Well...I’m a volunteer for the JTSMA and I really ummed and
ahhed about it because I don’t really feel like there’s a place for
me within it. You know we’re not really type I or type II, we
don’t really fit their…either of those bands because Joanna’s is
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still here, and when I go to the conferences I get a mixed reaction
from people, erm most don’t believe she’s been diagnosed with
type I, because a lot of people there have lost their children to
type I and they find it very hard to… understand and accept why
Joanna’s still here…and their child isn’t.
Hedgecoe (2002) has argued that diagnostic categories are important in terms
of the development of patient identities, as well as their imaginings of the
future. Trisha and Joanna occupied a space between diagnostic categories
which served to alienate them from other families affected by SMA. Rather
than clarifying the prognosis, the diagnosis of type I SMA reinforced the
haziness of the boundaries of the types of SMA, and the large degree of
overlap between the types. Whilst Trisha’s experiences with her daughter
forced her to reconsider the diagnostic boundaries of SMA type I and to re-
conceptualise it as a condition with which children can survive early infancy,
for other participants, the uncertainty about the boundaries of the types of
SMA occurred through the experiences of families other than their own.
The experiential knowledge gained through meeting other people
affected by SMA and listening to their stories -what Etchegary et al. (2008)
refer to ‘vague’ experiential knowledge- had an important role to play in
clouding the waters of the classifications of SMA and introducing uncertainty
to what had hitherto been taken for granted medical information. Lily was
diagnosed with SMA in childhood but did not know this was a diagnosis of
SMA type II until she was 15 years of age. Whilst not having much contact
with anyone else with SMA throughout her life, Lily became more involved
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with others with SMA in her twenties when she decided she wanted to have
more information about the condition. Lily attended her first JTSMA annual
conference when she was 28, an experience which she found particularly
bewildering in terms of her understanding of SMA:
When I was 15, I found out that I had type II and you read
about what type I, II and III entail, and you go on the
Jennifer Trust [website] and you type in SMA type II and it
comes up with all this information and you know…I just
thought I was so lucky to be type II because you look at type
I and you know the outcome and I just thought ‘phew’ you
know, ‘you’re out of the woods’ sort of thing, does that make
sense? You sort of think ‘Oh thank God, you know, I’ve had
a lucky escape, I’ve not got type I’. And then you go to the
Jennifer Trust [conference] and you see all of the type II
people and you think there’s so much variation and there are
people who look nothing like what I thought type II would
look like because I’d never had contact really, but I just
presumed they’d be like me…So in hindsight, I hung on to
the fact that I only had type II and I clung to that and I took
that for granted, but having gone to the Jennifer Trust
conference…I just don’t think the typings are very
informative anymore…because the spectrum is so massive
and they can’t even remotely try to whittle it down to like…
descriptions, if that makes sense.
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Lily’s embodied understanding of what type II SMA was like was
fundamentally challenged through attending the JTSMA conference and
gaining indirect experiential knowledge of other people’s type II SMA.
Whereas prior to this insight, the categorization of SMA had been a source of
security and certainty for Lily, enabling her to see type II SMA as ‘not that
bad’ and ‘taking it for granted’, seeing others with type II forced her to
reconceptualise the types of SMA in ways that were highly uncertain. For
Lily, this blending of medical and experiential knowledge, and the emergent
conceptualisations and ways of thinking about SMA, were not necessarily
welcome, as she commented: “I don’t think it’s that helpful to experience and
see it really [different people affected by SMA at the JTSMA conference] I
always say ‘ignorance is bliss’ and I still swear by that” (Lily). Henwood et
al. (2003) in their analysis of debates around the expert/lay knowledge divide
use the example of the emergence of the ‘informed’ or ‘reflexive’ patient to
argue that a fundamental oversight in these debates exists. They argue that
there are particular constraints on patients’ abilities and willingness to
become informed about their own health condition. One such constraint is the
reluctance of patients to take on board health information about their
condition (p.604); in many instances, they argue, the preference of the patient
is to defer to expert medical knowledge in order to remove difficult or
challenging decisions or distress that may emerge from this knowledge. In a
similar way, Lily wished to avoid coming into contact with extensive
information about the condition affecting her. For her, medical information
about SMA could potentially be distressing and unsettling rather than
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transforming her into an ‘informed patient’, and thus in order to minimise the
influence the condition had on her life, she actively avoided the acquisition of
such knowledge.
For other individuals, the classification system for SMA, rather than
blurred and unreliable as Lily’s account suggested, was instead presented as
being definite and clear cut. This was especially so for parents who had
children who died of SMA type I. For some of these participants, the apparent
certainty around the classifications of SMA (and thus the associated
prognoses) enabled these parents to accept their child’s prospects. Charlie is
in her 50s and experienced the deaths of two children (Jack and Alexis) from
SMA type I, both within the first year of their lives. Presenting the
classificatory system and associated prognoses as definite played a pivotal
role in aiding her acceptance of her first baby (Jack)’s diagnosis and
subsequent prognosis:
…when the doctors got the tests back and they told us they
were 100% sure and that he would definitely die and there was
nothing I could do about it, I felt quite relieved at that because
I knew that there was nothing I could physically do for Jack,
you know, he would die, and that created a sort of comfort for
me because I knew that no matter what I did, you know, he
would die. It wasn’t like cancer you know where there’s a
chance of them living but there’s a chance of them dying, I
don’t think I could have coped with that. I couldn’t have coped
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with that kind of uncertainty. And so we could accept that, and
that was a fact.
Charlie’s interpretation of the medical classifications, and thus the prognosis
associated with type I SMA as an undisputable and inevitable ‘fact,’ once
again points to the way in which experiential and medical knowledge are
mobilised together in forming conceptualisations of, and responses to, SMA.
Whilst Charlie’s experiential knowledge of SMA was, at this point, limited to
that of Jack who had just been diagnosed with the condition, her experiential
knowledge of how to make sense of, and attribute authority to, genetic test
results, and, further, her conceptualisation of a comparable condition (cancer),
were used to reaffirm medical classifications of SMA and the certainty of the
fatality of Jack’s condition. The perception of certainty around diagnosis and
prognosis offered Charlie a sense of reassurance and acceptance, and
consequently relieved her of the difficulties which she associated, through her
experiential knowledge, with an uncertain or changeable prognosis.
For other participants, however, the presentation of uncertainty
surrounding the different types of SMA had functional benefits. Rhona is 27
years old and was diagnosed with SMA type III in early childhood. However,
at this time, she was not given any indication as to the type or prognosis
associated with this diagnosis. She was able to remain ambulant into her teens
and now in her twenties uses a wheelchair, but is able to walk short distances
with the assistance of elbow crutches. For Rhona, the uncertainty surrounding
her prognosis and the lack of expectation was central to the maintenance of
her mobility:
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…There wasn’t much information available at all [at the
time of her diagnosis], we were told that the outcome was
uncertain really and I think in the long run that served me
well…the one doctor I was seeing when I was going
through a rough patch when I was 13… I was putting
weight on and I was finding mobility really really difficult,
he strongly believed that from then I could quite easily
have made the decision to go into a powered wheelchair
and then I would have lost the ability to walk, but because
we just weren’t expecting that to come, we expected me to
be mobile… forever sort of thing, and hoped that I would
be, it was very much, you know, I was really encouraged to
walk as much as possible, by my family. And I kind of got
through that phase through doing a lot of exercise and I do
feel that it would have been a very logical point to say,
‘right, stop the fight, kind of thing, start using a powered
wheelchair’ and then I think that that obviously would have
had a knock on effect on…I would have deteriorated then,
but it was because we weren’t sure and we didn’t know to
expect that I kept going.
For Rhona and her family, uncertainty had a large role to play in her
experience of SMA; the optimism from her family derived from the lack of a
clear prognosis and publicly available information on SMA. Davis (1960) in a
study of parents and children affected by Paralytic Poliomyelitis, refers to
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‘functional uncertainty’ (p.45) as being a mechanism utilized in doctor-patient
relationships to divert the emotional distress associated with a poor prognosis
and a means by which families and patients can remain optimistically hopeful
about the future. The lack of information concerning Rhona’s prognosis and
the associated uncertainty opened up a space for Rhona and her parents to
remain optimistic about the future and led to the avoidance of interventions
that, Rhona feels, would ultimately have been counter-productive in her
development. Through not knowing what to expect from life with SMA,
Rhona was able to adjust in a way that she felt she might not have been able
to had she known from the outset that she would eventually lose the ability to
walk. In this way, uncertainty within medical knowledge both shaped Rhona’s
experiences with SMA, but also became the basis from which she challenged
medical categorisations:
…I’m just not sure that the types [of SMA] can tell you
very much, as you can tell from my experience [laughs]
and there can be so much variation…I mean, they still
don’t really know what type I am, one doctor’s said ‘you’re
definitely a type III because you’ve got your mobility’ and
another one has said ‘you’re definitely a type II because
you’re too poor to be a type III’…[…]… So really, it’s not
all set in stone and there’s such a wide spectrum…we don’t
all fit into the boxes!
Experiential knowledge and medical knowledge of SMA, therefore, both fed
into and informed one another in the construction of Rhona’s perception of
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SMA, and her responses to it. Whilst Rhona was aware that the medical
typology of SMA had limited value in terms of offering a prognosis, and her
experiences defied medical classification, the centrality of this system as a
way of conceptualising SMA nevertheless was apparent in Rhona’s response,
and was reflected in many participants’ responses. Whilst medical knowledge
of SMA, therefore, was contested, it nevertheless was central to the way in
which participants constructed their perceptions of SMA.
As has been discussed within this section, families and individuals
living with SMA had to negotiate and reconcile different forms of knowledge
in arriving at understandings of what SMA is, and how it should be classified.
Contradictions and tensions often existed between expert medical knowledge
of SMA and the way in which it was experienced by those living with it in
their daily lives. For some participants, this lack of clarity had functional
benefits, whereas for others, the presentation of medical and experiential
knowledge as certain enabled them to make sense of, and manage the lived
realities of SMA.
Experiential knowledge emerged as a particularly important resource
within participants’ accounts; it could be drawn upon for practical advice and
reassurance, or to challenge medical knowledge. As one mother, Natasha,
who has identical twin boys both diagnosed with SMA type II, commented
about the importance of information gained from JTSMA members:
…The prognosis we got from the hospital for the boys
was ‘may not survive childhood’ but the prognosis from
the Jennifer Trust and the families we meet there is ‘can
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survive into adulthood’ and we prefer to look at the
positives. It is important for us to be a part of the Trust
and see all the children and young people because you
realize that SMA is so broad and that the doctors can
only tell you their perspective, but there is a lot to be
gained from speaking to the people who live with
it…they are the ones who really know what it’s like.
The contrast Natasha draws between the medical prognosis she received for
her sons, and the ‘prognosis’ gained from experiential knowledge, from ‘the
ones who really know’, is revealing in terms of the way in which experiential
knowledge can be mobilised not only to support and validate certain
experiences, but also to displace and contest medical knowledge in different
contexts. Whilst Natasha may still value medical knowledge of her sons’
condition, her assertion highlights the perception, held by participants in this
study, that the knowledge of SMA possessed by those living intimately with it
is a multi-faceted form of knowledge, inaccessible to the medical profession,
and one based in lived realities, rather than abstract notions, as Natasha went
on to comment:
….doctors obviously have their views on SMA, and you
take that on board… what they recommend, but you also
keep in mind that they’re coming at it from the point of
view of muscles and cells and nerves and all that,
and…really, the way they see it isn’t necessarily how we
live it.
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As Natasha highlights, not only are experiential and medical knowledge of
SMA derived from different sources, but their content is also substantially
different. Indeed, medical knowledge of SMA could often be experienced as
alienating given its highly technical and seemingly abstract nature, which did
not necessarily tally with everyday experiences of SMA.
Genetic knowledge of SMA was an aspect of medical knowledge
which further had a substantial impact on the way in which SMA was
understood and responded to, both by the medical profession, but also by
those living with SMA, as presented below.
The Geneticization of SMA
The location of the gene deemed responsible for causing SMA in 1990 by
Gilliam et al.’s group in New York, and shortly after by another team in Paris
(Melki et al., 1990), was heralded as a landmark in the history of SMA
(Dubowitz, 2008). It enabled the use of prenatal diagnosis of SMA through
the use of DNA markers, and was widely regarded as a starting point for the
development of effective treatments or even a cure for SMA. SMA became
classified as an ‘allelic disorder’, meaning that it involves a pair of genes on a
chromosome, and linkage analyses mapped this chromosome as 5q11.2-13.3
(Melki et al., 1990). SMA came to be understood as inherited in an autosomal
(i.e. relating to a chromosome that is not a sex chromosome) recessive pattern.
However, as the region of the aforementioned chromosome is regarded as
unstable (Nichole et al., 2002), there are also a high number of so-called ‘de
novo’ mutations deemed to cause SMA. ‘De novo mutations’ refer to genetic
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mutations that are not inherited, but occur during conception. These de novo
mutations can subsequently be passed on to future generations. Melki et al.
(1994) estimate that approximately 2% of those diagnosed with SMA have
such de novo mutations. However, the vast majority of those diagnosed with
SMA are found to have mutations in the SMN1 (Survival Motor Neuron)
gene, on chromosome 5q. In a study of 500 patients with SMA by Zerres et al.
(1997), 96% of those with SMA type I were found to have deletions on this
chromosome, 94% of those with type II and 82% of those with type III SMA
(Zerres et al., 1997: 202). Whilst the identification of the gene deemed
responsible for most cases of SMA did little to resolve debates about how to
classify the various presentations of SMA, genetic understandings of SMA
have altered the way in which it is diagnosed, and also the way in which cures
and treatments are conceptualised. Research on cures for SMA, for example,
has concentrated efforts on different ways of maximising the function of
SMN2, the so-called ‘rescuer’ gene, to compensate for the deleted SMN1.
This process is known as ‘transcriptional activation’ and correction of the
‘splicing’ of a copy gene (Wirth et al., 2006). Activation of this process has
been attempted through different chemicals, such as sodium butyrate (Chang
et al., 2001) and valporic acid (Brichta et al., 2003), as well as through stem
cell and gene therapies (Kerr et al., 2000; DiDonato, 2003). More recently, the
restorative possibilities of embryonic stem cells administered following
muscle atrophy have been suggested (Corti et al., 2008). These studies
highlight the potential to reverse the effects of SMA after they have started,
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although the direct benefits of this research to those living with SMA through
a definitive cure remain elusive.
The Genetic Diagnosis
Whilst the diagnosis of a serious and incurable physical condition in the
family was experienced as a major disruptive event for participants in this
study, the genetic aetiology of the condition carried with it its own specific
implications for the families and individuals who took part. The medical and
psychological literature points to the possibility of parents and families of
children with serious conditions experiencing a sense of responsibility for the
condition afflicting their offspring (Chapple et al., 1995; O’Dougherty and
Brown, 1990; Kerr and McIntosh, 2000; Young et al., 2002). However, for
families diagnosed as being affected by an inheritable condition, the
experience of guilt may be particularly pronounced (Kessler, 1998; Kay and
Kingston, 2002) and has been documented as being a common parental
reaction in relation to the diagnosis of other genetic conditions of childhood
such as DMD (Buchanan et al., 1979), Mytonic Dystrophy (Faulkner and
Kingston, 1998), Fragile X Syndrome (James et al., 2006), Sickle Cell
Disease (Evans et al., 1988) and CF (Fanos and Johnson, 2005) as well as
being observed in anecdotal accounts of parents of children with genetic
conditions (Gore Olsen, 2006). Indeed, by their very nature, genetic
conditions implicate more than one individual, and the consequences genetic
information has for family relationships as well as individual subjectivities
has been widely explored, particularly in relation to the notion of
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responsibility (Burgess and D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001; Dragonas, 2001;
Kay and Kingston, 2002; Hallowell et al., 2006; Hallowell, 1999; Hallowell,
2003; Hallowell et al., 2005; Downing, 2005; D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001;
Reed, 2007; Rhodes, 1998; Rose and Novas, 2004). For Polzer et al. (2002)
and Novas and Rose (2000), the increasing availability of genetic knowledge
has led to new forms of personhood; our notion of self has become inherently
relational, and imbued with responsibility to actively manage health
information, not only for ourselves, but for our biologically related kin. Polzer
et al. (2002) have related this shift to ‘neoliberal programmes of governance’
(Polzer et al., 2002: 156), whereby individuals are encouraged to regulate
their actions and selves in line with political objectives. Thus, the assumption
of responsibility for one’s own health is a characteristic of neoliberal
societies, and the practices of genetic testing and the procurement of genetic
risk information, not only for ourselves, but for our biological kin, has been
regarded as an extension of this obligation (Lupton, 1995; Peterson, 1998). As
Hallowell notes:
Biomedical discourses construct genetic risks as
internally imposed involuntary health risks. However, the
fact that these risks are involuntary does not absolve gene
carriers of the responsibility to act to protect their health.
Indeed, it could be argued that because genetic risks are
portrayed as part of the individual’s make up, their
responsibility to act to protect their health, or the health
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of future generations, is emphasised, for inherited risk
cannot be blamed on external sources.
(Hallowell, 1999: 599)
For families affected by SMA, particularly for parents, there was a strong
sense of responsibility attached to the genetic diagnosis of SMA and many
parents, and grandparents, blamed themselves (or each other) for having
passed on the condition to their offspring. Guilt is strongly associated with
responsibility, in that guilt can be understood as an emotional response to
feeling responsible for some (perceived) offence. For five parents of children
with SMA, the knowledge that SMA had been inherited was described as the
hardest part of the diagnosis, whereas for others, this experience of guilt was
transient and recurred in particular contexts. Paula has a 13 year old daughter,
Tamara, who was diagnosed with SMA type II, and a 9 year old son, Ethan,
who is able-bodied. Paula described her reaction to the inheritable nature of
SMA in the following way:
When we first found out it was genetic…um… I suppose
you just accept it really because I don’t think there’s
anything you can really do…if you’ve got that gene…
and I suppose we just accepted it really. We knew it came
from one of the parents, you know, of ours [Paula and her
husband’s]. But then just sometimes… you know we
look at Ethan and then you know look at Tamara and
sometimes you know she will say ‘why can’t I do this?’
or ‘It’s not fair’ or ‘how do you think I feel?’ and when
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you do hear her saying these things sometimes you do
think well ‘it is our fault that you’re like it’, you know
me and my husband’s, you know, we gave it her.
For Paula, her initial acceptance of the genetic diagnosis as being beyond her
personal control became displaced by her everyday experiences of her
daughter’s condition. Watching her daughter struggle or comparing her son’s
abilities to her daughter’s triggered feelings of responsibility or guilt; they
were contextually dependent and not a constant factor in her life. For other
participants in the study, reactions to the genetic diagnosis and the
implications for the experience of guilt were inextricably tied to the nature of
the SMA experience; where the effects of SMA were perceived to be
particularly severe or debilitating, guilt reactions appeared to be stronger, or
surfaced at ‘critical points’ (Bury, 1982) e.g. at diagnosis, when witnessing
suffering, when undergoing major surgery, or at the death of someone from
SMA (which will be returned to in Chapter 4). Genetic information was thus
received and responded to in the context of the experience of SMA and was
understood both in relation to, and through, this lived reality.
The intersection of experiential and genetic knowledge of SMA, as well
as prompting guilt reactions, has also meant that the ‘geneticization’
(Lippman, 1991) of SMA has not been universally accepted by those living
with SMA as relevant or significant in their lives. Isabella is 21 years old and
was diagnosed with SMA type II in early childhood. She has used a
wheelchair all of her life and is currently attending university, completing an
149
undergraduate degree. For Isabella, genetic information about SMA has very
little meaning for her:
Genetics is something I’ve never really thought about a great
deal to be honest. I mean I know it’s [SMA] genetic, and I
saw a lot of posters when I was little for ‘Jeans for Genes’
day and I’d see SMA and I’d be like ‘oh that’s what I’ve got’
but genetics…it just doesn’t really mean anything to me. I
don’t really understand how it relates to my life…I mean, I
know what genes are, I did Biology A level, I know all about
the science or whatever but I just don’t really like to put a
label on it.
For Isabella, the genetic language medical professionals use to describe the
aetiology of SMA did not speak to her own life; identifying her condition in
this way was, for Isabella, part of a medicalised way of thinking about, and
understanding her experiences, in which labelling and categorisation are of
fundamental importance. However, Isabella’s subjective experiences of her
self, identity and life allowed little room for such clearly defined categories:
Do you know though, I don’t even think of myself as a
disabled person either, I just don’t like categorising it in that
way because yeah I’m 100% reliant on people physically, if I
was left on my own for three days I would die because I can’t
get to the tap, but then mentally I’m not reliant at all. But then
you know some people who may be able to look after
themselves physically might not be able to sort out their
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money, or they may not be very strong, you know,
psychologically, in their thinking…so there are loads of things
and thousands of different ways of looking at abilities and
disabilities. So I just don’t really see the need to label it at all.
The medicalisation of Isabella’s life through the application of a diagnostic
label, and the social categorisation to which she felt subject, did not sit
comfortably with her perception of her own life (or the lives of others), in
which identities and subjectivities were far more fluid and unstable than such
compartmentalised thinking would permit.
Genetics and the Notion of Cure
Whilst some experienced the geneticization of SMA as a way of viewing
SMA abstracted from their daily realities, for others, the genetic status of
SMA was more intimately bound to the notion of cure. The construction of
SMA as a genetic condition which carries with it the suggestion that it may
one day be cured through advanced genetic technologies, is a representation
of the condition frequently harnessed by the JTSMA and other ‘genetic
advocacy groups’ (Novas, 2007) as a means by which to secure public
funding for research activities and to support fundraising activities. The
priority given to genetic explanations for SMA by organisations such as the
JTSMA has meant that the experiential knowledge of SMA accumulated
within and between members of the JTSMA has thus, inevitably, been shaped
by this genetic knowledge. For some members, this genetic knowledge
became a means by which to deal with everyday experiences of SMA and
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frames their experiential knowledge of the condition. Rakesh is 51 years old
and was diagnosed with ADSMA in his 40s after experiencing increasing
muscle weakness over a period of several years. For Rakesh, the concept of a
cure through the use of stem cells was particularly important:
…I have to believe that they will find a cure for SMA. I just
have to. You see I follow the developments in the research,
they are developing it every day and they can use stem cells
now to treat it, don’t they? In China…there was an article,
the other week, or the week before…. in the Observer, a
woman from Manchester and they found the gene that causes
her condition, and they replaced it with stem cells in the
brain. One month after the treatment, the necessity for her to
use the wheelchair is not there anymore so she is moving
about without help of wheelchair…so I am hopeful for that. I
remember that when I am experiencing my problems, a cure
will be on its way.
Holtzman (1999) and Fleising (2001) have used the term ‘genohype’ to
describe the way in which advances in genetic medicine have encouraged the
development of unrealistically high hopes and expectations for treatments and
cures amongst those living with genetic conditions (as discussed in Chapter
1). Indeed, whilst Rakesh appeared to acknowledge that there was a
possibility that such a cure may not be forthcoming, the anticipation of it
nevertheless shaped his daily life with SMA, enabling him to stay hopeful
that his symptoms would one day be alleviated. Shakespeare (2008a) has
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pointed to the way in which such genohype, or the rhetoric of cure being ‘just
around the corner’ (p. 101) is one that is frequently mobilised by medical
researchers in order to secure funding for, and to validate, their own work.
However, the reality of progress in this area has not kept pace with the raised
hopes of many families and individuals living with SMA, as I witnessed
myself at the 2009 JTSMA conference, in the fraught exchanges between the
guest speaker, a leading geneticist researching SMA, and the parents of young
children living with SMA.
However, the geneticization of SMA and subsequent suggestion of
cure or intervention has not been accepted as relevant or significant by all of
those living with SMA. Kristen is in her late twenties, was diagnosed with
SMA type II in childhood and has never been able to walk. She has an older
sister, Ellie, who was diagnosed with type III SMA at the same time that
Kristen received her diagnosis:
I don’t really know and I’ve always um not really been
that bothered about a cure. I know it’s [SMA] genetic,
but in my day to day life that doesn’t really mean that
much…and I’ve never really, um, been, um, focused on
treatment and ‘there has to be some sort of cure’…some
people are like that and…that’s not really been
something I’ve been that bothered about. I’d rather focus
on what I can do now. Often these things [cure] don’t
end up happening anyway, do they? I’m sure if you
spoke to my sister, she’d have a different opinion, even
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though people expect me to feel more strongly about it
because it [SMA] affects me in a more severe way than
her.
For Kristen, maintaining her focus on her experiences of SMA in her daily
life was a means by which to manage the hype surrounding genetic
technologies and consequently her expectations of a cure that may, or may
not, materialise. She further relates this disinterest in the concept of cure to
the very nature of her impairment, and her experiential knowledge of it.
Shakespeare (2008a) in his writing on the response of disability rights
supporters to the notion of cure, has highlighted the nature of impairment
experiences as a significant influence on disabled people’s attitudes towards,
and acceptance of, the notion of cure. Those with permanent and unchanging
impairments, particularly those present since birth or early childhood, he has
argued, have typically been less interested in the notion of cure than those
whose impairments may be described as degenerative or painful. Within this
latter impairment group, the prospect of cure often develops into a quest to
return to a (previously known) state of higher functioning or able-bodiedness
(Shakespeare, 2008: 106), articulated through the language of genetic
medicine. Indeed, for Rakesh who, unlike Kristen, had witnessed a decline in
his abilities over time and wanted to regain the life he had previously
experienced, approached genetic research into SMA from a different
perspective. The framing of his experiences of SMA as amenable to both
change and recovery, moreover, not only enabled him to remain hopeful
about the future, but also to manage the uncertainty of his present with SMA.
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The nature of impairment experiences associated with SMA will be returned
to in Chapter 5.
Conclusions
In conclusion, using the examples of the emergence of SMA as a disease
entity, the development of its medical typology and finally the implications of
its geneticization, this chapter has set out some of the tensions between expert
knowledge of SMA and the experiential knowledge of those who live with it,
and how they are played out in these contexts. The uncertainties inherent
within this expert knowledge- not only as to where the boundaries of SMA
lie, but also with regards to how it can it can be understood, predicted and
treated- have, in various ways, impacted on the way in which SMA is lived
through in the daily lives of those experiencing the condition, and,
consequently, the experiential knowledge accumulated from these
experiences. Whilst in some instances medical knowledge of SMA was
challenged by reference to experiential knowledge, expert medical knowledge
nevertheless framed and contributed to that experiential knowledge even as it
was resisted. As Markens et al. (2010) have suggested, the relationship
between expert and experiential knowledge may be more synergistic and
dynamic than previous research has suggested. Researchers, for example,
have tended to emphasise the uses of experiential knowledge as an alternative
to medical knowledge and have interpreted its validation as a form of
resistance to medical knowledge. However, even though many participants
challenged medical descriptions of SMA and questioned the relevance of
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genetic explanations to their lives, they nevertheless framed their
conceptualisations of, and experiences of, SMA in medical frameworks.
Indeed, an understanding of oneself as a ‘good type II’ as one participant,
Georgia, commented, is grounded in a notion of how SMA type II should be
experienced, according to this medical knowledge.
As Abel and Browner (1998) have argued, experiential knowledge
was, moreover attributed a very particular status vis-à-vis medical knowledge.
For families and individuals living with SMA, this knowledge was highly
valued; it offered them a form of security and point of reference at times
when they felt the most vulnerable, particularly in instances where expert
knowledge was felt to be especially uncertain and fallible. As Natasha
highlighted, experiential knowledge was often felt to be more secure and
‘real’ (Natasha), being grounded in the everyday realities of life with SMA,
onto which medical experts have only a limited window. The experientially
based ways of understanding SMA, as they emerged through participants’
accounts, will now be presented in Chapter 4.
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Chapter 4
Living with SMA
In Chapter 3 I presented conceptualisations of SMA and the impact of the
diagnosis of SMA on families and individuals. This analysis has revealed the
divergent experiences and conceptions of SMA amongst those who
participated in this study, as well as reactions to clinical and genetic
understandings of the condition. This chapter will present participants’
accounts of the impact of SMA beyond the diagnosis, in their day to day lives.
Whilst the diagnosis was a crucial point in participants’ accounts of their lives
with SMA and offered a socially legitimated reading of their experiences, it
was the meaning SMA took on and the consequences it had in their everyday
lives that formed the bulk of their stock of experiential knowledge of the
condition. It was through living with the condition that participants came to
reassess their initial reactions to diagnosis and prognosis, and also redefine
the condition’s significance over time. It was, furthermore, through these
experiences that participants accumulated knowledge that became both a
resource for the management of day to day living but also a point of reference
in the context of familial reproductive decision making (as presented in
Chapter 6). It was the sorts of experiences they felt they had with SMA, and
perceived others to have, that were important in imagining future lives with,
or without, the condition.
These experiences will be presented under three thematic sub-
headings- ‘experiences of disability’, ‘embodied experiences of impairment
and disability’ and ‘experiences of illness, death and bereavement’, rather
157
than using the medical typology to categorise and order the divergent range of
experiences associated with a diagnosis of SMA, which were discussed in
Chapter 3. Indeed, this chapter will address the question of whether such
medical categories can accurately account for the range of experiences within
each ‘type’ of SMA, and the associated assumptions about the correlating
level of severity of the condition. Participants’ experiences often extended
beyond the boundaries of each medically defined ‘type’ of SMA in a non-
linear fashion with a constant movement back and forth between the different
types of experience. Finally, I will present the ways in which participants
made sense of these experiences, and the strategies they used to overcome the
problems associated with them will also be presented. Despite commonly held
assumptions about the lives of individuals with SMA as necessarily difficult
and constrained, participants reported a range of creative and innovative
coping strategies and philosophies to counterbalance any negative
implications of living with SMA. By presenting these accounts of SMA, this
chapter will problematise medicalised and popular presentations of the
experience of SMA.
Experiential Accounts of Living with SMA
Despite there being an extensive literature documenting the medical
complications associated with severe SMA, less is known about how it is
experienced by affected families and individuals. A study by Bach et al.
(2003) attempted to measure clinicians’ perceptions of ‘quality of life’ for
children diagnosed with type I SMA as compared to care providers’
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(primarily the parents) perceptions, and discovered a wide discrepancy
between the two. The care providers, in contrast to the clinicians’ perceptions,
reported many positive and fulfilling experiences of living with SMA and
rated their children as being happy, despite physical difficulties. A similar
study examining the impact of SMA on familial stress levels reported that
families with children diagnosed with SMA often develop good coping
strategies, compared with families with children diagnosed with Fragile X
Syndrome, which the authors attribute to the physical nature of SMA in
contrast to Fragile X Syndrome which can involve physical and mental
disabilities (von Gontard et al., 2002b: 955). Such findings are also supported
by the social science literature on the impact of a disabled child on the family
(Asch, 1999; Ferguson et al., 2000), which suggests that the experience is not
always negative (as is so often assumed), and that parents of disabled children
can and do have rewarding experiences of parenthood. This is not to say that
SMA cannot be challenging for families, indeed, studies have pointed to the
‘burden’ of care involved with caring for a child with high support needs
(Boyer et al., 2006), and the difficulties experienced by able-bodied siblings
who may receive less parental attention than their disabled sibling
(Laufersweiler-Plass et al., 2003), but rather, that research suggests that
families affected by SMA may nevertheless thrive in spite of the financial,
practical and emotional demands associated with care for a child diagnosed
with severe SMA.
As discussed in Chapter 3, SMA can be experienced in lots of
different ways, and as such has been categorised into ‘types’ by the medical
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profession to reflect these differences. Each type is associated with a
particular level of anticipated ability, life expectancy and ‘quality of life’, and
the type of SMA diagnosed is often used as a proxy to refer to the sorts of
experience that the individual or family can expect. However, these medically
defined types do not necessarily correlate with the experiences of those living
with a particular ‘type’ of SMA; many spoke of a lack of identification with
the experiences of others who have been diagnosed with the same type of
SMA as themselves:
When my family met another girl with the same type of
SMA as me, they just could not believe we had the same
condition, we’re so different.
(Lily, diagnosed with type II SMA)
This could also be experienced as a lack of identification with the diagnosis
of SMA itself :
I just sometimes think it would make more sense to have
different names for it, the kind of concerns we have as
parents of a type I baby are so different to those of
parents who have children with type II or III…we’re
worrying about CPAP machines [positive airway
pressure] and suction and how long we’ll have our babies
for, whereas type II parents are worrying about
wheelchairs, access to schools, equipment for cars, those
sorts of concerns. I guess it’s just because it’s caused by
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the same gene, that’s what connects us, but it presents
very differently.
(Mark, father of baby with SMARD)
For Mark, as for many other participants, it was their experiences of SMA that
came to have a significant impact on their perception of the condition and the
similarities and differences between others with the condition. This was not
only informed by medical definitions of SMA, but also a sense of shared
experience; shared challenges, shared losses and shared grieving. The next
sections present some of these shared experiences of SMA, and have been
categorised according to experiential theme rather than diagnostic category.
Whilst the medical typology of SMA has many uses, and proved to be a
helpful reference point for participants, informing their overarching
conceptualisation of the condition, the typology cannot fully account for the
range of experiences within each category. This chapter thus problematises
some of the assumptions inherent in medical definitions of the SMA
experience, particularly the assumption that SMA can be understood as being
measurable on a scale of severity. In particular, the suggestion that those types
of SMA medically defined as more severe necessarily involve higher degrees
of suffering, or are experienced more negatively than those that are defined as
less severe, is explored. This analysis is organised under thematic headings,
‘experiences of disability’, ‘experiences of embodied impairment and
disability’ and ‘experiences of illness, death and bereavement’. It is important
to note that these themes are not designed to describe the experience of any
particular diagnostic type of SMA, but rather they serve to demarcate
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different forms of experiential knowledge, between which individuals with
SMA and their families may pass through and between at various points
during their experience with the condition.
Experiences of Disability
One of the central emergent themes when participants described their
experiences of living with SMA was the prevalence of the experience of
disability, and also participants’ strategies for overcoming or managing it.
Definitions of disability have altered over time, ranging from a physically
based description of ‘abnormality’, bodily ‘deficit’ or ‘incapacity’ (Thomas,
2002: 38) to contextual definitions, as supported by social model of disability
theorists (e.g. Oliver, 1996b; Barnes, 1992). The writers and activists who
developed this latter definition of disability drew attention to the social and
physical restriction experienced by disabled people, which they saw as arising
from society’s failure to accommodate their needs and rights as opposed to
any bodily difference or deficit (Oliver, 1996a). Thus, definitions of disability
which follow social model of disability theorising have removed the
association of impairment (physical difference) with disability (its social
product), and emphasised the role of the social and spatial environment in
creating disabling barriers (Barton and Oliver, 1996). In order to support an
emphasis on the social origin of disability, social model of disability theorists
have simultaneously removed the body from an analysis of disability, the site
at which traditional (i.e. medical model) explanations have focused (Paterson
and Hughes, 1999). This contextually based definition of disability supported
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by social model of disability theorists will be used to explore the experiences
of individuals with SMA, as for many participants, experiences of restriction,
whether social or physical, were often seen as arising as a consequence of
environmental, rather than physical factors.
Despite Lamb and Peden’s (2008) exploratory study of peoples’
experiences with SMA focuses on SMA as an ‘illness’ with reference to
strategies of ‘symptom management’, individuals who took part in my study
rarely spoke of their experience in these terms. Instead, for many participants,
the emphasis was on the way in which their social and physical environment
shaped their experience of SMA, and mobility was a key element of this
experience.
Powered wheelchairs are the most commonly used mobility aids for those
living with SMA as they require minimal muscle strength to operate and can
be used by children as young as 20 months. These chairs allow for
independent movement and current models allow the user to be raised to
standing height or lowered to the floor to retrieve objects, which has altered
the autonomy and capacities of those affected by SMA to control their own
environment (Jones et al., 2003). Whilst these chairs offer users increased
autonomy, their weight and size (which is considerably greater than that of
manual wheelchairs) together with their use in a society in which physical
access for wheelchair users is limited, means that many families and
individuals living with SMA continue to face environmental obstacles in their
daily lives. Kate is in her 30s and is the mother of a 7 year old boy, Jamie,
who has been diagnosed with SMA type II. Jamie now uses a powered
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wheelchair full time which prompted the relocation of the family to a house
which can accommodate the extra space required to manoeuvre the chair as
well as the spending of considerable resources to adapt the house to make it
fully accessible for him. For Kate, her experiences of SMA were defined
primarily by her experiences of social and environmental problems:
I think a lot of the things I go through with Jamie on a day
to day basis, I think it’s not his condition that’s the
problem, it’s everything else that goes with it, you know,
the lack of help, the lack of adapted places, all those sorts
of things which are the hardest… I do think that could be
easier… it’s like 3 years ago I wanted him to go to a school
which wasn’t adapted, and they couldn’t do it, I fought
them, but it was too much money so…It’s difficult getting
transport to the school he does go to now as well, so we
walked it. We can get transport, but he can’t use it because
of the wheelchair he needs. So really you need a hell of a
lot of money, you know they out-grow their wheelchairs,
and you have to keep replacing them, you can never go on
holiday where you want to….You know it’s all this kind of
thing all the time, things never turn up at the school or
things never get ordered, that sort of thing, it’s that stuff
that makes it so bloody hard, not really the SMA itself.
Families affected by SMA frequently spoke of the need to ‘fight’ to get
appropriate support (the right social security benefits, equipment, adaptations
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and access), constructing ‘battling’ as an important strategy by which to
overcome difficulties associated with a society poorly equipped to cater for
people with disabilities. Whilst experiences of disability were therefore
presented as amenable to social and environment manipulation, the emotional
and physical demands of this ‘fighting’ and need to be assertive was also
evident in participants’ responses. As one foster mother of a young boy,
Marcus, diagnosed with SMA type II commented:
When everything’s in the right place, all the equipment’s sorted,
that’s when you can forget about SMA because it’s not so much
of a struggle. But you do have to be incredibly assertive. Since
having Marcus in my life, I’ve had to learn to really fight for
things and stand up for his rights, things that I previously took
for granted.
The familial stress potentially involved with managing the high care needs of
a disabled member have been well documented in the literature (Farber, 1960;
Baxter, Cummins and Pollack, 1993; Floyd and Gallagher, 1997), and the
availability of appropriate support, interventions and adaptations is
acknowledged as crucial to the adjustment of such families to disability.
Children with SMA in particular may require regular physiotherapy, hospital
check ups, surgery and the regular replacement of their equipment and aids
(such as wheelchairs) as their bodies grow and change, on top of their day to
day care needs. The medial literature points particularly to the orthopaedic
complications associated with prolonged sitting, which may pose specific
challenges to those affected by SMA such as joint contractures and scoliosis
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(curvature of the spine) (Evans et al., 1981). Whilst the suppleness of joints
may be maintained to some extent through the use of physiotherapy exercises
and orthopaedic interventions (such as standing frames and serial plaster
casting), many people affected by SMA experience permanent joint
contractures in their legs, which can interfere with personal care and daily
activities, necessitating the use of aids and adaptations (Wang et al., 2007).
Scoliosis is ordinarily treated with bracing and/or a spinal fusion operation,
which involves fusing the spine in a straight position surgically. This
operation is a major procedure with a long recovery period (Aprin et al.,
1982), but one which may improve respiratory function and sitting balance
(Wang et al., 2007), in spite of the potential side effect of further loss of
mobility and flexibility post surgery (Furumasu, 1989).
The management of children living with SMA in their day to day lives
therefore involves the input of a range of professionals from both health and
social care, as well as considerable amounts of the family’s resources which
may constrain the family’s social and other activities (Wang et al., 2007).
Seven siblings of people with SMA reported that they felt that they had
received less parental attention than they otherwise might have done due to
their parents’ distraction with caring for their child with SMA; a finding
reflected in many studies on sibling relationships within families with
disabled children (Laufesweiler-Plass et al., 2003; Labato, et al., 1988;
Fleitas, 2000).
For adults with SMA as well, access to resources appeared crucial to
how SMA was experienced. Two participants with SMA who reported
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particularly negative experiences with the condition had both lost their full
time jobs as a result of their deteriorating abilities and many others
emphasised the importance of access to resources in overcoming the
restrictions in terms of housing, jobs and education. For Hannah, who is 42
years old and was diagnosed with SMA type I in childhood, having the right
resources at her disposal is crucial to the way in which she experiences her
life:
…having a quality to my life, for me, means having
somewhere to live that’s an ok environment, in ok
surroundings, transport, enough finances to be able to pay for
the people that I want assisting me, e.g. not from an agency but
privately employed [this makes the difference of disabled
people being able to hire employees of their own choosing
rather than allocated workers]. I mean you know it’s a whole
package. It means being able to get up when I want to get up,
being able to go to bed when I want to go to bed, go out in my
vehicle when I want to go out in my vehicle, and if I want to
drive around at two in the morning then that’s….you know, up
to me, that is quality of life. My life is not determined by the
condition I’ve got, to be honest it’s more about the quality of
the care I receive, that is what makes the difference.
Community care policies such as the introduction of the Independent Living
Fund (ILF) and direct payments from statutory bodies have been introduced to
enable people with disabilities to direct the personal assistance they receive
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(through their ability to hire and fire their own workforce and negotiate
working hours and pay with their employees) (Morris, 1994), and nearly all of
the adults living with SMA who were interviewed in this study reported being
in receipt of this monetary support. Morris (1994) has highlighted some of the
conceptual difficulties of these schemes, including the underpinning
assumptions about disabled people’s need for ‘care’ rather than autonomy,
together with some of the practical issues associated with their
implementation, including complexities in the negotiation of the relationship
with personal assistants (PAs) (more specifically, enforcing professional
boundaries), and the potential inflexibility of the services when erratic or
unsociable hours of work are required. However, all but three of the
participants in this study diagnosed with SMA were able to live independently
as a consequence of their receipt of ILF and direct payments which they felt
positively about, in spite of reported difficulties with identifying and retaining
appropriate PAs and the personal intrusion posed by the need for continuous
support.
The importance of the social and physical environment in determining
the life experiences of people with disabilities is crucial to many disability
rights supporters’ perspectives on prenatal testing and selective termination in
relation to disability. Writers such as Asch (1999) have argued that the
availability of prenatal testing draws attention away from social arrangements
that create disability and instead focuses on the impaired foetus as ‘the
problem’. As Shakespeare (2006) reminds us, environments can be equally as
disabling as bodies, and thus the way in which participants in this study
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constructed the causes of the problems and restrictions associated with life
with SMA is important in relation to reproductive decision making. Indeed,
for many, the problems associated with disability (i.e. restriction arising from
social arrangements) were seen as potentially open to interpretation or even
change; and thus experiencing disability was not necessarily a negative
phenomenon.
Lamb and Peddon (2008) have described the way in which participants in
their study developed innovative strategies to manage their daily lives with
SMA. Such strategies included maintaining an optimistic life view,
establishing networks of strong relationships, maintaining a ‘normal’ life
through independent living and adopting creative approaches to dealing with
symptoms. Similarly, participants in this research described the way in which
experiences of disability could be mediated by various factors. In particular,
the importance of optimism, perseverance and ‘thinking of ways around
things’ emerged as significant coping strategies for individuals living with or
alongside SMA. Geraldine is in her 40s and has been diagnosed with SMA
type II. She has used a wheelchair all of her life, is currently unemployed and
lives in her own bungalow with the support of 24 hour personal assistants:
Well I’ve got a very positive outlook on life I mean
obviously it is quite debilitating and it is quite limiting but I
mean obviously it is all down to your view on life and your
outlook. I’m not going to just sit in and let it get to me, but
you know there’s a lot of inspiration belonging to the
Jennifer Trust, you know I can get inspiration from other
169
people affected by the condition and at the end of the day,
you can go about your daily life and be as normal as you
want. If you’re willing to fight for the things you need and
you keep positive, there’s no reason why your life can’t be
as good as anyone else’s.
For many participants, dealing with disability included dealing with others’
assumptions about what life as a disabled person meant, and indeed, many
were keen to dispel this assumption by presenting their experiences as
overwhelmingly positive. By maintaining a positive outlook and developing
strategies to circumvent obstacles, participants presented their experiences of
disability surmountable, as mediated by personal attitudes and actions, for
which individuals must take responsibility.
For many, this personal attitude was attributed to positive experiences in
childhood and a supportive family. Isabella is 22 years old, has been
diagnosed with SMA type II and has been a wheelchair user all of her life.
Isabella was born in Australia, but moved to the UK with her mother
following the death of her father when she was three. Isabella’s mother has
been her full time carer since this age:
I’ve never really thought about me having SMA
because…I’ve just grown up the same as everybody else and
I’ve never really thought about it. I think I was about 13 in
school when people started doing things that were a bit
difficult or whatever…and I’d still take part but I was actually
like ‘ah…I can’t do some of these things’ but if that was the
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case then I’d just find something else to do, you know we’d
find a way round it …and when I was growing up I did
everything that my friends did…I even had a skateboard and
my mum made sure I had whatever anybody else had I had, so
my SMA didn’t really matter…my mum’s attitude has always
been ‘never say never’ and so that’s been my attitude too. I
was always the disabled person who’s never been disabled
because of that.
Despite the wealth of studies documenting the difficulties and challenges
faced by families affected by disability, participants overwhelmingly reported
positive familial experiences and adaption to life with SMA. Moreover, recent
research has reflected these more positive accounts of families thriving in
spite of disability (e.g. Ferguson et al., 2000). However, as the participants in
this study can be considered a self-selecting population, it may be that
families with positive experiences of SMA were more likely to volunteer to
participate than those with more difficult experiences, which may have biased
the reporting of family life with SMA.
Disability could also be circumvented by more practical rather than
simply attitudinal strategies. As Lamb and Peddon (2008) have suggested
through their interview study with individuals affected by SMA, living with a
disability requires the use of ‘innovative and creative strategies’ in order to
overcome obstacles. There was evidence that participants in this study
engaged in similar ‘thinking outside the box’ (Lamb and Peddon, 2008:255)
to bypass these difficulties arising in day to day life. These strategies often
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involved research, experimentation, the development of particular ways of
undertaking tasks or the use of specialist pieces of equipment. Lily, for
example, a mother with SMA in her twenties with a three year old daughter,
designed and had various pieces of assistive equipment custom made to
manage some of the physical and practical difficulties she encountered when
caring for her daughter, including the adaptation of her wheelchair to
accommodate her transportation.
Disability therefore, was experienced as an aspect of SMA that was
mediated by various factors. Whilst the implementation of legislation to
eliminate the problems associated with disablement was emphasised,
participants also cited access to resources, personal attitudes and philosophies,
the use of creative strategies and the availability of strong support networks as
means by which the experience of disability could be transformed or
manipulated. However, in spite of the possibilities of transcending traditional
understandings of disability as necessarily negative and restrictive, there were
also elements of the experience of SMA which were conceptualised as being
beyond the scope of individual, social or environmental change. These aspects
of the experience of living with SMA will be referred to as ‘embodied
experiences of impairment and disability’ and ‘experiences of illness, death
and bereavement’ and will be analysed below.
Embodied Experiences of Impairment and Disability
Whilst individuals who had been diagnosed with SMA and their families
experienced disablement in various different ways, there were further
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dimensions of their experiences which transcended the social and
environmental. Indeed, participants also spoke of their bodily experiences of
their condition, what it feels like, physically and emotionally, to live in a body
affected by muscle weakness. Family members also described this bodily
impact of living alongside SMA, not only in terms of the physical
consequences of caring for an individual affected by SMA, but also the
emotional implications of such work. Indeed, whilst family members did not
have access to knowledge about what it feels like to experience SMA in their
own bodies, they nevertheless experienced SMA through their bodies as a
consequence of living intimately with the condition.
D’Agincourt-Canning (2005), in her study of genetic risk perceptions
in families affected by hereditary breast/ovarian cancer has suggested that
individuals who are in close association with individuals affected by cancer
‘participate directly in the cancer experience’ (p. 56). By offering care, as well
as emotional and practical support, these individuals come to know cancer
through their relative’s experience of the condition, and these experiences in
turn influence their perception of their own genetic risk. For D’Agincourt-
Canning (2005), however, as well as Abel and Browner (1998), this form of
experiential knowledge can be distinguished from that possessed by
individuals who have received a diagnosis of a particular condition. Abel and
Browner (1998) for example, refer to the experiential knowledge of relatives
who care for individuals with dementia as ‘empathetic knowledge’ as it is
grounded primarily in emotional ties (p. 315), whereas D’Agincourt-Canning
(2005) defines the knowledge of care-givers as ‘tangible knowledge’, or
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subjective knowledge of the condition derived from close association with
those living with it and observing their realities. Both D’Agincourt-Canning
(2005) and Abel and Browner (1998) reserve the term ‘embodied knowledge’,
as a component of experiential knowledge, to describe the experiences of
those individuals who have received a diagnosis of the condition affecting the
family. However, upon analysis of the accounts of the family members of
individuals with SMA, these participants’ experiences of SMA were
thoroughly embodied; the care work they offered their relatives was often
both physically and emotionally demanding, and they came to know and
understand the impact of SMA through their own bodies. Rachel is the mother
of a 12 year old girl diagnosed with SMA type II, Anna, and is her main carer
at home. For Rachel, caring for Anna is a thoroughly embodied activity:
SMA is extremely tiring for the families, really, because
you basically have to take over what their bodies can’t do
and that’s a hell of a lot of stuff, you know…Anna’s not
strong enough to reach out and pick a drink up off the
table, so I do it…you know, she can’t lift herself up er
she can’t support her weight, so I lift her. You become
their muscles and their strength, in effect, for them, if that
makes any sense, you do what they can’t…so it is very
tiring and I end up thoroughly exhausted at the end of
each day if I’m honest.
For Rachel, caring for her daughter meant blurring bodily boundaries, a
finding which has been documented in the literature in relation to caring
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practices (Meyer et al., 2007). Through becoming the muscles and strength
for another body, Rachel became two bodies in one, posing a fundamental
challenge to the notion of the autonomous, discrete individual, and
highlighting the inseparability of embodied and empathetic experiential
knowledge. Stress and physical exhaustion featured strongly in family
members’ accounts of living alongside SMA, the consequences of which were
felt in the bodies of individuals caring for someone with SMA. Needing to lift
their relative, assisting with physiotherapy exercises, turning their family
member in bed several times a night alongside other daily care activities such
as assistance with washing dressing and eating, all contributed to an increased
workload for the family, and, often, physical fatigue and stress, particularly
for women, to whom much of this workload fell. Thus, whilst differentiating
between ‘empathic/tangible’ knowing and embodied ways of knowing SMA
may be useful in distinguishing the different ways in which individuals come
to know SMA, these distinctions draw on notions of Cartesian dualism.
Cartesian dualism refers to a reading of the body whereby a conceptual gulf is
positioned between mind and body, between ‘empathy’ and ‘embodiment’,
and reflecting an underlying assumption that these are distinguishable and
independent of one another (Grosz, 1994). Grosz (1994), drawing on the
works of Lacan, however, has developed the notion of a ‘Möbius strip’, an
inverted three dimensional figure of eight (8), to present an alternative reading
of the body, and one which demonstrates the
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…inflection of mind into body and body into mind, the ways
in which, through a kind of twisting or inversion, one side
becomes the other.
(Grosz, 1994: xii)
Grosz’s conceptualisation of the fluidity of body and mind such that mind and
body flow into one another, inside and outside the body in a continuous loop
may be more easily mapped onto the accounts of the families living with
SMA, whereby the boundaries between emotion and body, and between
bodies themselves, became blurred.
The way in which emotion and embodied experiences of SMA fed into
one another occurred via various routes; two participants who were diagnosed
with SMA themselves (and thus had experience of the condition directly) also
performed assistance work for other relatives affected by SMA, and thus had
‘empathetic’ knowledge of the condition through observing their relative, but
also embodied knowledge of the condition. Whereas for other participants, the
inseparability of bodies and emotion was apparent in the way in which they
recounted particularly difficult experiences of SMA. Miriam is 40 years old
and experienced the death of her daughter, Skyla, to SMARD when she was
just 10 months old. Miriam and her husband were firstly told that Skyla had
Peripheral Neuropathy and had to be permanently ventilated due to breathing
difficulties. However, when the family were relocated to the UK, Skyla was
re-diagnosed with SMARD:
We were sent to [hospital] in the UK where sadly they
could only confirm what we had been told in Holland
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and that there was nothing that could be done for Sklya.
That was the hardest part for us, and our families, was
that we just could not accept that no one could do
anything, she looked perfect, it was very hard to accept
that she was dying and I couldn’t help her. She remained
on a ventilator until [date] when we made the
heartbreaking decision to withdraw the ventilator and she
slipped away in my arms. As devastated as we were, we
also felt an element of relief for our precious girl that she
did not have to suffer anymore. I remember waking up
the day after she had died and thinking that at least she
did not have to be suctioned anymore which was
something that she hated having done. The suffering was
so much for little Skyla to bear, and the whole family
suffered with it and continues to do so. It’s a devastating
disease.
Through describing SMA as a ‘devastating disease’, Miriam highlights both
the bodily aspects of devastation, caused by the disease to Skyla’s body, but
also the devastation and suffering experienced by herself and her family; the
embodied and emotional aspects of the condition are merged into, and
experienced, as one and the same, reaffirming the familial nature of genetic
disease.
It is important to recognize these various forms of experiential
knowledge as participants came to ‘know’ SMA through a variety of means.
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Whilst carers have been conceptualized as having empathetic knowledge of
the condition affecting the person for whom they care, an analysis of the
families of individuals affected by SMA revealed that the way in which these
individuals experienced SMA was thoroughly embodied as well as
empathetic, with a fluid interchange between the two. This finding is
significant in terms of an analysis of the accounts of families living with
SMA. As D’Agincourt (2005) has highlighted, it is often taken for granted
that ‘embodied’ experiences, by virtue of their emergence from sensory
perception, are to be regarded as more being more ‘authentic’ or reliable
forms of experiential knowledge than those gleaned from empathy or the
experiences of others. This blurring of boundaries between emotion,
embodiment and experience, however, suggests a more complex picture of
experiential knowledge and the way in which the different forms of it can be
conceptualised.
For participants who have been diagnosed with SMA themselves,
embodied experiential knowledge again took on a different form to that of
family members. Despite the fact that social model of disability theorists have
largely shied away from an analysis of the experiential aspects of impairment
(or what it feels like to live in an impaired body) in favour of an analysis of
the social and economic constitution of disability (Paterson and Hughes,
1999), participants’ lived sense of their own bodies was so central to how they
perceived SMA as a condition, this dimension of experiential knowledge
cannot be discounted.
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All participants who took part in the research were asked to explain how
they describe SMA to others in order to elicit their experiences and
perceptions of the condition. For individuals diagnosed with SMA, this
question evoked a range of what can be termed ‘embodied descriptions’;
descriptions of what it feels like to live in a body which cannot always easily
be independently manoeuvred or controlled in the desired manner; a body
which is subject to muscle tremors, fatigue and difficulties with breathing
(Wendell, 1996; Öhman et al.,2003). Whilst social model of disability
theorists have dismissed such experiences of bodily hindrance as belonging to
medical models of disability, these experiences were often intermeshed with
experiences of disability, as will be discussed later. Analogies were used as a
way of capturing these experiences in a way that could be easily understood:
When people ask me what it’s like to live with SMA, I
always say it’s like living in a strait jacket, but when your
mind is fine so you are incredibly constrained. You live
your life through other people.
(Fae, in her 30s, diagnosed with type II SMA)
…I always say to people that having SMA is a lot like
having the flu but without the fuzzy head, you know you
feel like you’ve got a lead blanket over you, your body’s
too heavy for you to lift. Just lifting your arm is so much
effort so you’re completely exhausted.
(Kristen, in her late 20s, diagnosed with SMA type II)
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I always describe it in terms of a remote controlled car with
the batteries dying. The muscles are too weak to do what
they want so it’s like the car trying to get over a tiny bump
and it just stalls. And when I say that people say ‘o yeah I
know what you mean’.
(Paul, in his 30s, diagnosed with SMA type II)
For Hughes and Paterson (1999), as for the participants with SMA, these
embodied experiences of impairment are important, and thus cannot be
written out of thinking about, and theorising disability. Indeed, our
perception of the world is created through and within our bodies (Bendelow
and Williams, 1995), and thus embodied experiential knowledge is crucial in
framing the reality of life with SMA.
For Paterson and Hughes (1999) the means by which to realign these
experiences of the body with the social and political domain in which
disability is produced and reproduced lies in the theoretical contribution of
phenomenology. Following Leder’s (1990) use of the concept of ‘dys-
appearance’, Paterson and Hughes (1999) have argued that the impaired body
emerges to awareness through its encounter with the social world. Unlike
work in the field of medical sociology, which has used the concept to explore
the way in which the chronically ill body rises up into conscious awareness
through its deviation from ordinary functioning (Williams, 1996), for Paterson
and Hughes (1999), the impaired body is brought into the disabled person’s
consciousness only at critical points; the points at which it is not adequately
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catered for by society. Indeed, like the respondents in Watson’s (2002) study
of identity and disability, embodied experiences of impairment were not
experienced as a ‘hindrance’, but as simply their way of being in the world.
Embodied experiences of impairment thus emerged through their interaction
with a disablist society. Rhona is in her late 20s, diagnosed with SMA type
III, and described her sense of SMA in the following way:
I really don’t think about myself as having SMA at all, I
don’t notice it on an everyday basis I think it bothered me
more…I mean when I think back to times when I was
down and I was a child and the condition really affected
me, it was because I couldn’t do something everybody else
could do and I wasn’t being treated the same, and that’s the
only time I remember thinking the whole ‘why me?’
and…um because I literally wasn’t able to do…not
necessarily not able to do, I probably could have done,
people assumed I couldn’t, or there wasn’t the facilities to
enable me to get involved like everybody else, those were
the only times that I thought that I’m physically different to
everyone else because when you’re able to just get on with
things you don’t notice it at all and I never think about
having SMA.
For Rhona, her embodied sense of being ‘different’ emerged at the points in
her life in which her social and physical environment prevented her from
participating in activities she would have otherwise liked to; her impairment
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‘dys-appeared’ (Leder, 1990), whereas ordinarily her embodiment was not
experienced as disruptive. Nick Watson (2002)has used Somer’s concept of
the ‘ontological self’ to argue that impairment often becomes incorporated
into disabled people’s realities so that it may be a phenomenological
impossibility for them to imagine life without it. Indeed, many of the
participants with SMA had never been able to walk and had always lived with
reduced strength, and thus their awareness of their embodied impairment
came through their social interactions with the world, others’ judgements of
their bodies as intolerable to live in or inadequate, or the failure of society to
enable their bodies to function in ways in which they desired.
Rosie is 28 and has been diagnosed with SMA type II, uses a powered
wheelchair full time and requires the use of night time ventilation on
occasion. As SMA involves weakening to the intercostal muscles (those used
to support breathing), people diagnosed with SMA often experience
insufficient oxygenation during sleep and thus many make use of overnight
ventilation technologies (Lamb and Peden, 2008). Rosie relies on a 24 hour
PA system to live independently and works full time as a solicitor in London.
She contrasted her own sense of her body and her life to how she felt others
perceived it:
And I mean I get, I get very strange reactions from people
when I meet them. I always say that actually the reaction I
get, people react to me as if I am feeling as they are,
because they react in a way, you know they are completely
new to it and they think ‘well how would I feel if I were in
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this position?’ er and then they assume that I feel like that
forgetting that I’ve had 28 years of it, um and that I’ve got
a very different perspective…so there are um, there are
people who um have that attitude, who just, their
experience of their lives and their bodies is so far away
from mine that they are scared – it’s a fear thing, because
they are worrying about how they’d live with it. I do know
some people who would be devastated to live the way I do.
For Rosie, her sense of embodiment was entirely different than she perceived
others to be who had not lived her life. Her body was as she had always
experienced it and thus her point of orientation in the world differed from that
of non-disabled people who could not contemplate these experiences. Thus, a
heightened awareness of the differentness of her impaired body emerged not
only through being excluded, as in Rhona’s experiences, but also through the
attitudes, and perceived attitudes, of others.
However, for a minority of participants, SMA was not a condition which
they had experienced since birth, and for others, their embodied experiences
of impairment were unstable, ever changing and unpredictable. Shakespeare
(2006) has made distinctions between those impairment groups for whom
experiences of disability remain stable over time, and those who experience
deterioration, suggesting that they may be conceptualised as two different
groups with different viewpoints and concerns (Shakespeare, 2006: 106).
Whilst the progressive nature of SMA has been debated within the medical
literature, it was a generally accepted fact amongst those interviewed that the
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symptoms of SMA can be expected to worsen with age. In particular, an
increase in fatigue, respiratory problems and issues with swallowing and
speech are reported as being amongst the most common emergent difficulties
experienced by ageing individuals with SMA (De Groot and De Witte, 2005).
Moreover, individuals with SMA type III and rarer variants of SMA such as
SBMA and ADSMA (see Appendix V for descriptions of these variants) are
all medically defined as being conditions with late onset (i.e. in the second or
third decade of life) and marked by gradual decline with age. Whilst the
explanations for this worsening of symptoms vary, for the participants who
noticed such changes, their embodied experiences of impairment emerged in a
different way to those individuals whose SMA had remained stable, and it
was many of these participants who experienced their bodies as a ‘hindrance’.
Indeed, their sense of impairment was reported as emerging specifically at
points at which they experienced such deterioration as well as through their
interaction with a disablist society. Hayley is 34 years old and was diagnosed
with SMA type II at 18 months of age. She described her changing sense of
her own body in the following way:
But I mean everyday I notice things that are harder and that are
more difficult but people that are around me don’t necessarily
notice, but I’m much more aware of my condition now than I
was when I was growing up…like my skin’s breaking down
now, and I’m noticing that, but I’m still fighting and I’m still
trying but things become harder and harder as you get older and
like at the moment I have pain constantly in my right arm…I’m
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now having to lift my arm to the control box [on wheelchair] by
biting my fingers with my teeth […]And I’ve always fought it
and never let it get the better of me, but it is beginning to get the
better of me now, because I can see it getting worse, whereas
before it was just how I was, you know. Now, I just get used to
one thing, and then something else packs up, and that’s hard.
For Hayley, her awareness of her body and her condition arose from the
deterioration she experienced. The ‘breaking down’ of her skin, and pain in
her right arm represented a form of ‘dys-embodiment’ (Williams, 1996) or a
fracturing of her otherwise taken for granted sense of embodiment; ‘that’s just
how I was’ (Hayley). Unlike Rhona, whose sense of impairment and physical
difference arose from her interactions with a disablist society, for Hayley, it
was her own sense of ‘dys-embodiment’ that constituted this aspect of her
sense of self. Williams has suggested that at critical junctures in the chronic
illness trajectory individuals experience dys-embodiment and what frequently
follows is the development of coping styles and strategies to realign body, self
and society, in an attempt at ‘re-embodiment’(Williams, 1996: 34). For
Hayley, ‘fighting it’ and ‘not letting it get to her’ represented these strategic
attempts at re-embodiment, and her struggles with maintaining this ‘fight’
highlight some of the pressures on those living with SMA to appear positive
in spite of the challenges facing them. The relentless nature of this process of
re-embodiment, for Hayley, was driven by the deterioration of her condition;
SMA was at the forefront of her consciousness because she was living in a
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continual ‘oscillation’ between dys-embodiment and attempts at re-
embodiment (Williams, 1996: 39).
Whilst there were a range of embodied experiences associated with
SMA, including a sense of ‘dys-appearance’, of ‘dys-embodiment’, ‘re-
embodiment’, or a movement between all three of these states at various
points, these embodied states did not necessarily correlate to medical
classifications of SMA in any clear way. Whilst neurologists and geneticists
have attempted to classify SMA on a numerical scale of severity to mark out
those experiences most likely to be characterised by suffering and
intolerability, this scale did not always match participants’ accounts. In fact,
for some participants, the experience of ‘dys-embodiment’, and particularly
that which emerged from the deterioration of SMA symptoms, was perceived
to involve suffering of a higher degree than that of ‘dys-appearance’, whereby
an embodied sense of impairment was an ‘absent presence’ (Leder, 1990),
emerging through an interaction with a disablist society rather than through
bodily decline. Kristen and Ellie are two sisters in their twenties, and have
been diagnosed with SMA type II and SMA type III respectively. Whilst
medical definitions of SMA position Kristen’s experiences of SMA as more
severe and involving a higher degree of physical restriction than Ellie’s,
Kristen reported that these medical categories did not fit her own, and her
sister’s experiences of the condition:
I don’t really think you can know much about the sort of
life someone will have from the type of SMA they’ve got
because, I think SMA is much less of a big deal to me
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than it is to Ellie, you know, because I’ve always had it,
it’s always been there. I could never walk whereas she
could walk and had a normal life up until she was a
teenager, and she has found that so hard as she’s got
weaker and she really hates her disability, I know she
does, even though people expect that to be my attitude,
not hers, because it affects me in a more severe way I
suppose, but I’m not really bothered by it. I guess the
other thing is that I’m a constant reminder to her as well,
like about how she could get, physically, and I think that
scares her. It’s got to be much harder if you’ve got to
keep adjusting and looking at things you can’t do
anymore whereas…you know I’ve always been this way.
I never lost anything.
Shakespeare (2006) has highlighted the potential differences in perspective
and attitude towards their impairments of different groups of disabled people.
In particular, Shakespeare notes there can often be differences in perspective
between those with ‘congenital impairments which are largely static in
nature’ (p. 106) and those individuals with ‘acute degenerative conditions’
which may have been present at birth but which only become problematic in
childhood or midlife, as described previously in relation to Hayley’s
experiences (Shakespeare, 2006: 106). As Shakespeare (2006) has noted, the
concerns and viewpoints of these groups of individuals may be very different
and there is much potential for vastly differing experiences of impairment
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between them. Whilst Shakespeare (2006) appeared to be referring to
different impairment groups when describing the possible associated
experiences and perspectives, SMA could be experienced in both of the ways
Shakespeare has outlined. For some individuals their SMA had been present
from birth or within the first year of life, whereas for others it had a gradual
onset, for others still, deterioration occurred alongside ageing. De Groot and
De Witte (2005) in a questionnaire survey of adults living with SMA found
that some of the most common medical complications associated with ageing
with SMA included difficulty with sleeping, speaking, coughing and
swallowing and fatigue. In defining those forms of SMA present from birth as
the most severe, however, medical typologies fail to accommodate these
fluctuating embodied experiences. Indeed, such a system does not
acknowledge the potentially different perspectives embedded within these
embodied experiences of SMA. Being diagnosed with type III SMA does not
necessarily guarantee an experience of SMA that is fundamentally ‘less
severe’ than those of individuals with type II. As Kristen’s account highlights,
it appeared to be the process of deterioration itself, the gradual loss of
abilities or the onset of ill health, that was associated with the greatest level of
(perceived) suffering and distress as opposed to the resultant level of
impairment per se. Disability activists have worked hard to disentangle the
automatic amalgamation of ‘suffering’ with ‘impairment’ and the associated
assumption that the degree of suffering experienced by an individual can be
read off from their level of impairment. As these interviews revealed, it is not
necessarily the degree of disability and impairment that leads to SMA being
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experienced negatively (although this can be the case), but that particular
embodied experiences were more closely aligned with suffering than others.
These findings have implications for an analysis of experiential
knowledge. The literature around experiential knowledge has tended to
conflate ‘empathetic’ and ‘embodied’ forms of experiential knowledge as
being similar in constitution, but having been arrived at with differing degrees
of intensity or closeness to the experience (D’Agincourt, 2005; Etchegary et
al., 2008). However, interviews with people diagnosed with SMA and their
families have revealed that ‘empathetic’ and ‘embodied’ experiential
knowledge can produce inconsistent, or entirely contradictory, accounts of the
same life with SMA. Many people diagnosed with SMA felt that those who
would empathise with their experiences brought with them assumptions about
which experiences involve suffering, and which do not- assumptions that
could be entirely inconsistent with the embodied experiences of people
diagnosed with SMA themselves. Whilst the literature on experiential
knowledge has thus drawn attention to the way in which accounts of
experiential knowledge can contrast with medical knowledge, little attention
has been paid to the way in which experiential knowledge accounts can
similarly contain internal tensions and inconsistencies which render them as
unstable as the forms of medical knowledge that they are frequently presented
as an alternative to.
A further dimension of experience associated with SMA is that of illness,
death and bereavement. These experiences were presented by participants as
instances where SMA involved unequivocal suffering. Unlike experiences of
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disability or embodied experiences of impairment, these experiences were
presented as involving levels of distress which could not be remedied or
reduced by personal, social or environmental intervention, and thus were of a
fundamentally different character to other experiences of SMA.
Experiences of Illness, Death and Bereavement
The conceptual differences between ‘illness’ and ‘impairment’ have been the
subject of much debate both within and between the fields of medical
sociology and disability studies. However, theoretically robust distinctions
which account for the differing contours of both impairment and illness are
still lacking (Oliver, 1996a; Bury, 1996; Mulvany, 2000; De Wolfe, 2002;
Corker, 1999). Much work in the field of medical sociology has been
concerned with the social significance of illness as well as strategies of
adaptation used by those who experience it (Barnes and Mercer, 1996). Social
model of disability theorists, however, have instead bracketed off the
experiential aspects of illness or impairment in favour of an analysis of the
structural origin of disability. As dialogue between these two fields has
developed, the similarities, particularly between what medical sociologists
term ‘chronic illness’ and disability theorists term ‘impairment’ have been
emphasised (Mulvany, 2000: 592) or the terms have been treated as
synonymous (Oliver, 1996a: 40). However, tensions remain, as evidenced in
the difficulties reported by those with chronic illness in identifying their
experiences as an ‘impairment’ or ‘disability’, as suggested in the previous
sections (De Wolfe, 2002: 257). The social model of disability in particular
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has been criticised for sidelining the experience of illness and suffering,
which can be an integral part of impairment experiences (Morris, 1991).
Social model of disability theorists such as Oliver (1996a) have tentatively
suggested a ‘sociology of impairment’ as an arena in which to interrogate
these experiential aspects of ‘impairment’, including pain, discomfort, fatigue
and malaise whilst retaining a critical distance from those theoretical models
which have traditionally been concerned with them, including individual and
medical models of disability (Oliver, 1996a: 49). Paterson and Hughes (1999)
have attempted to develop this ‘sociology of impairment’ through a
phenomenological lens, demonstrating that oppression is not only located in
the social fabric of society, but also in the ‘flesh and bones’ of disabled
people; oppression is an embodied experience (Paterson and Hughes, 1999:
606).
For writers such as De Wolfe (2002) herself living with Myalgic
Encephalomyelitis (ME), any attempts to subsume those with chronic illness
into social model thinking will necessarily be inadequate as the proposed
adaptation of society is ‘contingent on the absence of suffering’ (De Wolfe,
2002: 262). Indeed, both De Wolfe (2002) and Shakespeare (2006) have
argued that there are certain aspects of impairment that are experienced
negatively and which defy accommodation within society. Impairments can
be problematic in and of themselves (Shakespeare, 2006: 43), and it is these
aspects of impairment that more easily render themselves to the term ‘illness’.
De Wolfe (2002) equates illness specifically with ‘suffering’, which, despite
the possibilities for emergent meanings and narratives (e.g. Frank, 1995), is
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largely experienced negatively; as a state of embodiment most people would
seek to avoid:
It would be perverse to prefer illness and misery to health
and happiness…virtually anybody…would rather be well.
Illness should not be romanticised. It ruins lives.
(De Wolfe, 2002: 263)
Similarly, when talking about living with SMA, participants drew conceptual
distinctions between those experiences of impairment, disability and
embodiment which were mediated or counter-balanced by contextual factors
(for example having a positive attitude or a supportive social and physical
environment), and those aspects of SMA which allowed little room for
interpretation; the experiential aspects of SMA which were deemed to be
imbued with suffering.
Paula is the mother of a 13 year old girl who was diagnosed with SMA
type II. For Paula the possibilities of chest infections and illness were seen as
so separate from the rest of the experience of SMA that she spoke about them
as being separate conditions:
…well with Spinal Muscular Atrophy, I was always told,
and it’s always stayed in the back of my mind,
that…about 3 years ago we had a cluster group, we had
an outing [through JTSMA] and you get to talk to
different people there and a lady said to me, another
parent, and she said ‘it’s never actually SMA that kills
the person or the child, it’s more the respiratory side of it’
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you know, with them being unwell etc. You know it’s not
actually the spinal muscular atrophy, it’s if they become
really really unwell, and then they get the respiratory and
then the chest infection and then the pneumonia, that’s
what normally, you know, they pass away with that. It’s
not actually the condition, Spinal Muscular Atrophy,
that’s the problem. I always say to Rob [husband], I
could live with that [SMA] if it was just that, but it’s the
illness side of it that’s the problem, that’s what they
suffer with and that’s what makes it hard I think.
Individuals diagnosed with SMA are deemed medically to be at a continuous
risk of (potentially fatal) chest infections and pneumonia due to the
weakening of the chest muscles. Paula’s daughter passed away from such a
sudden onset chest infection a few months following participation in this
research. Due to the risks posed by potential chest infections, many people
with SMA attend regular respiration clinics and keep a supply of dried
antibiotics at home to treat the sudden onset of an infection, which is regarded
as a medical emergency (Loos et al., 2004; Wang et al., 2007). For Paula,
these respiratory difficulties associated with SMA were conceptualised as
entirely separate from her everyday experiences of SMA that she regarded as
separate entities; as entirely distinct experiences which could be ranked
according to their tolerability.
The ‘suffering’ associated with SMA, furthermore, transcended the
medical typology of SMA in the way that it was presented by participants.
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Rather than being confined by and to particular ‘types’ of SMA, suffering was
more closely correlated to specific embodied experiences. The lived reality of
chest infections, discomfort, going through, and recovering from, spinal
fusion surgery as well as the deterioration of abilities were all embodied
experiences that participants associated with suffering. However, the most
undisputed form of suffering associated with SMA by participants was
represented by the individuals who developed severe breathing difficulties
and subsequently died. This form of SMA was most commonly associated
with type I SMA. However, seven individuals with type II SMA in their
families had experienced the death of a relative from SMA due to respiratory
difficulties (and one person’s daughter with type II SMA died shortly after
being interviewed) and furthermore, three individuals had lost children to
SMARD. Thus, these experiences were not solely associated with a diagnosis
of type I SMA. For families who experienced the death of a relative with
SMA, the suffering was both innate and intractable for the individual
concerned as well as for their relatives; unlike those experiencing embodied
impairment or disability, this suffering could not be displaced by social or
environmental changes. Indeed, despite the ‘genohype’ (Fleising, 2001)
surrounding the treatment of SMA, including the more recent ‘recreation’ of
the early stages of the condition using stem cells which has been heralded as
heightening understanding of the biological mechanisms of condition and
consequently ‘paving the way’ for future treatments or cures (BBC News,
Dec. 2008; Yu et al., 2008; Sendtner, 2009; Nicole et al., 2002), medical
science is still unable to offer these options for those diagnosed with SMA.
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For many parents and relatives then, experiencing severe SMA involved a
sense of helplessness; the only release from the suffering their children
endured occurred when they passed away.
Charlie and Fraser are in their 50s and experienced the deaths of two
of their children from SMA type I. For Charlie and Fraser, the deaths of their
children marked the end of a relentless and futile battle with the condition
which was conceptualized as a form of release:
When I think back to when our children were really ill…
You knew that the time had come when you were actually
sitting beside them and wishing that they would just take
their last breath, you know? You know and they were
struggling to breathe, their breathing was so restricted, they
couldn’t take a breath, they couldn’t cry, their cries were
weak…and I just knew when the time had come when I
was wanting my children’s lives to end…because I thought
they were suffering.
For Charlie and Fraser, the experience of losing their two children involved
suffering for the whole family which many individuals found simply too
much to bear. Charlie further recalled being actively avoided by friends who
could not cope with the reality of her situation after she had given birth to her
second child with SMA type I:
…I remember when I’d had Alexis and people used to cross
the road, you know, good friends of mine and they’d cross the
road and only speak to me from across the road when I was
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with the pram…and I’d think ‘I’ve got a lovely wee baby in
here, come over and look at her’ but it was because they
couldn’t cope…but, you know, I forgave them all. And I
thought ‘it’s you that can’t cope with my situation’ and I didn’t
lose friends through that, they all came back to me after it was
all over. You know and they say now, ‘I didn’t know what to
say and I didn’t know what to do’ and they feel terrible about it
now.
Experiences of illness, death and bereavement therefore were presented as
experiences of suffering which extended beyond the individual diagnosed
with SMA to the family, friends and more distant relatives. Whilst
experiences of disability and embodied experiences of impairment primarily
related to the individual diagnosed with SMA, experiences of illness, death
and bereavement were presented as involving collective suffering; embodied
and empathetic forms of experiential knowledge became intermeshed in the
familial experience of suffering, which, as will be discussed in Chapters 6
and 7, had consequences for the way in which this form of suffering was
conceptualised in the context of reproductive decision making.
Conclusions
In conclusion, in addressing the question of how families and individuals
experience SMA and related to medical knowledge, this chapter has explored
the content of participants’ experiential knowledge of SMA and made
conceptual distinctions between the different forms of this knowledge. Whilst
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medical descriptions of SMA have distinguished between different ‘types’ of
SMA to account for the range of experiences associated with SMA, this
chapter has suggested alternate ways of understanding these differences.
Distinguishing between ‘disability’ ‘embodied impairment’ and ‘ illness,
death and bereavement’ as different forms of experiential knowledge
associated with SMA reveals the limitations of the medical typology in
accounting for the lived reality of those who live alongside SMA. Indeed,
despite the suggestion by the medical definitions presented in Chapter 3 that
there is a linear progression of severity running from the mildest type of SMA
(type III) up to types I or even 0, the narrative accounts of those individuals
living intimately with SMA suggests a far more complex picture. The
marrying of SMA type with assumptions about quality of life, moreover, is
problematic when viewed in the context of the different forms of experience
associated across each type. By distinguishing between ‘disability’,
‘embodied impairment’ and ‘illness, death and bereavement’, which transcend
medical classifications, it became clear that everyday experiences with SMA
did not map clearly onto the medical typology, and moreover, that there was
little correlation between these everyday experiences and the genotype of
individuals diagnosed with SMA. Despite the primacy attributed to genetic
knowledge in accounting for SMA, and its role in facilitating the ‘hype’
around the possibility of future treatments, genetic information emerged as
having extremely limited value in predicting or mediating the various ways in
which SMA was experienced in daily life -effective treatments for SMA
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remain elusive, and as has been described in Chapter 3, there is a documented
incongruence between pheno- and genotype expression of SMA.
By focusing instead on different forms of experience rather than
medically defined types of SMA, important conceptual distinctions have been
made between those experiential aspects of SMA which were considered to be
mediated by social and environmental factors, and those aspects which were
deemed to be pre-social -beyond medical, environmental and social
resolution. Such aspects of SMA were presented by participants as
fundamentally negative and involving physical and psychological distress not
amenable to any form of intervention. Whilst medical definitions have located
the presence of such suffering in what are regarded as the more ‘severe’ types
of SMA (e.g. type 0-I), analysis of the accounts of participants have revealed
that such experiences were not actually contained within any particular type
of SMA. Rather, SMA was experienced often as a complex interplay between
these different types of experience; a movement that took place over time and
in a range of different contexts.
As well as highlighting the difficulties in medical accounts of SMA, in
analysing the accounts of different family members’ experiences, this chapter
has further highlighted some of the difficulties associated with an analysis of
experiential knowledge. Whilst ‘empathetic’ and ‘embodied’ forms of
experiential knowledge have been studied in the literature as knowledge
derived from the same experience but from differing levels of abstraction, this
chapter has highlighted some of the internal tensions and inconsistencies with
this conception of experiential knowledge. Firstly, the lines between
198
embodied and empathetic forms of experiential knowledge were blurred and
intertwined in families affected by SMA, and secondly the accounts of life
with SMA emerging from experiential knowledge could be entirely
contradictory; empathetic accounts of SMA did not necessarily tally with the
way in which individuals diagnosed with SMA reported their embodied
experiences, leading to internal tensions within experiential knowledge itself.
An understanding of these different forms of experience of SMA, their
mapping onto medical classifications and the experiential knowledge of SMA
emerging from them are of crucial importance to an understanding of how
families affected by SMA approach reproductive decision making. The
negotiation of these different factors led to contrasting accounts of
reproductive decision making, as Chapters 5 and 6 present.
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Chapter 5
Reproductive Decision Making: Experiential Knowledge as Valued
Resource
In the previous chapters, I have analysed the nature of experiential knowledge
for families affected by SMA with an emphasis on the range of experiences
reported, and the problematic nature of the medical taxonomy for classifying
these experiences. I have argued in Chapter 4 that in spite of medical
definitions, the way in which SMA is experienced cannot be neatly contained
within diagnostic categories; families affected by SMA instead report a far
more complex picture of living with the condition, with intersecting
experiences of impairment, illness and disability across medically defined
‘types’ which are, moreover, rooted in ever-changing social, political and
economic circumstances across the life-course. The following two chapters
will take further the analysis of these experiential aspects of SMA to explore
the ways in which they not only create a backdrop for, but are also
strategically mobilised within, reproductive decision making.
Medical descriptions of the inheritance of SMA assert that in order for a
person to inherit SMA when it is not caused by a de novo mutation (which
account for 2% of diagnoses), both parents must be ‘carriers’ of SMA. This
means that each parent has one copy of the faulty SMN1 gene each. As it
requires two copies of this gene to result in a case of SMA, the carrier parents
do not display symptoms of SMA, but can have a child who does (See
Appendix IV for diagram). It is estimated that approximately 1 in every 40-50
people in the general population have this deletion on the SMN1 gene and
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thus are carriers (Wirth, 2000). When two carrier parents reproduce, they can
therefore have children who display symptoms of SMA, are asymptomatic
carriers or non-carriers. The widely accepted medical estimates of each
pregnancy are as follows:
 25% chance of producing a child who would be affected by SMA.
 50% chance of producing a child who would be an SMA carrier
 25% chance of producing a child who would not have SMA and
would also not be an SMA carrier.
(Simard, 2007)
(see Appendix IV for diagram)
These genetic risk estimates are different for some of the variant forms of SMA
such as ADSMA and SBMA which have dominant (i.e. only one copy of the
gene is needed to result in an affected child) and x-linked (i.e. transmitted on
the ‘x’ chromosome) inheritance respectively. SMARD involves a different
gene to classical SMA. It is, however, recessively inherited in the same way as
SMA (see Appendix V for an explanation of the types of genetic testing
available to families affected by SMA and Appendix VI for a description of
ADSMA, SBMA and SMARD).
For families affected by SMA, this medical knowledge of the
inheritance of SMA must be negotiated alongside experiential knowledge of
SMA. In order to present this complex relationship between experiential
knowledge and medical knowledge in reproductive decision making, the
analysis will specifically focus on the interaction between experiential
knowledge and notions of ‘reproductive responsibility’. Responsibility is a
key theme that has been analysed by different writers in relation to
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reproduction and disclosure, particularly in the context of genetic conditions
within families (e.g. Downing, 2005; Hallowell, 1999). Despite the fact that
responsible attitudes and behaviours are emphasised for any couple
approaching reproduction, and particularly for pregnant women (Ivry, 2007),
for families with a known history of a genetic condition, the imperative to
make ‘responsible’ reproductive decisions is even more pronounced (Reed,
2009). This chapter will therefore analyse the negotiations that occur for
families affected by SMA around ‘responsible reproduction’ and experiential
knowledge, paying particular attention to the strategies used to ameliorate the
tensions and contradictions emerging from their intersection. More
specifically, in this chapter I will argue that experiential knowledge is
presented by participants as clarifying the perceptions of their reproductive
responsibilities, either through its interpretation as a ‘warning’, or as
‘reassurance’ as to the possible outcomes of future reproductive decisions,
before moving on to the more problematising interpretations of experiential
knowledge and reproductive decision making in Chapter 7.
Responsibility and Reproduction
The concept of responsibility has been identified as a central area of inquiry
in the literature, both in relation to genetic knowledge more generally, as well
as in relation and parenthood. Studies around the management of genetic
knowledge within families have specifically addressed the existence and
operation of notions of responsibility through an analysis of the dynamics of
disclosure and the ownership of genetic information within families (Arribas-
Ayllon, M. et al., 2008b; Burgess and D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001;
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Chadwick, 1999; Hallowell, 1999; Downing, 2005; Polzer et al., 2002;
D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001; Hallowell et al., 2003), whereas the specific
forms of responsibility attached to parenthood, or more accurately,
motherhood, have also been highlighted in the literature in order to account
for the meanings, roles and socially accepted behaviours assigned to it (Ivry,
2007; Green, 1997; Wilson, 2007; Charo and Rothenberg, 1994; Dragonas,
2001; Ettore, 2002; Reed, 2009). For families affected by SMA considering
reproduction therefore, both ‘genetic responsibility’ (or a responsibility to
negotiate the genetic risks to one’s own health and the health of others)
(Kenen, 1994), as well as ‘parental responsibility’ (or the responsibility to
prioritise the welfare and well-being of a (potential) child) may need to be
negotiated, as well as other forms of responsibility to wider family and kin.
This section will present participants’ experiences and conceptualisations of
responsibility in relation to reproductive decision making under the headings
of ‘relational responsibility’ and ‘accountability’. These thematic headings
will be used to distinguish between the experiences of responsibility
grounded in everyday experiences and relationships (Burgess and
D’Agincourt-Canning, 2001) and the more abstract notions of responsibility
to distant, unknown others or society, and will include issues around
responsibility for disclosure of genetic information, as well as within
participants’ own reproductive decisions. It will be argued that the
presentation of particular accounts of experiential knowledge of SMA is an
important means by which participants negotiate these various, and
sometimes competing, responsibilities.
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Relational Responsibility
Despite the development of the new genetics being based in rhetoric of
individual choice and freedom, promising more information and suggesting
enhanced possibilities for the management of health risks (Kenen, 1994), the
discovery of a genetic condition within one’s family, as has been discussed in
Chapter 2, is often experienced as a familial discovery, necessarily involving
others and carrying implicit, and explicit, responsibilities. By its very nature,
genetic knowledge is situated within the context of biological and social
relationships, and for individuals who took part in this research, knowledge
about their genetic risk implied perceived responsibilities not only in relation
to their own reproductive decision making, but also the feelings, judgements,
freedoms and reproductive decisions of others within and outside their family.
Burgess and D’Agincourt-Canning (2001) have described this sense of
responsibility as ‘relational responsibility’ in the context of their research on
HD and hereditary breast/ovarian cancer. For Burgess and D’Agincourt-
Canning, relational responsibility captures the moral dimensions of
responsibility that are born out of ‘…specific life stories, shared
understandings and mutual and self-expectations’ of individuals (p. 363). For
Finch and Mason (1993), these moral dimensions refer to the impetus to
present one’s actions as falling within the boundaries of the pre-determined
conceptions of responsibility that mark out one’s identity as a responsible
brother, sister, daughter or father etc.
In the interviews that I conducted, participants expressed a strong sense
of what their relational responsibilities were, who they were accountable to,
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and who should enact them. Louise is 35 and has a seven year old son, Will,
diagnosed with SMA type II. For Louise, the discovery of a genetic condition
in her family led her to a series of difficult decisions in which her perceived
moral obligation to disclose had to be balanced against the possibilities of an
emotionally challenging situation for herself:
Um I think basically when he [Will] was diagnosed, and they
said it was a genetic thing and I said ‘well where the hell’s
that come from?’ you know I don’t know anyone who’s got
it in my family or anyone else’s family, because I’d never
heard of it before. But obviously we know it’s genetic and
since then I’ve done a family tree and I think there were 3 or
4 people in the family with it. But it’s all linked off different
ways with my, my husband’s dad, his half cousin, really
really far away in America, she’s got type II and she’s really
bad, she can’t sit up unsupported, she has a ventilation thing
at night time, and then I’ve got my mum’s second cousin
who lives in [town] where I live, and she can’t sit up
unsupported which is quite bad, so these people I knew
nothing about…but the biggest shock for me was that it
brought up other things in the family. I found out that I
actually have a half brother which had been kept from me
before. So I thought he should know about the SMA but I
was confused about how I felt about meeting him, you know,
if I can handle all the information about my family. In the
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end I decided to contact him through [website] because I felt
he needed to know, I believe we’re a similar age and he has a
right to that information, you know he might want kids
himself, he might already have them, so no matter how I feel
about doing everything, I’ve got to lay down the facts
because it’s only fair. And he is my brother.
As Hallowell (1999) has argued, the construction of genetic risk management
as a moral issue has the possibility of constraining women’s choices. Despite
her reservations, and the risks to her own emotional well-being, Louise felt an
obligation to inform her half brother of his potential genetic risk, and this
responsibility overrode the potential emotional risks to Louise involved in
uncovering her family’s long kept secret. Despite not knowing her half-
brother, Louise prioritised her blood ties with him when counting him as
family, and thus was clear in what her ‘sisterly’ duties involved, including her
responsibility for his reproductive decisions in light of the information she
possessed (Rhodes, 1998). For writers such as Reed (2009) and Hallowell
(1999), the operation of these forms of responsibility are, however,
necessarily gendered; that is, the responsibility to enact these relational
responsibilities fall primarily to women.
Chloe is 36 years old with a two year old son, Tommy, who was
diagnosed with SMA type II a year prior to the interview taking place. Upon
Tommy’s diagnosis, Chloe felt a similar responsibility to disclose this
information to her female relatives and her husband’s female relatives in
order to alert them to the possibility of them being carriers with a view that
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this information might be of use to them in their own reproductive decision
making:
It was important for me to know it was genetic because I have
4 nieces and Ryan [husband] has nieces on his side as well,
you know all at an age that they might be thinking…My
feeling all along was if they have the knowledge of SMA, then
they have the options. What they do with it is entirely their
decision, but I had to let them know the facts and make the
information available so I printed off information for all of
them to take to their GPs if they wanted to test. But I don’t
know how many of them went, I think part of it is a ‘it’ll never
happen to me’ attitude, but also not many GPs are
knowledgeable about SMA here in Northern Ireland.
Despite the fact that SMA is a recessive condition and thus transmitted by
both parents equally (as Chloe demonstrated an understanding of when later
talking about her own reproductive decisions), she nevertheless felt that it was
her responsibility to inform her female relatives about their potential genetic
risk (despite the fact that her husband’s brother would medically be defined as
being at higher ‘risk’ of being a carrier of SMA than any of her husband’s
nieces), perhaps reflecting her assumption that it is women who take primary
responsibility for reproductive decisions. Reed (2009) has argued that
women’s assumption of responsibility for reproduction can be related to the
fact that pregnancy takes place in women’s bodies; the embodied connection
with the foetus and the association of certain behaviours with negative
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pregnancy outcomes (e.g. smoking, alcohol consumption) positions women as
the guardians of the foetus whose actions have direct implications for its well-
being. Other writers such as Hallowell (1999) have further suggested the
notion that women tend to ‘…position themselves as self-in-relation, to see
their lives as interconnected to others, or to define themselves in terms of their
social relationships with, and obligations to, others’ (Hallowell, 1999: 616).
This can be used to understand women’s felt sense of genetic responsibility to
their family members. The sense of responsibility, as has been demonstrated,
not only included the assumption of responsibility for reproductive decision
making, but also the dissemination of genetic risk information to family
members. Hallowell (1999) has noted that this gendered assumption of
relational responsibility could be experienced as both burdensome and
constraining, not only for women, but also those for whom they enacted their
responsibilities. Nevertheless, by enacting such genetic disclosure
responsibilities, however emotionally challenging, women could define their
actions as justified and maintain their identities as responsible family
members.
As well as a responsibility to disclose genetic information, there was
also evidence that participants took emotional responsibility for their other
family members as an integral part of their ‘relational responsibility’.
Reproductive and disclosure decisions were never made in isolation, but
instead in a social context, and there was evidence in participants’ accounts
that the emotional responses of their family members had to be factored into
any decisions they made about how to use genetic information. Not only were
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responsibilities to existing children and the relationship between partners
considered, but also the feelings and viewpoints of extended family members
and kin. Charlie and Fraser, having experienced the birth of a healthy son,
Toby, and then the deaths of their second and third child (Jack and Alexis) to
SMA type I, described the way in which their responsibilities to their existing
child and extended family members were implicated in their decision to
undergo prenatal testing for their fourth pregnancy:
…well just when Alexis was born they [medical profession]
had made the break through with prenatal diagnosis. So they
took blood off Alexis so they could do the tests, but I don’t
know where we’d have gone with that one [future
reproductive choices] if the test hadn’t come about, because
it wasn’t just, you know, us dealing with the situation, it was
grandparents and Toby himself, all of our families and our
friends, you know. And they were all wishing that we would
chuck this, you know. They were all wishing that we would
just get a grip and give it up, stop, you know? You were just
aware of people wishing you’d stop, they didn’t tell you, but
you know we’ve got friends and they knew it was really hard
for us, you know. If people care about you, it affects them as
well. So you know that whatever decision you make you
have to take into account what effect it’s going to have on
them, you have to take that into account because you have to
live with the consequences of that.
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(Fraser)
Roberts and Franklin (2004) as well as Rapp et al. (2001) have emphasised
the way in which reproductive decisions in the context of genetic information
are necessarily social decisions, and not simply personal ones. Despite the
emphasis on patient autonomy in relation to genetic testing more generally
(Skene, 1998; Chadwick, 1999; Arribas-Ayllon et al., 2008b) individuals
approach reproductive decision making in the context of ‘a range of over-
lapping contexts, including personal, familial, and wider social contexts’
(Roberts and Franklin, 2004: 289), and thus this broader social context needs
to be accommodated in a consideration of how individuals approach their own
reproductive decisions, and the additional dimensions this may bring (Gilbar,
2007).
That participants felt a responsibility or accountability to their family
members for the reproductive decisions they made was also reflected in the
number of couples who reported that their reproductive decisions were kept a
secret from their families. Indeed, unlike the disclosure of a genetic condition
within the family, the responsibilities around reproductive decision making
were experienced as particularly fraught as they directly implicated the lives
of future generations of the family, and participants saw themselves as being
particularly vulnerable to the judgements and criticisms of others. Keeping
secrets served to protect both the emotional well-being of families, but also to
deflect this criticism, judgement or interference from other members
concerning the decisions made. Becky is 40 years old, lives in Switzerland
with her two children and partner and experienced the death of her first baby,
210
Lucy, to SMA type I. At the time of Lucy’s death, Becky was pregnant again
and underwent a CVS which revealed that the foetus also had the genetic
deletion associated with SMA. Becky and her partner, Rico, decided to keep
their decision to terminate this pregnancy a secret from their families:
When we got the results of the CVS we didn’t tell any of
the family members because we didn’t want to be touched
by their views. It hadn’t occurred to them that I was
pregnant when Lucy died. We were aware of how guilty
our parents had felt after the diagnosis and death of Lucy,
and it was enough for us to deal with our own grief without
them knowing about our decision to terminate. I think they
would have taken it very hard so close to Lucy’s death.
Our families are close knit, but are located in Northern
Italy and Belgium, so it was not difficult for us to keep it a
secret. We didn’t tell them anything until after I’d had the
termination, I was pregnant again with my son and I’d had
the all-clear test results.
For Becky, managing her relational responsibility meant not only managing
her responsibility to her prospective child, but also to her own, and Rico’s,
parents. By referencing the ‘guilt’ her parents experienced at the death of her
first child, Becky’s account highlights the way in which responsibility for
reproductive decisions can be experienced not only by the parents in question,
but can operate both vertically (i.e. grandparents-parents-children) as well as
horizontally (siblings-cousins), as has been suggested previously. Moreover,
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the guilt associated with a genetic diagnosis can be heightened by, and
intermeshed with, the (often) traumatic experience associated with
terminating a wanted pregnancy, amplifying the grave sense of responsibility
surrounding reproductive decision making for such families and the need to
safeguard against the potential emotional harm of, and from, different
members.
For some individuals, enacting relational responsibility not only meant
taking into account the emotional, social and practical well being of existing
family members, but also unknown future generations of the family. Rakesh is
51 years old, married with two children, and was diagnosed with a rare adult
onset form of SMA, Autosomal Dominant Spinal Muscular Atrophy
(ADSMA), in his 40s. Despite reporting a happy and supportive marriage and
positive relationships with his two adolescent children, Rakesh’s diagnosis of
ADSMA in his adult life led him to re-evaluate his pre-diagnosis decisions
about marrying and having children, and also to fear for the future well-being
of his own children and any subsequent generations of his family:
SMA can be active, it can affect you [symptoms can first
appear] from the age of 2 up until about 40 or 50 or even
70, so if you know about it, it could help to prevent it… I
wouldn’t have got married, if I’d known earlier. Knowing
that the gene would affect future generations then I
wouldn’t no…because, the thing is, right, that you’re
talking about future generations and four maybe five
generations down the road could be affected, you know?
212
And you know the condition will spread…and ten years
time, you don’t know what the future will hold…and I
think if you’ve got the condition, you’ve got that
responsibility to stop it in its tracks.
For Rakesh, SMA was conceptualised as a relentless condition which he had a
responsibility to stop. Two other participants, one with an adult onset form of
SMA (Ian, diagnosed with SBMA), and the other with an earlier onset in
infancy (Cara, diagnosed with SMA type II), described a similar concern
about future generations and the possibility of having children who are
carriers of SMA, regardless of whether or not they displayed symptoms of
SMA. Whilst primarily presented as a concern for the prevention of disease in
future generations, there was also a social component to the responsibility
experienced by these participants. As Cara, commented, ‘I suppose it’s about
preserving the integrity of your family lineage, you don’t want any nasties to
come from your side of the family’. Rakesh additionally perceived a stigma
associated with disability and genetic disease more generally within the Asian
community in which he lived and worked, which could potentially extend to
his children, and one which Rakesh saw himself as having primary
responsibility for:
I’m very cautious, you know about telling them [people in
the community] what I’m suffering from. Medically, they
don’t understand it so they think it’s contagious and stay
away from me, and I’m noticing that. You know I say it’s a
muscle condition, you know, but that’s all I tell them, I
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can’t tell them anything else and if they ask me a specific
question, I can’t lie to them so I tell them. But the thing
with that, right, is that it could affect the children because
if they [community members] know that it is genetic, if
they know that it’s hereditary, my children will be affected
if and when they do want to get married… the prospective
family might look at it differently, won’t they? I mean they
might not develop the condition, but they might be
carrying the gene, it might be dormant and four
generations down it might come out again, and that would
affect my children’s prospects, so that’s my responsibility,
right?
Whilst the testing is not yet available for Rakesh’s family to know for certain
whether his children are likely to develop ADSMA later in their adult lives,
for Rakesh, the possibility of his children experiencing the stigma attached to
his condition existed regardless of their genotype. The existence of a stigma
around carriers of genetic conditions has been considered in the medical and
social sciences literature (Kay and Kingston, 2002; Parsons and Atkinson,
1993; Kenen and Schmidt, 1978; Evers-Kiebooms et al., 1994), with the
suggestion that carriers of genetic conditions may experience stigma
particularly when approaching reproduction, or self-stigmatisation (including
experiencing guilt and shame) as a result of the diagnosis of a genetic
condition. For some participants, such as Rakesh, through prioritising his
relational responsibility to his children and future generations of his family,
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the issue of stigma became particularly central to the negotiation of
responsibility and led to practices of ‘perception management’ (Goffman,
1963) when interacting with other members of the community.
A final area of relational responsibility that has not been extensively
acknowledged in the medical and social sciences literature is a sense of
responsibility stemming from the existence of a family member living with
SMA. For some participants, having a family member affected by SMA
produced a particular form of emotional responsibility which was referenced
in their reproductive decision making. For the able-bodied adult siblings of
individuals with SMA, the possibility of being perceived as under-estimating
the quality and value of their siblings life by undertaking carrier testing or
prenatal testing with a view to prevent the birth of someone with SMA
produced a particular form of responsibility. Disability rights supporters have
referred this particular notion as the ‘expressivist objection’ to prenatal testing
(Parens and Asch, 2000), as it draws attention to the way in which the
existence of such tests express a negative valuation of disability. There was
evidence in this study that this expressivist objection was an important factor
that could both justify and constrain the reproductive decisions of siblings or
parents of individuals with SMA and inform how participants understood
what acting responsibly meant. Zoe is in her late twenties and is the older
sister to Rhona, who was diagnosed with SMA type III at two years old. Zoe
has a three year old daughter, Freya, and made the decision to avoid carrier
testing of herself or her husband before, or during her pregnancy. Zoe cited
her responsibility to protect her Rhona’s feelings as an important factor in her
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decision to avoid testing, despite Rhona’s encouragement for her to use the
tests:
The possibility of me being tested to see if I was a carrier was
openly discussed in the family. Rhona had mentioned that I
could be tested if I wanted to and that it would be quite
interesting to know who in the family is a carrier, but I always
said the only reason I would ever do it would be just for
medical research purposes, you know if they wanted to know
to further the research then I would happily help out, but I
wouldn’t know otherwise because it wouldn’t affect me having
children or not and my husband was in agreement with that.
Then when I became pregnant with Freya the midwife asked
me again if I wanted to be tested…but I said absolutely not,
because my husband and I both agreed, you know, who
wouldn’t want another Rhona? We just thought if it happened
it happened, and I wouldn’t have had a termination anyway. It
turns out Freya was fine, but I know that I would have also
have felt…very guilty, maybe guilt’s not the right word…but
it would have been horrible for Rhona if we had undergone the
testing. I know she told us she was happy about it, but it would
be like us saying that it mattered to us, you know if we had a
baby that was like her, it mattered enough to go through the
testing, and it absolutely wouldn’t…and I wouldn’t want her to
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think that or feel that way about it. It could be like saying that
we actually didn’t want her either. Which is rubbish.
Despite the fact that a considerable amount has been written about the
expressivist objection, particularly in relation to social policy (Fletcher, 2002;
Shakespeare, 1998; Parens and Asch, 2000) and attitudes of, and towards,
disabled people (Chen and Schiffman, 2000; Middleton et al., 1998; Press et
al., 1998; Shakespeare, 2008), very little attention has been paid to the way in
which it is experienced within families in the context of relational
responsibility. This may be on account of the fact that the expressivist
objection to prenatal testing intersects with socially based approaches of
disability, which, for political purposes has tended to shy away from
psychological responses to disablement. Whilst the concept has been used to
describe reactions to antenatal screening practices, anecdotal evidence has
pointed to its existence within families affected by genetic conditions (Kent,
2000 pp.61-63; Atkinson, 2008; Bowler, 2006), and for some participants,
avoiding this form of emotional harm to family members affected by SMA
was an integral part of their relational responsibility to be considered in the
context of reproductive decision making.
The different forms of relational responsibility that were experienced
within reproductive decisions are important to highlight as they had a
profound impact on the way in which reproductive decisions were approached
and accounted for to others. As Downing (2005) has highlighted, which
responsibilities are prioritised in the context of reproductive decision making
plays an important role in the negotiation and maintenance of moral identities
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and also had serious consequences for the way in which experiential
knowledge was (re) conceptualised and expressed in the interviews. Aside
from relational responsibility, however, participants also referenced a broader
sense of accountability for their reproductive decisions, an accountability to
unknown others as well as a moral accountability to society. There is a broad
literature documenting the development of new medical technologies and
casting speculation over the future of society in the context of these
developments (Gurnham, 2005; Brownsword et al., 1999; Fukuyama, 1992;
Gosden, 2000). In particular, concerns have been raised about the associations
of reproduction with consumerism as prospective parents are able to deselect
traits in their future offspring, and a loss of the spontaneity and chance
ordinarily associated with reproductive outcomes (Gurnham, 2005). For some
writers, this is part of a growing shift towards a society in which children have
come to be valued as ‘commodities’ designed to parental specifications, the
fears around which have been articulated into the notion of the ‘designer
baby’ (Lee, 2002). The sense of ‘accountability’ reported by parents in this
study incorporated these wider societal concerns and judgements about
‘designer babies’, as well as responsibilities to more distant or imagined
others.
Accountability
Whilst relational responsibility, in its many forms, played a significant role in
the reproductive decisions taken by families affected by SMA, a less personal
and more abstract notion of responsibility was also expressed which I will
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refer to as ‘accountability’. The term ‘accountability’ captures the
responsibilities felt towards unknown others, communities and society. These
forms of responsibility are captured in the work of Rapp (1999), who has
referred to women as ‘the philosophers and gatekeepers of the limits of who
may join our current communities’ (p. 318), and are thus accountable for their
reproductive decisions at not only a personal level, but also a social one.
There was evidence to suggest that participants were acutely aware of the way
in which their decisions were judged and perceived by others and their
responsibility to maintain their moral identities in this sphere. Press coverage
of the issues around reproductive decision making, as well as comments from
the general public served as reminders to families affected by SMA that their
accountability for their reproductive choices extended beyond their own
family; that these were social issues in which other individuals had a stake.
One mother of a child with SMA recalled an incident of being asked by an
acquaintance if she planned to get her subsequent pregnancy ‘properly tested’
so as to avoid tax payers taking the brunt of the financial consequences of her
having a second disabled child (Tara, mother of child diagnosed with SMA
type II). Kate is 37, has a seven year old child diagnosed with SMA type II,
and at the time of interview was about to embark on her third cycle of Pre-
implantation Genetic Diagnosis (see Appendix V for a description of PGD).
She described her encounters with the attitudes of others in the following
way:
K: Most people I tell about the PGD are fine with it,
but I did have one comment off one person saying that
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I’m playing God, I’m messing in things that I shouldn’t
be, and don’t I think about the direction this is heading
in, but that’s the only negative comment I’ve had.
F: and how did you respond to that?
K: Well she went off to do IVF herself anyway so,
what’s the difference? But, she wasn’t a close enough
friend for me to challenge her on that one or to worry
about it. If she had’ve been closer to me then I would
have done but she wasn’t and the ones who have an
answer for everything…the people who aren’t in that
situation are the ones who tend to not agree. And I just
think just wait and see if you’re in this situation then
see how you feel then.
The way in which PGD is accounted for in the narratives of those undergoing
or moving on from the process has been described by Franklin and Roberts
(2006) and Roberts and Franklin (2004). One participant in Roberts and
Franklin’s (2004) paper, Anne, who lost her daughter to SMA before
undergoing PGD, experienced a similar sense of wider interest in her
reproductive decisions, this time in relation to the ‘designer baby’ debate
(Roberts and Franklin, 2004: 289). The idea that the use of PGD (and indeed
other reproductive technologies) are usurping God’s role in deciding ‘who
should and should not inhabit the world’ (Hubbard, 2006:93), or paving the
way for future generations of genetically enhanced children (Franklin and
Roberts, 2006) have been discussed in the literature, particularly in relation to
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popular representations and public opinions (Scully et al., 2006; Bloomfield
and Vurdubakis, 1995; Lee, 2002; Gosden, 2000; Nerlich et al., 1999). For
Kate, (as well as for Anne, in Roberts and Franklin’s (2004) study), however,
these forms of public accountability were not always experienced as a form of
responsibility. The closeness of Kate’s relationship to her friend was an
important factor in determining the boundaries of her accountability in
reproductive decision making. Finch and Mason’s (1993) study of the
negotiation of familial obligation has suggested that closeness and
involvement are important mediating factors in the experience of familial
responsibility, in that those individuals with close emotional ties may
experience their familial responsibilities in a different way to those with more
distant relationships. Beyond the family, the emotional and psychological
connectedness of individuals appears to affect their sense of accountability to
them. As the woman to whom Kate refers was not a ‘close’ friend, and was
not in the same situation as her, Kate was able to take her accusation less
seriously, but nevertheless still felt that she had to defend her actions. By
referring to her own personal knowledge of her standpoint, the experiential
knowledge she has obtained through both being a mother to a seven year old
child with SMA, and having already gone through two cycles of PGD, Kate
could defend her position and discredit her friend’s opinion and standpoint as
a ‘non-knower’; her lack of intimate knowledge of her life was used as a
means by which to deflect her judgement and surpass any responsibility to
wider society, the future of reproduction, or God.
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Thus far, I have presented the different forms of responsibility that
emerged in the accounts of, and reflections about, reproductive decision
making in families affected by SMA. These have included, but are not
confined to, forms of ‘relational responsibility’ and ‘accountability’. Whilst
these forms of responsibility have been discussed as discrete categories for
illustrative purposes, there is a degree of fluidity and inter-connectedness in
the way in which they are experienced. Individuals may maintain their
broader accountability by prioritising and upholding their relational
responsibilities, and a sense of accountability may correspondingly shape the
nature and ideals of relational responsibility as they change and transform
over time. A presentation of the different ways in which responsibility is
experienced in reproductive decision making is important as it is through
attendance on these responsibilities that social and moral identities are
sustained (Walker, 1998; Finch and Mason, 1993). Reproduction is an arena
in which powerful norms and values exist; values which sustain the
boundaries of these obligations. It is through these that would-be parents must
negotiate their own reproductive choices. I will now present these strategies
used to negotiate responsibility in further detail in the following sections,
specifically focusing on the different meanings attributed to experiential
knowledge in these contexts, as both ‘warning’ and ‘reassurance’.
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The Negotiation of Experiential Knowledge and Responsibility
In the previous section, I have considered the various definitions and types of
responsibility that were considered in the imagined and actual reproductive
decisions made by those with SMA in their families. This section will
examine the way in which these responsibilities were negotiated in
reproductive decision making in the context of experiential knowledge of
SMA. The literature has suggested that the experience of a condition, whether
first-hand or through a family member has the potential to affect feelings
about having a child oneself with that condition (Gow, 2000; Wertz, 1992;
Asch, 1992; Parsons and Atkinson, 1993; Kelly, 2009) and, more recently,
how these forms of experiential knowledge may influence screening decisions
through more distant forms of knowing has been highlighted (Etchegary et al.,
2008). However, no study thus far has specifically examined the intersection
of these different forms of experiential knowledge with the specific
responsibilities associated with reproduction, and the tensions and
(dis)continuities associated with them that are negotiated by families affected
by an inheritable condition.
Shakespeare (1998) has suggested that in spite of the implications of
genetic technologies for people with disabilities, the voices of disabled people
have been largely absent from discussions around the implications of their
uses (Shakespeare, 1998: 673), with researchers instead focusing on the needs
and concerns of prospective parents. This research seeks to address this gap in
the literature by simultaneously presenting both the concerns of people with
disabilities and their family members. It is within the relationship between
those diagnosed with SMA and their family members that one of the central
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issues raised by disability rights supporters about prenatal testing, the
expressivist objection, is experienced and negotiated.
Experience as Warning/Reassurance
The different ways in which SMA was experienced and described by
participants has been discussed in Chapter 5. This chapter emphasised the
way in which participants distinguished between different forms of SMA
experience; ‘disability’, ‘embodied experiences of impairment’ and ‘illness,
death and bereavement’. It is in the context of reproductive decision making,
however, that these experiences and understandings of SMA took on new
significance and meaning. Indeed, participants frequently reported contrasting
views about the possibilities of having a child with different types of SMA, on
the basis that they are associated with different experiences, different abilities
and different levels of suffering. Whilst the prenatal test available for SMA is
not able to determine which type of SMA a foetus is likely to develop, it is
generally accepted within the medical profession that future generations, if
found to have two copies of the deleted SMN1 gene, will be affected by SMA
in a similar way to existing or previous relatives. Whilst the experiences of
some sibling groups within this study suggested that this was not always the
case (e.g. Kristen and Ellie, sisters who were diagnosed with different types of
SMA), participants nevertheless reported that they anticipated any future
generations diagnosed with SMA to be affected in a similar way to existing
family members. Within this context, the meaning attributed to that particular
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relative’s experiences with SMA came to be of crucial importance in
imagining future lives with SMA.
Experience as Warning
In speaking about, and attributing meaning to, this experiential knowledge in
the context of reproductive decision making, participants presented their
conceptualisations of SMA in more or less certain ways. For parents of
children who experienced severe SMA and died in infancy or experienced
ongoing illnesses with a shortened life expectancy, the suffering associated
with SMA was an unquestionable fact. Fraser is in his 50s, has two children
without SMA, but experienced the deterioration, suffering and eventual
deaths of his second son and first daughter due to SMA type I at 10 months
and 8 months of age respectively. Fraser had witnessed his children gradually
decline over their short lives, requiring tube feeding, and finally being unable
to breathe unassisted, spending much of their short lives in a paediatric
intensive care unit. For Fraser, the suffering his children had gone through
before their early deaths left no room for interpretation, and left him feeling
secure in the meaning he attributed to his experiential knowledge- that it was
a warning of the suffering involved with SMA and an impetus to prevent the
recurrence of SMA in future generations:
….the ability to under go prenatal testing [after the deaths of 2
babies, and before going on to having child without SMA] was
a God send for us, because no one would want that if they
could avoid it and I think everybody would say the same who
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is affected by it. I don’t see any dilemma at all with type I
testing, the test is there and I think every parent should take
advantage of that. I can’t understand where they’re coming
from if they don’t…I know some parents face a big dilemma
around type II testing, but if type I is the biggest genetic killer
of children under the age of 1 in the UK, which I’m told it is,
then I’m sitting in the prettiest spot in the argument in a way
because I don’t see any dilemma with using the test. You
know, and very few people could argue against my position…I
know some people talk about type Is living past their first
birthday, but that wasn’t going to be the case for our children,
so I think I’m sitting in the securest spot in the whole
argument, I think.
For Fraser, the suffering and the shortened life of any future children affected
by SMA were presented as a certainty. In the same way that parents of type I
babies in Roberts and Franklin’s study (2004) emphasised the certainty of
illness and premature death of babies affected by type I SMA, so Fraser
attributed this meaning to his witnessing of his children’s deaths. By
presenting this outcome as inevitable, Fraser saw his responsibility as lying
primarily as preventing the recurrence of SMA in future generations, which in
turn enabled him to see his position regarding prenatal testing as secure; by
undergoing testing and selective termination of any future pregnancies found
to be affected by SMA, Fraser and his wife, Charlie, were enacting their
responsibilities as parents to prevent the future suffering of another child, to
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divert the possibilities of their own grief and to safeguard their family’s
emotional well being. Their perceived sense of responsibility lay not in their
attendance to a broader, ethically framed accountability around prenatal
testing, but instead emerged from the realities of the pain, sadness and horror
of watching their two young children succumb to SMA.
Hallowell’s (2006) study of women’s perceptions of the risk of
developing ovarian cancer in the context of a familial history of the disease
has emphasised the way in which analyses of negotiations around risk, and
genetic risk in particular, have been abstracted from reality; the risks are not
treated as immediate or ‘real’, and the management of these abstract risks are
typically cast as an issue of identity (Giddens, 1991; Downing, 2005; Novas
and Rose, 2000; Polzer et al., 2002), devoid of any emotional content. By
drawing on interviews with women at risk, Hallowell (2006) has
demonstrated the emotional dimension to genetic risk perception; the women
she interviewed had nearly all witnessed the gradual decline and eventual
death of a close relative with ovarian cancer. Their perception of their genetic
risk was both grounded in their intimate encounters with suffering as well as
their obligations to maintain their other social relationships (e.g. to partners,
children, parents).Within this study, the emotional weight of participants’
experiential knowledge of SMA was felt in their accounts of suffering; it was
heard in the voices of parents as they recounted their experiences of
witnessing their children dying; it was visible at the bereavement support
meetings, the memorial service at the JTSMA annual conference and it was
felt every time a sentence was left unfinished during an interview, the
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emotional weight of experiential knowledge often too heavy and painful to
translate into words. As one participant eloquently stated, recounting her
experiences of witnessing the deaths of her three sons in infancy due to SMA,
‘bereavement is such a…hollow word…I cannot name what it is that I have
lost, can’t identify… I have no language… there are no words’ (Denise).
Frank (2001) has questioned the ability of researchers to accurately depict the
experience of suffering, as, by its very nature, suffering cannot be contained
within language; to tie it to words is to fail to accurately represent it, reducing
feelings and sensations to ‘complaints and specific concerns’ (Frank, 2001:
354). Hallowell (2006) and Bendelow (2006), however, have argued that
whilst dimensions of suffering are experienced privately and may defy
representation, suffering can nevertheless be communicated, recognised and
understood in ourselves and others. Whilst representations of it may only ever
be partial at best, Hallowell (2006) has argued that we nonetheless have an
obligation to write personal experiences of suffering into research; a process
that may challenge researchers emotionally, but to neglect this duty is to risk
overlooking an integral aspect of human experience.
In terms of the perception of genetic risk and responsibility, emotional
suffering incurred through witnessing the deaths/frequent illnesses of close
family members with SMA fundamentally altered the way in which
participants approached reproductive decision making. Experiential
knowledge of the horrors of past suffering, moreover, compelled participants
to formulate their relationship to the future in specific ways; enacting
reproductive responsibilities became a means by which to circumvent future
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suffering and alter the relationship to past hurts, as Fraser went on to
comment:
Despite the two affected by SMA, we have got two
children both free from SMA, and it’s my belief that you
get paid back, you know Alicia’s doing great and Toby’s
just started at medical school. You know, for all that we
went through, you get paid back. And I believe it’s
changed me as a person, what I’ve been through. I’m
more comfortable talking about death with folk, I feel ok
to do that. I’m probably a nicer person than I would have
been [laughs].
The suffering experienced by Fraser, his wife and his two children affected by
SMA, enabled him to regard the successes of his children without SMA as a
form of compensation or reward for what they had gone through, reinforcing
his identity as a responsible parent. Giddens (1991) has argued that self-
identity is not fixed throughout the life span, but is managed in relation to
lived realities and experiences. The ‘reflexive project of self’, or the rational
decisions taken to manage self-identity may be triggered by significant
experiences which compel individuals to redefine their identities. Experiential
knowledge of suffering, and the steps taken to avoid its recurrence, not only
had implications for the identities of individuals in their present, but was also
a means of maintaining continuity of these identities for future selves. By
defining his children’s various successes as a form of payback, Fraser
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continued to actively manage his identity as a responsible parent and one
humbled and fundamentally changed by his experiences of trauma.
Whilst the narratives of those parents whose children died in early
infancy from SMA invariably involved descriptions of experiences
characterised by unequivocal suffering, of both the children and their families,
descriptions of the lives of children who survived infancy but incurred
frequent bouts of illness and high degrees of restriction were also talked about
in these terms. It was in these circumstances that the experiences of SMA
were interpreted as a warning of the possibilities of suffering in future
generations, and the focus of reproductive responsibility was presented as the
prevention of its recurrence. Downing’s (2005) research on the perception and
enactment of responsibility in families affected by Huntingdon’s disease when
approaching reproductive decision making has emphasised the way in which
the nature of social relationships alters the perception and enactment of
responsibility. The changing prioritisation of relationships (i.e. whether
prospective parents prioritise their relationship with each other, themselves,
their existing children or any other relationship which they see as having
value and meaning), alters the way in which they relate to, and experience
responsibility. For participants who defined their relatives’ experiences of
SMA as involving suffering, there was little room to accommodate potentially
conflicting responsibilities. The obligation to protect the interests of a
potential foetus or child was seen to override any parental objections or
reservations about prenatal testing.
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Trisha is in her 30s and has a seven year old daughter, Joanna,
diagnosed with type I SMA. Whilst Trisha and her husband are not certain
about whether or not they would want any more children, Trisha reported that
she felt the use of prenatal testing and other antenatal tests is an integral part
of accepting the responsibilities of parenthood as they protect the best
interests of the child:
I suppose I think that now you have all these tests, you
can test for other conditions and SMA as well, there’s no
need to have disabled children you know. If you don’t
need to, then don’t, you know? At the hospital where we
take Joanna there are children there who are in a lot of
pain and who have no quality of life at all…and I think if
that could have been avoided, then that probably should
have been the case. Without wanting to sound
callous…but I think that because I’ve got Jo I can say
that, it gives me some legitimacy to say that. I see what a
burden it is for Jo to be carrying on, she’s so often ill and
I watch her suffer with it everyday so…if you’ve got a
pregnancy, you’ve got a responsibility to do what you
can for that child, what’s in their best interests even if it
goes against your instincts as a mother.
The issues suggested in the balancing of parental autonomy with the
responsibility to protect the best interests of future lives in the context of
potential disability or impairment has been discussed widely in the literature
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(Downing, 2005; Vehmas, 2001, 2002; Skene, 1998; Charo and Rothenberg,
1994; Rhodes, 1998; Shakespeare, 2008). Whilst for writers such as Green
(1997) and Purdy (1996), there are moral limits to parental freedom in
reproductive decision making in that parents must ‘strive to give…children
lives unimpaired by genetic (or congenital) disorders’ (Green, 1997: 6), for
other writers such as Vehmas (2001) and Asch (2001), the decision to
undertake to parent any child, regardless of impairment or disease, can also
be considered a hallmark of responsible parenthood. Indeed, the widespread
abhorrence expressed by the general public to the use of genetic technologies
such as PGD to select future children on the basis of social reasons, (e.g.
preferred eye/hair colour) can be regarded as an expression of this conception
of parental responsibility (Scully et al., 2006); ‘responsible’ parents,
according to this perspective, are expected to love and value whatever child
they produce, regardless of their own personal preferences and desires.
Parents such as Trisha were acutely aware of the existence of this broader
accountability through which reproductive decisions were scrutinized, and
many reported feeling guilty or judged by others (whether imagined or
enacted) for transgressing (for example through invasive testing or
termination) what Trisha refers to as the ‘natural instinct’ as a mother to
nurture and protect their growing foetus.
Importantly however, for Trisha, experiential knowledge of her
daughter’s condition offered her a means by which to escape this paradox in a
way that maintained her identity as a responsible parent. Trisha’s experiences
of being a primary carer to her seven year old daughter with SMA who
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requires 24 hour care, and a witness to her frequent illnesses with chest
infections, led her to perceive SMA as a burdensome. For Trisha, having
SMA meant ‘suffering’, not only for Joanna, but also for herself and husband
who described physical and psychological exhaustion meeting her needs and
that of her other daughter, aged 11. Trisha mobilised her experiences of her
daughter’s impairment to validate her perspective on reproductive decision
making; by emphasising the burden of her daughter’s condition for both of
their lives and regarding their experiences as a ‘warning’ as to the quality of
future lives with SMA, Trisha was able to ‘trump’ the discourse of parental
responsibility which positioned her with a duty to care for any child she
would have. Moreover, Trisha additionally positioned herself as being in a
privileged position vis-à-vis other parents in that she had intimate experience
of living with SMA which qualified her to lay claim to experiential
knowledge and thus enabled her to make ‘insider’ judgements about the sorts
of lives children with severe disabilities possess, implicitly suggesting that
differently positioned parents may not be able to justify such a standpoint in
the same way. By laying out the boundaries of experiential knowledge and
maintaining the unacceptable standard of life experienced by children with
SMA, Trisha was able to exonerate herself from one of the perceived central
tenets of parental responsibility: to accept any child.
Experience as Reassurance
Whilst the existence of genetic testing technologies have set a new precedent
in terms of extending the boundaries of responsible behaviour in pregnancy
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(Lippman, 1991), for some participants in this research, the decision not to
use genetic technologies could equally be presented as acting responsibly
through the mobilisation of experiential knowledge and the transformation of
reproductive responsibility. For individuals with SMA themselves, and thus
with first-hand experiential knowledge, this standpoint was particularly
relevant to the presentation of their reproductive decision making. Rhona is in
her twenties, has been diagnosed with SMA type III, and hopes to have
children in the near future. For Rhona and her husband, the process of
undergoing genetic testing in preparation for childbearing was not a priority,
despite it being strongly recommended to them by health care professionals.
While Rhona recognized that prenatal testing can offer benefits to some
people, she felt that selective termination or PGD would not be an option to
her in the event of her husband being found to be a carrier of SMA. For
Rhona, her experiences with SMA were central to this decision:
I suppose actually in hindsight now, SMA’s been a positive thing
really. I think that a lot of sort of what I’ve done and what I’ve
achieved has been hugely down to sort of having the personality to
overcome the problems that have come along with SMA. Um I
think when you sort of know your own experiences and when you
think about having children and whether they will be affected by
SMA, the way I look at it is, ‘well I’ve coped and I’m fine with
everything’ so, you know, it’s not all bad. I mean there’re always
going to be a certain amount of people who feel it’s irresponsible
to bring in a child to the world knowing that they’re going to be
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disabled or because you’re disabled yourself, but they tend to be
the people who have no experience of disability themselves, they
don’t know what it’s like and it’s just their perceptions… and
that’s just part of the harshness of life and I don’t take a lot of
notice of them.
Saxton (1984) and Morris (1991) have drawn attention to the way in which
women with disabilities in particular are often regarded as being incapable of
caring for children, and are thus excluded from the sphere of parenthood. This
situation may be particularly exacerbated for individuals with genetic
impairments who are presumed to automatically transmit their impairment to
their offspring, regardless of the nature of its inheritance. Thus, both parent
and offspring are positioned as being potentially problematic (Kallianes and
Rubenfeld, 1997). The prevalence of negative attitudes towards people with
disabilities reproducing may introduce a degree of accountability to the
decisions made by those with disabilities, which Rhona acknowledges.
However, by distinguishing between others’ perceptions and her own
experiences, Rhona was able to resist the discourse of responsibility that she
felt others applied to her as a disabled mother and potentially the mother of a
disabled child. Defining her embodied knowledge of living with a genetic
disability as being ‘not so bad’ (or even positive retrospectively) enabled her
to understand and represent her decision as responsible. SMA for her was not
harmful or undesirable (as others may suggest), but a condition which instead
instilled character and around which a happy and fulfilling life could be built.
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As well as a positive image of what a person’s life with SMA could be like,
Rhona also challenged the idea that someone with SMA would not be able to
adequately parent a child, particularly a child with SMA themselves, by
drawing on her experiential knowledge:
I mean I think a child with SMA would be really lucky to have a
parent with SMA really, because as someone with the same
disability, you already know about the sorts of obstacles you’re
going to come across, getting into schools and the
surgery…things like that, and you already know about how to
get round them…you know where to look for help and support
and you’ve already made those sacrifices in your life and live
with the restrictions that can come with it. You don’t get upset
when you can’t take your child on holiday because there’s
nowhere accessible, because you never had those holidays
yourself, you know? So I just think I’d be a lot more confident
and have a hell of a lot more insight than, say, an able-bodied
parent who has a child with SMA, you know, who didn’t even
know what it was before the child was diagnosed.
Rhona was aware that others might regard the decision to risk having a child
with SMA as irresponsible and of her own need to be accountable to this
accusation. However, by drawing on her own life experiences and by defining
them as positive, she was able to redefine the boundaries of parental
responsibility and justify her own standpoint on parenting with SMA. Being
in the privileged position of knowing SMA from the inside, Rhona felt that
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she had the authority to rewrite notions of responsibility, over and above those
who might define her as irresponsible.
Whilst Rhona drew on her experiential knowledge to disregard the
responsibility that was so central to the decisions undertaken by Trisha and
Fraser (to prevent the future suffering of children with SMA), being reassured
that SMA was a condition that could be lived with (with minimal or no
suffering) did not necessarily mean that prospective parents felt willing or
able to undertake this parenting. Megan is 32 and was diagnosed with SMA
type II at the age of 18 months. She has never been able to walk and has used
an electric wheelchair since childhood. She lives independently with the
assistance of PAs. Whilst currently not in a relationship or considering having
children, and indeed in doubt about her ability to have children, Megan
nevertheless described having thought carefully about what the possibilities of
childbearing would mean for her:
I’ve thought about it quite a bit actually because…um If I was
having a child with SMA, well any…if I was having a child with
any disability, I would want to be in a very secure relationship
with someone who was very supportive and I think particularly
if that child had SMA. I don’t think…I would have no worries
about bringing a child into the world who has SMA because I
know my life, although it’s been difficult at times-I’m not going
to say it’s been easy- but I do know that it’s been enriched by it
as well. And you know I would have no feelings of ‘oh I
shouldn’t put somebody else through that’ at all, because I don’t
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think it’s a bad thing, but I would think…I would have to
seriously consider how my partner would feel about that. And I
think that would be my major concern, you know the practical
side of things and having a partner who could provide that
support, to support me and a child with SMA. It’d be more, can I
put all that on my partner’s shoulders? Because I certainly
wouldn’t think ‘oh the child will have a terrible life I couldn’t
put them through that’, it’d be more ‘can I ask that of a partner?’
and I don’t think I could.
For individuals with SMA themselves, the uncertainty, risk and responsibility
associated with reproduction related not only to the risk of them having a
child affected by SMA (which is medically defined as a 3 out of 4 chance if
the partner is a carrier of SMA and a certainty if their partner had SMA as
well), but also uncertainty about their physical ability to undertake parenting
tasks associated with raising a child, with or without SMA. Downing (2005)
has suggested a ‘model of responsibility’ to describe the way in which people
approach genetically reproductive decisions (Downing, 2005: 220). By
examining the way in which people evaluate their ideas about the future,
personal values, prioritization of relationships and access to social support in
relation to their conceptualisations of risk, Downing has argued that the
negotiation of responsibility in genetically risky reproductive decision
making is in a constant state of flux (Downing, 2005: 221). As each of these
factors change and shift in terms of the importance attributed to them over
time and context, so the approach to, and actual reproductive decisions made,
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may alter. For Megan, her experiential knowledge of SMA was an important
aspect of this negotiation, as it was her primary resource in her evaluation of a
child’s potential life with SMA. By defining a life with SMA as a worthwhile
life, and instead prioritising the relationship with a potential partner, Megan
was able to discount the responsibility that had so guided Fraser’s and
Trisha’s decisions. Unlike Rhona, however, who felt secure in her abilities to
undergo childbearing, Megan’s prioritisation of her relationship with a
potential partner enabled her to regard the possibility of foregoing
reproduction (despite her positive evaluation of life with SMA) as
responsible.
The Specificity of Experiential Knowledge
Whilst experiential knowledge of SMA, whether conceptualised as warning
or reassurance, was spoken about primarily in terms of the suggested
implications for future lives with SMA, for some participants, the knowledge
acquired by living through a relative’s SMA was not related to one particular
diagnostic category, and thus could be used as a resource to guide
reproductive decisions relating to other disabilities and conditions. For such
participants, their experience of SMA, rather than being centred around a
diagnostic label, was instead identified according to the type of experience
they had had with SMA whether this was of ‘disability’, ‘illness and death’ or
‘embodied experiences of impairment’. Becky, who lives in Switzerland and
whose first baby, Emma, died of SMA type I at eight months of age described
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how her experiences of SMA altered her attitudes to testing for her three
subsequent pregnancies:
B: When I was pregnant with Emma I didn’t have any tests at
all, I just had the nuchal screening for Down’s [syndrome], but
that was all fine. I was told I was low risk. But after the sadness
and grief of losing Emma we were a lot more careful about the
other pregnancies, we had one termination for SMA. We also
requested to be tested to see whether we were carriers of Cystic
Fibrosis, which I don’t think is available in the UK.
F: Um, I don’t think so…why was that?
B: It was to do with the fact that there is no cure for Cystic
Fibrosis. We didn’t want to bring another ill baby into the world
when there’s nothing that can be done. I would have accepted a
test for anything like that, we researched the various conditions
and which we could be tested for.
Whilst Becky’s experiences had been labelled as ‘SMA’, she described them
in terms of the suffering, sadness and loss associated with having a terminally
ill baby. For Becky, these experiences traversed medically upheld boundaries
and compelled her to avoid, not just SMA specifically, but any condition
deemed incurable and fatal. Her experiential knowledge instilled in her not
simply a responsibility to prevent another life with SMA, but instead a
responsibility to prevent the birth of a terminally ill baby. Her sense of
responsibility was thus grounded in her experiences rather than being
attached to a specific medically defined condition.
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Whilst Becky’s experiences of the loss of her daughter warned her of
the difficulties she may face as the mother of another seriously ill baby, for
participants whose experiences of SMA were reassuring, a similar projection
of the experience of SMA onto other conditions took place. Matthew is in his
twenties and has a sister, Cara, who was diagnosed with SMA type II at 18
months of age. Matthew and Cara currently live together in a shared flat.
Whilst not considering reproduction in the immediate future, Matthew
reported that, on reflection, his perspective on disability generally has been
shaped by his experiences of his sister’s SMA:
I think having the family history I have, living with my sister
for 25 years, makes me far less inclined to be worried about
having a disabled child myself, be it SMA or Down’s
Syndrome, or whatever, because, [pause], because I don’t
see…you know I went on to take a job with disabled people, I
work with students who have Down’s Syndrome and similar
conditions and it certainly does not make them of less worth.
Er, you start to see disability as simply a different way of
doing things rather than a problem…And er, I suppose being
close to a disability, being close to differences gives you that
awareness. Disability is an example of a difference, within
individuals…and that’s what we’re talking about really, aren’t
we? Attitudes to disability.
Despite the fact that Press et al.’s (1998) and Etchegary et al.’s (2008)
respective studies suggest that women’s personal experiences of disability,
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whether within their own families or broader social circles do not necessarily
lead to more accepting attitudes about the possibility of having a disabled
child themselves, for Matthew, familiarity with SMA and his choice to work
with disabled people allayed any fears about having a disabled child himself.
For him, feelings about having a child with SMA were synonymous with
feelings about disability more generally. This attitude was reflected by other
participants who had grown up alongside SMA, and in particular, participants
with SMA who defined themselves as ‘disabled’ as opposed to identifying
themselves as ‘a person who has SMA’, as Kristen (who has been diagnosed
with type II SMA) commented:
Being a disabled person, you come into contact with other
people who are disabled just in life generally. I went to PHAB
[Physically Handicapped and Able-Bodied] club and met people
with all kinds of disabilities which taught me to be tolerant and
have a greater awareness of others with disabilities- you face a
lot of the same problems.
These different ways of understanding and identifying with SMA are all
relevant to the way in which experiential knowledge was conceptualised. For
both Matthew and Becky, their experiences of SMA had implications for their
reproductive responsibilities, not just in relation to SMA, but for other
conditions that are currently tested for. Their respective experiences of
disability and illness, and the meaning they attached to them, were projected
onto other conditions which they deemed to involve similar consequences.
Some of these projections were based on direct experiences with others with
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these conditions, whilst others were based on cultural representations and
medicalised information. The research by Wertz (1992) has suggested that
parents of children with a genetic condition, CF, express a range of attitudes
towards selective termination for other conditions, with some fully supporting
the practice and others less comfortable. This study suggests that it is the
experiential knowledge accumulated through living intimately with a given
condition that is important in shaping these attitudes towards other conditions,
and consequently, in shaping reproductive responsibilities towards them.
Conclusions
This chapter has demonstrated, through the presentation of different
participants’ accounts, how the meaning attributed to experiences of SMA
informs participants’ conceptualisations of their genetic risk and,
consequently their reproductive responsibilities. As Downing (2005) has
argued, the strategies thus used to diminish genetic risk by individuals from
families affected by SMA may offer more of an insight into the way in which
genetic risk and responsibility are experienced than what is actually decided.
Whilst Megan, Rona, Fraser and Trish arrived at different (anticipated)
reproductive decisions, the strategies they employed to arrive at, and assert,
these decisions were similar in that they all mobilised their various
experiences of SMA to ascertain where their responsibilities lay. Their
experiential knowledge was, however, not only a resource with which to
imagine future lives and discern responsibilities, but it was also used to
deflect the felt and anticipated criticisms of others. By constructing
243
themselves as the true ‘knowers’ about SMA, in that they live(d) with it, they
positioned themselves as possessing a privileged standpoint from which to
best assess the risks to any future offspring associated with being born with
SMA; what they knew about SMA was, therefore, less important than the
way in which they presented and positioned this knowledge. Indeed, by the
strategic presentation of their experiential knowledge, participants could
exonerate themselves from the demands of specific aspects of parental
responsibility, by invalidating the (felt) criticisms of others, and also by
transforming its meaning. For Trisha and Fraser, experiences of SMA
instilled in them a responsibility to prevent another life with SMA, whereas
Rhona and Megan’s experiences of SMA meant that they could transform
what it meant to be a parent, or a child, in the context of having SMA and to
regard these as positive, rather than the negative way they assumed them to
be evaluated by others. However, for some participants, experiential
knowledge, rather than bringing into focus the felt responsibilities associated
with reproduction, instead heightened the some of the dilemmas around
reproduction. Further, for some participants, experiential knowledge was
presented as being an irrelevant or unreliable knowledge source. I will present
these contrasting accounts in Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6
The Limits of Experiential Knowledge in Reproductive Decision Making
In the previous chapter, I have presented the way in which experiential
knowledge can be drawn upon as a constructive resource in reproductive
decision making. Whilst these participants attached vastly different meanings
to this knowledge of SMA, it was nevertheless presented by all as a reliable
and valuable form of insight, around which future reproductive decisions
could be oriented. However, for some participants, the usefulness of this
knowledge was less clear. Indeed, experiential knowledge could be
experienced as problematic when its meaning was less certain, less fixed, or
conflicted with other deeply held values. It is these instances wherein
experiential knowledge was felt to be burdensome, challenging or unstable
that will now be examined.
The Burden of Experiential Knowledge
In the processes of thinking about, and recalling, reproductive decisions,
participants spoke about the range of responsibilities for which they were
accountable. Whilst for Fraser, Trisha and Rhona and Megan presented in
Chapter 6, experiential knowledge was described as enabling them to navigate
these competing demands and maintain their identities as responsible
(potential) parents, for others, their experiential knowledge was burdensome
and in conflict with their perceived responsibilities.
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Kate is 37 and has a seven year old son, Jamie, diagnosed with SMA
type II. At the time of interview Kate and her husband were waiting to
undergo their third cycle of PGD. Kate described her arrival at the decision to
undergo PGD as arising out of a long period of not conceiving despite trying
to, and having been offered the procedure when seeking medical advice for
infertility:
I think we took the PGD because somebody told me about it
and then we got offered the funding so we just sort of went
along with it...we wanted another child and it had just never
happened for us. PGD seemed like it would be the easiest
route, because I couldn’t have another child like Jamie, it
wouldn’t be fair on him because he needs so much attention,
and I couldn’t cope with all the lifting. We didn’t have
the…but going down the route of testing and terminating…
well it would be like getting rid of Jamie, that’s how I’d look
at it. And you know I love him to bits, he’s so funny, and yes
he’s in a wheelchair what have you, but he’s a lovely little
boy and that’s how I see him. And it would just be like
saying, well wiping him away really, saying he wasn’t really
what we wanted…and that would be a very hard thing to
explain to Jamie when he’s older, but because of not being
able to conceive naturally as well...I don’t know if that
makes it easier for me, because it’s not like I just chose it, it
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was because I couldn’t conceive naturally it was the only
option.
Kate’s description of her arrival at PGD touched on some of the recurring
themes across many of the interviews undertaken with parents of children
with SMA who wanted to have further children. For Kate, her experiential
knowledge of SMA presented her with a difficult dilemma; it enabled her to
see not only the reality of the care work involved in looking after a child with
SMA, but it also simultaneously enabled her to discount SMA when
evaluating her son’s life: ‘when you have a child and live with a child, you
see past the wheelchair and all the problems’ (Kate). This personal
knowledge of what it’s like to live with SMA, and also feeling that caring for
a second child with similar support needs would stretch the family’s resources
beyond their capacity, left Kate trapped between incompatible
responsibilities, to both protect the emotional and physical well-being of her
existing child with SMA, but also to safeguard the future welfare of the
family unit. Larson (1998), through an empirical study of the impact of
disability on maternal-child relationships in Mexico, has referred to this
situation as the ‘paradox’ of disability. Through her interviews with mothers,
Larson discovered that a constant tension existed between the mothers’
feelings about loving their child for who s/he was, but simultaneously
wishing to erase the disability, and the problems that came along with it
(Larson, 1998: 865). Larson’s (1998) study highlights the over-
simplifications of the expressivist objection to prenatal testing- pointing to the
possibility of concurrently valuing the lives of those with disabilities, but also
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wishing to avoid the challenges associated with life with a disability. For
Kate, in spite of the fact that PGD is generally not positioned within the
medical-scientific literature as an infertility treatment, presenting her use of
PGD not as a ‘choice’, but instead as inevitable given her difficulties with
conceiving, enabled her to negotiate these competing responsibilities that her
knowledge of SMA presented.
Whilst Kate’s experiences with SMA and PGD enabled her to
navigate a pathway through the competing responsibilities and inherent
tensions she perceived to be involved with loving and valuing a child with
SMA whilst also preventing future affected lives, other participants became
trapped by the dilemma, unable to reconcile their conflicting feelings.
Claire is 30 and lives in a neighbouring town to her sister, Megan (32), who
was diagnosed with SMA type II at the age of 18 months. Megan works as an
artist, and Claire works as a part-time teacher and is also employed by Megan
as one of her personal assistants for the remainder of the time, replicating
some of the assistance work Claire undertook for Megan when they were
growing up. Both sisters took part in the study and described their
relationship with each other as close. Claire has a long term partner with
whom she has had discussions about the possibility of having children.
However, for Claire, her close relationship with her sister, as well as her
knowledge about the possibility of genetic testing created a painful dilemma
for her and her partner:
Yeah I think I’m in quite a difficult position with that really,
with having children. Because my first thought was that I
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would never bother with any sort of testing, if we were going
down that route, because I know SMA quite well really and I
see what a wonderful person Megan is, and you know we often
say that her condition has given her strength, mental strength
that she may never have developed, so I know it on that level,
but… I also know the other layers of it…um [pause] I suppose
it sort of sounds cold to say it but, it’s human nature to sort of
think that if it could be preventable for somebody…Is it going
to be really difficult or is it something that you can take on? Of
course you’re going to want the child that doesn’t have to
struggle and things, no one wants to see their child go through
that. So I’ve got that, but on the other hand I’ve got ‘what
would that say to Megan?’ It would be like me saying that she
wasn’t important or that her life wasn’t worthwhile with her
condition, that there was something wrong with her. So where
you go with that….um….Yeah I’m stuck between a rock and a
hard place [laughs].
In the same way that Kate feared explaining her decision about avoiding the
birth of a child with SMA to her son in the future, so Claire feared her sister’s
interpretation of a decision to avoid a similar situation. Whilst for Kate, her
resolution to her dilemma lay in use of PGD, for Claire, there was no such
means of reconciling her experiential knowledge of SMA with her
responsibility to protect her sister’s feelings and possible interpretations of
her actions. Downing’s (2005) research has suggested that social context is
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important in the approach to reproductive decision making, and that these
contexts may inform the values individuals bring to reproductive decisions, as
well as for what, and to whom, they consider themselves accountable. What
emerged as particularly important in the narratives of those who took part in
this research was the point in their reproductive lives at which the interview
took place. Interviews were conducted with those who had had children or
were in the process of deciding, whilst for others, the possibilities of
reproduction were hypothetical or imagined. Some participants narrated well-
rehearsed accounts of the reproductive decisions they had already made and
appeared familiar with telling these stories, highlighting the fact that
negotiations of responsibility for reproductive decisions within families
affected by SMA extend beyond the point at which decisions were enacted,
and indeed the work of managing and justifying these decisions for such
families was ongoing. For other participants, however, the possibility of
reproduction had not been thought about in any depth before; whilst some had
undergone carrier testing and therefore had been given statistics as to their
degree of genetic risk, others were only aware of this risk by virtue of having
an affected relative. For individuals such as Claire, reproduction, as a distant
possibility rather than an immediately threatening risk, was considered from a
level of abstraction that allowed more room for uncertainties and imaginings,
than for those participants who were reflecting on decisions that had already
been made. It may be unsurprising therefore, that reproductive dilemmas
were more frequently expressed by those participants who had not yet made a
reproductive decision that involved medically defined genetic risk. Indeed,
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such accounts many not reflect the reproductive decisions participants may go
on to make, as the context of reproduction changes with increasing life
experience, age, competing responsibilities, financial status etc. Nevertheless
for Claire, experiential knowledge of SMA and the context of her relationship
with her sister, complicated her feelings about her own possible genetic risk.
Whilst experiential knowledge, therefore, could in certain situations be used
strategically to clarify and justify reproductive decisions, for other
participants, it left them stuck ‘between a rock and a hard place’, with a risk
of being constructed as ‘irresponsible’ whatever decision is taken.
As well as fears about the possible impact of an expressivist objection
to genetic testing from family members affected by SMA, participants also
spoke about their responsibility to protect their own emotional well being, and
the ways in which their knowledge of SMA posed particular threats to this
responsibility. Evelyn, for example, who is in her 20s and has been diagnosed
with SMA type II, had never met another person diagnosed with SMA until
the age of 25 when she first attended a JTSMA conference. Up until this
point, Evelyn’s knowledge of SMA was primarily derived from medical
sources (e.g. consultations with clinicians, leaflets on SMA distributed at the
hospital), as well as seeing other people who she described as ‘looking like
me’ at the specialist SMA clinic she attended throughout her childhood.
Evelyn described her first experience at a JTSMA conference as a ‘real eye
opener’ which had a substantial impact on her perception of SMA as a
condition, and also on her feelings about having a child affected by SMA
herself:
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I’d always said that I knew what I’d do if I were to have a
child of my own with SMA, that it was fine if it was a type II
or III, but that I wouldn’t have a type I baby as I think it’s
cruel really to have them when they suffer and die so young,
you know, if you can stop it, if you have a choice about it. I
know a lot of parents don’t get a choice in that…[It is not
possible to diagnose the type of SMA prenatally] But yeah,
that was before I went to conference for the first time, and it
threw all that out of the window [laughs] because I met an
eight year old with type I, and they’re doing really well and the
parents love them to bits and…I don’t know, it’s made me
reconsider it all really um because now that I know that, I
would feel guilty for the rest of my life…if you got rid of a
type I, and then you saw that…I wouldn’t want to put that that
weight on my shoulders, knowing that it could have been ok,
they might have lived and I’d just got rid of them. So now...I
just don’t know what to think about it really, it’s more
complicated now isn’t it [laughs]?
The work of Lyons (2000) and Etchegary et al. (2008) have highlighted the
way in which experiences of health, illness and disability presented in the
media, or the lives of unknown others can contribute to an individual’s
understandings and feelings of ‘knowing’ about a condition. Whilst
Etchegary et al. (2008) have contrasted this form of knowing with more
‘vivid’ knowledge obtained through the lives of friends and family, Evelyn’s
252
first meeting with a family affected by type I SMA nevertheless had a
significant impact on her feelings about the types of SMA, and the
experiences of suffering therein. Seeing that a person diagnosed with SMA
type I could survive past infancy introduced a new form of responsibility for
Evelyn; she now had to weigh the doubt this knowledge brought to her
previously steadfast evaluation of life with SMA type I against her desire to
protect herself from the possibilities of regret and guilt. Her indirect
experiential knowledge of another family’s experiences with SMA, combined
with her direct knowledge of SMA in her own life led her to re-evaluate her
responsibilities in reproduction rendering them both uncertain and
contradictory; both terminating or continuing with a pregnancy affected by
SMA type I could cause imaginings of what ‘could have been’ in light of her
indirect knowledge of SMA type I, with the attendant guilt and regret if these
imaginings appeared more favourable than reality.
This section has demonstrated the way in which experiential
knowledge, whether obtained through having SMA oneself, or through less
direct means, for example, living with, or meeting someone with SMA, rather
than clarifying reproductive decisions, could actually introduce uncertainties
and tensions to reproductive decisions. For both Claire and Evelyn,
experiential knowledge of SMA both enlightened them to the possibilities as
to what life with SMA could be like, but also created confusion as to which
responsibilities they should prioritise when making reproductive decisions.
Indeed, whether SMA was perceived as entailing suffering and whether or not
there was a close family member affected by SMA are examples of factors
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that not only shaped participants’ experiential knowledge, but also impacted
on the way in which participants conceptualised their felt sense of obligation.
Whilst thus far, experiential knowledge has been described as a stable
resource, created, re-created and passed between individuals living closely
alongside SMA, offering possibilities for the creation, subversion and
transformation of felt responsibilities in medically defined ‘risky’
reproductive decision making, not all participants conceptualised this
knowledge in this way, or indeed, as being available to the majority of people
living with SMA. Some participants provided tightly defined accounts of
experiential knowledge, regarding it as the property of a small minority of
those diagnosed with SMA and not transferrable within and between social
groups, whereas other participants provided far less lucid accounts of their
lives with SMA. For these participants, the experience of SMA could not be
described or owned in any meaningful way due to its unstable and ever-
changing character. In contrast to the bounded knowledge presented by
participants so far, these participants regarded their experiences of SMA as
far more fluid and uncertain and thus an unreliable basis for knowledge
claims. These accounts of contestation around experiential knowledge, and
their interaction with responsibilities in reproduction will now be examined.
Ownership and Privilege
Whilst experiential knowledge of SMA was treated by some participants as a
taken-for-granted product of their experience of the world, for others, it was
described as a privileged form of insight available to only a minority of
individuals. This contestation around ownership of, and rights to claim,
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experiential knowledge of SMA is important as it strikes at the very heart of
what constitutes experiential knowledge of SMA. Indeed, as has been
discussed previously, participants came to know SMA from a variety of
different perspectives; as the parents, carers, spouses, siblings, partners or
children of individuals with SMA, or as people who have been diagnosed with
SMA themselves. The question as to which of these individuals had access to
the appropriate experiences, identities and subjectivities to give them a
validated standpoint from which to lay claims to ‘knowing’ SMA, however,
was highly contested. Given that experiential knowledge of SMA was
regarded as a crucial resource in reproductive decision making, and an index
by which to organise responsibilities, the way in which individuals lay claim
to, or invalidated claims to, experiential knowledge is another important
centre of negotiation and tension in the reproductive decisions of families
affected by SMA.
As the development of genetic and screening technologies has brought
with it the possibility of the prenatal detection of a range of conditions, so has
concern risen amongst disability rights supporters as to the sources of
information by which prospective parents come to know about the conditions
their foetus is being screened/tested for. In particular, concern has been raised
about the communication of overly medicalised portrayals of conditions to
prospective parents which simply emphasise the medical complications
associated with it (as found by Williams et al. (2002) in relation to Down’s
syndrome) as opposed to the possibilities for a fulfilling life (in spite of
impairment) that are often reported by the families and individuals currently
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living with that condition (Asch, 1999; Ferguson et al., 2000). By elevating
the status of the knowledge of disabled people in defining the reality of life
with impairment, and rendering them the ‘best experts’ (Peterson, 2006:32) in
their own conditions, disability rights supporters have attempted to counter
balance some of the medicalised assumptions deemed to inform many
people’s attitudes to disability, and subsequently, their approach to selective
termination decisions (Asch, 2000).
For some individuals with SMA, their experiential knowledge of
SMA was viewed in these political terms and perceived as a resource for
would-be parents considering the possibility of having a child with SMA, as
Hannah, diagnosed with SMA type I commented:
I definitely think there should be a space for us in this
debate about selective termination, I mean I basically think
it’s genocide for the contemporary world. The medical
view of disability is so narrow and they only see like the
worst angle of it. Even in families with SMA…you know,
how can these parents know what it’s like really? Just
because they’ve got a kid with SMA doesn’t mean they
know what it’s like or put them in a position to make that
sort of judgement on whether or not the kid should live.
Only people with SMA really can say what it’s like, so the
decisions to terminate are based on ignorance rather than
fact.
256
Hannah’s concerns about the uses of selective termination have been echoed
elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Rock, 1996) and present a view of
experiential knowledge not simply as a valuable form of insight into life with
SMA, but instead as the only authentic version of what living with SMA
means. As presented in Chapter 1, issues around the status of different sorts
of knowledge have been debated extensively within the feminist
epistemological literature (Hartstock, 1983; Hekman, 1997; Ramanzanoglu
and Holland, 1999; Code, 1991). Feminist standpoint theorists, following the
work of Hartstock in the early 1980s, have argued that the unique standpoint
of women offers a justification for the knowledge claims of feminist research
(Hartstock, 1983). From the starting point that all knowledge is ‘situated’,
standpoint theorists have argued that women, through their subjugated
position, can offer unique insights into the experiences of oppression, they
offer a ‘true’ account of the internal workings of patriarchy (Hartstock, 1983).
Whilst feminist standpoint theory has been heavily criticised, particularly for
its inability to account for difference without attracting the criticism of
relativism (Hekman, 1997; Ramanzanoglu and Holland, 1999), as well as its
inability to disentangle truth claims from their discursive construction, it
nevertheless appears to be echoed in the accounts of disabled people who
claim epistemic privilege. This claim can be understood in terms of feminist
theorising as an attempt to create a counter-hegemonic discourse to the
disablism inherent in western societies. Indeed, despite the criticisms levelled
at the valuing of some voices over others, Hartstock (1997) maintains that
there are ethical, political and social justifications for doing so; she argues
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that the privileging of certain knowledges may offer ‘possibilities for
envisioning more just social relations’ (p. 373) which should be taken
seriously as a basis for discounting relativist accusations. The possibility of
altering the value attributed to lives affected by impairment has certainly been
suggested as a justification for privileging the voices of people with
disabilities in the debates about prenatal testing and selective termination.
Tom Shakespeare, a prominent disability rights supporter and writer
on the ethics of prenatal testing, has nevertheless occupied a more graduated
position, regarding his experiences (as a person with a genetic impairment) as
being relevant to, but not necessarily offering a better account of, life with
disability as presented to would-be parents facing the possibility of selective
termination (Shakespeare, 2005). In terms of families affected by SMA
considering reproductive decisions, the ownership of, and privilege accorded
to, experiential knowledge of SMA appeared to carry moral weight, and was
a point of contestation for many participants. Whilst for Hannah, claiming a
privileged perspective on SMA was part of her broader political commitment,
such claims could also be used strategically within families to justify
particular standpoints and to discredit others.
Luke is 40 years old and lives and works in London for a consultancy
company. His sister Gill, with whom he lived whilst he was growing up, was
diagnosed with SMA type II in childhood. Luke has two children, and
underwent carrier testing before having them. When found to be a carrier,
Luke’s wife was also tested and was found not to be a carrier. Luke described
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his feelings about undergoing testing before having children in the following
way:
I have to say that I wasn’t overly concerned about getting
the testing done, but my wife thought it might be a good
idea to get it done. I wouldn’t say I was worried about it
though, because you know I’ve had real experience of what
it’s like, living with Gill and knowing what SMA is like.
But I’ve certainly seen friends of mine and I guess I might
have been in the same sort of state of mind...that unless you
know what the impact is on your life, and what your child’s
life will be like, you know, you worry. There’s a sense that
your life quality changes, you know as a parent, and that
it’s going to be an incredibly difficult life for you and your
child, and I don’t agree because I’ve got first-hand
experience of it, so I guess I’ve got that unique perspective
of it.
The medico-scientific literature in particular has pointed to the significant
influence having a relative affected by a particular condition has on feelings
about one’s own genetic risk, reproductive choices and sense of
responsibility (Kay and Kingston, 2002; Wertz, 1992; Elkins et al., 1986;
Beeson and Globus, 1985). Whilst for some conditions, this experiential
knowledge meant that relatives were less afraid of the possibilities of having
an affected child themselves (Wertz, 1992; Elkins et al., 1986), for others,
knowing the ‘intimate detail about the realities of care’ (Beeson and Globus,
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1985: 110) associated with the condition created more unease in relatives of
affected individuals about such a possibility (Kay and Kingston, 2002;
Beeson and Globus, 1985). Gow’s (2000) study of women with conditions for
which prenatal tests or screening are available (which included interviews
with women affected CF), highlighted the women’s feelings about how their
siblings would perceive their condition and also their feelings about having a
child affected by CF themselves (p. 262). As unaffected siblings do not have
the same constraints on their reproductive decisions imposed by a chronic
illness or disability as individuals diagnosed with SMA and parents of
affected children, the experiential knowledge of siblings may offer particular
insights into experiential knowledge and its role in reproductive decision
making (Bryant et al., 2005). In total seven able-bodied siblings of
individuals with SMA took part in the study, all of whom emphasised the
positive view of SMA they had developed having grown up alongside their
sibling, and also the resourcefulness of their parents in accommodating the
family’s needs. A further six individuals with SMA described their
anticipation that their siblings (who had not taken part in the study) would
share a similar view to this, whilst three commented that they were uncertain
about their sibling’s feelings. Whilst five of the able-bodied siblings who took
part specifically mentioned experiences of guilt akin to ‘survivor guilt’, or
feelings of being overshadowed by their sibling’s high support needs whilst
growing up, all were keen to state the potential of people diagnosed with
SMA to achieve and thrive in spite of disability- a finding reflected in the
literature in relation to other conditions (e.g. Scelles, 1997; Van Riper, 2003).
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Luke’s feelings about growing up alongside SMA and his confidence in the
insight this perspective offered him, therefore, are representative of this group
of siblings.
Despite the ‘empathetic knowledge’ (Abel and Browner, 1998) of
SMA accrued by this group of siblings, however, the accounts of individuals
diagnosed with SMA suggested different criteria by which a person can
‘know’ SMA, and thus who may be qualified to ground their reproductive
decisions in this knowledge. Indeed, for many participants diagnosed with
SMA, siblings’ knowledge of what it’s like to live with the condition was
partial and incomplete, although it was acknowledged that they may be able
to reflect on the experiences of caring and living in a disabled family. Gill,
Luke’s sister and diagnosed with type II SMA, for example, disqualified her
brother’s knowledge claims when she talked about her life with SMA:
I definitely feel that no one can ever know what SMA is
really like until they live with it themselves, you know,
they’ve got it. Because other people, outsiders, no matter
how close they are to you, they could be in your family even,
they can’t put themselves in your position. And my brothers,
they don’t really know how much help I need, because while
I was at home with them growing up I was quite capable of
doing quite a bit for myself, it’s only since I’ve moved out
and lived on my own that now I need PAs [personal
assistants] all the time…They [brothers] know I need help,
but I don’t think they know how much help I need. So it’s
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really just between me and my PAs. Not even my
friends...it’s not something you...talk about...everything
that’s physically hard is usually done in the house, you know
all the personal help and looking after the house and
everything, no body sees that apart from the person who’s
helping me. And even then, how do they know how it feels
to you? So yes it’s so individual in that respect, you can’t
know unless you’ve lived that life.
Whilst Abel and Browner (1998) distinguished between ‘embodied’ and
‘empathic’ knowledge in the way in which people gain experiential
knowledge, for Gill, experiential knowledge was a bounded form of
knowledge; it could only be accessed by those living with the condition
themselves, and was not transferrable to ‘outsiders’ by virtue of them living
with her. There is a strong contrast between Luke, who described his
experiences with SMA as ‘first-hand’, and Gill who referred to all people as
‘outsiders’, outside of her body, perspective and standpoint and thus
ineligible to evaluate her life. Indeed, as her care needs changed over time,
and she moved out of the parental home, her experiences of SMA began to
change; she took on PAs and experienced independent living, and thus her
brothers’ knowledge of what life with SMA was like became outdated. For
Gill, being able to discredit Luke’s perception of her life with SMA was
particularly important in relation to his decisions about undergoing carrier
testing, as being able to claim authoritative knowledge of SMA could serve as
a bastion against the emotional harm associated with the thought that Luke
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might wish to prevent a life affected by SMA. As Gill commented when
recalling her brother’s decision to undergo carrier testing:
I actually gave Luke all the information [about the
genetics of SMA] before he and his wife started trying
for a baby, so they could know about their options and
choices and I was glad they had it, but once I’d given the
information, I realised that information is really powerful
and that then they had a choice and I started to think, if I
had known that she [Luke’s wife]was pregnant and she
had a little baby with SMA, and they got rid of it, I mean
that would have been shattering. Because that tells you a
lot about what they think about my life. And actually my
life, from where I’m seeing it, is probably a hell of a lot
better than most people’s…but they can’t see it from
where I’m seeing it, only from where they are, which is
probably quite different, so their decision wouldn’t really
be based on reality, if you know what I mean.
Being able to police the boundaries of who could claim experiential
knowledge was crucial, not just for individuals with SMA considering the
reproductive decisions of others, but also prospective parents (with and
without SMA), as it enabled participants to discredit the perspectives of
others who may criticise their decisions or viewpoints or protect against the
emotional harm inflicted by the reproductive decisions of others.
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Importantly, however, claims to ownership of experiential knowledge
additionally served to strengthen identification with others who are deemed
legitimate holders of this knowledge. For those people who have been
diagnosed with SMA themselves, a common identity and sense of empathic
understanding with other people with SMA was emphasised, as Hannah,
diagnosed with type I SMA commented:
I am actually very interested in other people that have
SMA because there is a commonality between us, you
know, when you meet someone else with SMA it’s like
meeting a long lost member of your family. We’re all
linked in that way and there’s that…[pause]familiarity
in how we do things, how we move, how we look, the
things we can do and the things we can’t and the things
we face in life that are unique to us I guess, that those
people who don’t have SMA don’t really understand.
The term ‘biosociality’ (Rabinow, 1992) is one that has emerged in the fields
of sociology and anthropology to account for the ways in which groups form
around common biological or genetic identities (Hacking, 2006); according to
Rabinow (1992), the new genetics are no longer grounded in the natural
world, but instead are imbued with cultural understandings of relatedness. For
writers such as Schneider (1980), biology can be understood as a cultural
system whereby kinship and biogenetic relatedness are conceptualised as one
and the same thing, so that the uncovering of new ‘biological facts’ triggers
the reconfiguration of kinship. Thus, kinship ties and bonds can be
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scientifically ‘discovered’ where there were none before (Franklin, 2001:
306). Rapp et al. (2001) have argued that, in line with Schneider’s thinking,
genomic practices have increasingly come to dominate the way in which we
scientifically ‘discover’ kin and additionally account for ‘atypical’ members
of kin groupings (Rapp et al., 2001: 384). For Rapp et al. (2001), the
emergence of lay organisations akin to the JTSMA are founded on the basis
of a shared genetic identity which serves to normalise, empower and
construct ‘imagined kindred’ for affected families and individuals (Rapp et
al., 2001: 393). Through a study of the meanings of kinship in relation to lay
organisations, Little People of America (LPA), National Marfan Foundation
(NMF) and a proliferation of Down’s Syndrome support groups, Rapp et al.
(2001) have demonstrated the way in which collective identities are forged on
‘genealogies of affliction’ (p. 386), which may be claimed through readings
of the body. Indeed, for Hannah, it is through reading the bodies of other
people affected by SMA that she recognises herself; the familiarity of
appearance and abilities that signal that she has met someone who belongs to
her ‘family’, linked by a shared physical and genetic identity. Rapp et al.
(2001) have suggested that the forming of these kinship groups are important
in the undertaking of kinship work, and the specialised bodies of knowledge
that emerge from them, namely the experiential and medical knowledge
obtained by living intimately with a condition. Whilst the knowledge
production and collective identities to which Rapp et al.’s (2001) research
points, however, may be possessed by individuals diagnosed with a condition,
as well as their families (indeed it is highlighted within Rapp et al.’s study
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that a large portion of the aforementioned knowledge is accumulated and
disseminated by and for the mothers of affected children), Hannah’s
description of her close identification exclusively with others with SMA
suggests a more tightly defined version of ‘biosociality’, whereby
identification may be based on very specific readings of both the body and
assumptions about genetic make up. Whilst carriers of SMA may have certain
genotype similarities with those with SMA, for Hannah, the specific features
of those with SMA marked them out as a group and defined their experiences
as inaccessible to others. The importance of Hannah’s assertion in terms of
the ownership of experiential knowledge lies in its support of a
conceptualisation of experiential knowledge as a discreet form of knowledge,
only accessible to, and shared exclusively among, those united by a common
genetic and physical identity.
This section has suggested that issues around ownership and privilege
are of central importance to an analysis of experiential knowledge. Etchegary
et al. (2008) have employed a visual metaphor to describe the different
intensities of experiential knowledge that are mobilised around prenatal
screening decisions, contrasting the more ‘vivid’ accounts of women’s
experiences (those which are close to them) with the more ‘distant’ forms of
knowledge that women use, such as those obtained through the media or the
narratives or contact with unknown others. Whilst describing these more
‘distant’ forms of knowledge as ‘less personal’ (p. 122) than vivid accounts,
Etchegary et al. (2008) do not extensively consider the relative value of these
different forms of experiential knowledge. My research suggests that not only
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can contrasting ways of knowing SMA be differentiated, but also that these
bodies of knowledge have a hierarchical value; not all sources of knowledge
are considered equal, and there was a tendency to view embodied experiences
of SMA as more ‘accurate’ accounts of life with SMA, with various degrees
of removal from this experience. Those who had lived with someone with
SMA were considered to possess more expertise in what life with SMA is like
than more distant family members and friends.
This hierarchy serves important functions in the negotiation of
reproductive responsibilities for families affected by SMA. By offering
participants a means by which to claim authority on a resource deemed so
central to reproductive decisions by these families, individuals were able to
strategically discredit or subvert the knowledge claims of others in order to
justify their own reproductive choices, or to protect their own feelings of self-
worth and value. These strategies additionally served to draw closer together
those individuals at different points in the hierarchy; laying claim to universal
experiences was a means by which to forge collective identities, which in turn
reinforced the foundations of the hierarchy. The hierarchy of experiential
knowledge was not necessarily experienced as oppressive, but instead can be
viewed as a creative strategy by which participants could negotiate the
complexities of reproductive decision making whilst simultaneously
safeguarding their own emotional and social well-being.
Experiential knowledge has thus far been treated as a form of
knowledge to which different meanings may be attached, and around which
negotiations of status, responsibility and ownership circulate. However, some
267
participants’ accounts of experiential knowledge were far more fluid than this
analysis suggests; for these participants, experience was a conceptualised as
unstable, continually evolving and changing, and subject to revision at any
point. Moreover, experiential knowledge could also be rendered obsolete by
the valuing of particular responsibilities or through a personalisation of this
knowledge; by rendering experiential knowledge as entirely individual and
context-dependent, the relevance of experiential knowledge to reproductive
decisions is called into question. These considerations will now be addressed.
Experiential knowledge as Unstable/Obsolete
Experiencing SMA, as has been discussed in Chapter 5, is a complex, multi-
faceted and ever-changing phenomenon. The different ways in which SMA is
experienced may alter over time and context, and personal responses to these
changes may additionally be dependent on social, psychological and
emotional factors. Despite an emphasis thus far on the way in which these
experiences become condensed, summarised and attributed meanings in the
context of reproductive decision making in order to negotiate the complex
tensions and issues surrounding genetic risk, not all participants felt satisfied
with this approach, and the strategic processing of their experiential
knowledge associated with it. Some highlighted the personal nature of their
experiences and the impossibilities of generalisation, whilst others presented
their experiential knowledge as obsolete in order to give weight to all-
encompassing responsibilities, to preservation of life and to God.
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The Instability of Experiential Knowledge
Chapter 5 has demonstrated the ‘slipperiness’ of the experiences of SMA
described by participants in this study. Despite attempts by medical
professionals to capture and define particular ‘types’ of SMA, according to
physiological characteristics, the way in which lives with SMA are actually
experienced defies such classification, and instead appears characterised by
movement between different experiential categories. The range of experiences
associated with SMA, and the emphasis placed by participants on the social
context of these experiences as well as the personal strategies developed by
individuals to counter-balance negative consequences of SMA render the use
of experiential knowledge in reproductive decision making highly complex; it
suggests that the unique nature of each experience with SMA negates the
possibility of drawing generalisations.
Eileen is in her 40s, was diagnosed with SMA type III in childhood
and has gone on to marry and has two (now adult) children. Eileen has a
brother who is also diagnosed with SMA (type II) which was confirmed
shortly after her own diagnosis, having initially been diagnosed as having
DMD. Eileen’s brother has never been able to walk. However, she is able to
walk with a walking aid, but describes herself as tiring quickly. Eileen’s adult
children do not have symptoms of SMA, but are presumed to be carriers of
the condition by the medical profession and the family, given that all children
of people diagnosed with SMA inherit one copy of the damaged SMN1 gene,
making them carriers of SMA. Eileen’s account of her life with SMA, the
strategies she employed to make her reproductive decisions in her twenties,
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and her current reflections on these decisions demonstrates the fluid nature of
experiential knowledge, and its unreliability in the context of reproductive
decision making:
When they were born, I mean my children are 21 and 23
now, there was no testing for it [SMA] at all so really it was
pot luck, we didn’t know what we were going to do if…but
we were quite prepared to take that chance at that time
because SMA didn’t seem that scary to us. I was 20 and I
was still quite active, much more so than now, my brother
was much stronger then, although he was still in a chair, so
you don’t think about what happens 20 years down the line,
as you age and you go downhill. You just see how you are at
that particular time when you make your view of what SMA
is like and even with that you can probably never know
enough because with any condition, every person’s different,
the condition changes, so you can only get a brief idea of
what’s going to happen and I mean 20 years down the line it
could go…[pause]You can have a brief idea about what’s
going to happen, but you don’t know exactly and even the
doctors can’t tell you that, because with SMA particularly
there’s so much individual variation.
Whilst Eileen described her experiential knowledge of SMA accumulated in
her twenties as reassuring, on the basis that she felt her symptoms to be mild-
‘I guess I just thought that I wasn’t that bothered by it, it could be lived with’-
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the context of growing older with SMA and experiencing deterioration altered
Eileen’s view of the stability and reliability of past experience as a resource
with which to imagine the future. For Eileen, her changing perception of her
SMA affected the value she attributed to experiential knowledge in the
context of reproductive decision making. Whilst firstly describing it as an
important factor in her decisions to have her children in her early 20s, now in
her 40s, Eileen’s perceptions of SMA have evolved. Having experienced a
decline in her abilities over time, and witnessing the same with her brother,
Eileen now questions the reliability of experiential knowledge in guiding
reproductive decisions and shaping a ‘view’ of what SMA is like. In the same
way that the medical profession cannot accurately predict an individual’s
future experiences with the condition, so one’s own sense of what SMA is
like may prove to be unstable; continually expanding to incorporate new
experiences and circumstances, with certainty only ever being provisional.
This change in the meaning attributed to experiential knowledge of
SMA, however, was not always based on embodied experiences, and could
instead be based on empathetic knowledge or expansion of information, as
Nathan, whose sister has been diagnosed with SMA type II commented:
I must admit, my perspective on SMA did start to change
when I had grown up and started to learn more about it. I
suppose I just thought of SMA meaning that you can’t walk,
you’re weak, but when I found out that chest infections
could like…kill my sister, they could be fatal, I think I
started to see it differently. I hadn’t realised when she’d been
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ill when we were children that that could have been so
serious. So yeah I was quite shocked by that part of it, it
made me rethink things a bit.
As Eileen and Nathan’s accounts highlight, the negotiation of parental and
reproductive responsibility may be approached differently when experiential
knowledge is discounted as a reliable indicator of future lives with SMA.
Eileen’s reflections on the nature of her experiences with SMA,
however, suggest an additional influence on the interpretation of experiential
knowledge as a reliable or unreliable resource. Her reproductive decisions
may well have been presented differently had her children been born with
SMA. Reproductive status, therefore, as well as the perceived status of
experiential knowledge, could alter the way in which knowledge of SMA and
reproductive responsibilities were experienced and recounted. Perceived
accountability to ideas about parental responsibility restrict the number of
possible readings of experiential knowledge retrospectively, as either a stable
or unstable resource, as a strategy to justify reproductive decisions already
made as well as those not yet taken.
The Limits of Experiential Knowledge
In addition to the continual processes of re-negotiation and re-naming of
experiential knowledge over time and context, Eileen’s account additionally
touches on another issue in the uses of experiential knowledge in reproductive
decision making. By referring to the individual variation in experiences of
SMA, Eileen highlighted one of the limits of experiential knowledge
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acknowledged in the literature in relation to the rise of the so-called ‘expert
patient’, that is, its particularity (Prior, 2003). Whilst SMA may be a label
assigned to a large group of individuals, a disparate and broad range of
experiences are nevertheless described by those living with SMA. Indeed, as
well as physiological differences between individuals (which account for
some of the variation in these experiences), peoples’ lives with SMA are also
intersected by social, economic and political circumstances which affect the
way in which they live with SMA. These factors as well as the strategies
individuals use to manage SMA, as has been discussed in Chapter 5, may
account for these differences in experience of SMA as much as the
medicalised taxonomy system currently used to make sense of them.
Lily, who is in her late twenties, has been diagnosed with SMA type II
and recently had her first child commented about her views of the
classification of her own experience of SMA:
I always thought with type II I was safe…you know how
nasty type I can be, so I always thought you know ‘I’m out
of the water’ sort of thing, but it wasn’t until I went to the
[JTSMA] conference for the first time and I saw the type IIs
there and I started to see the amount of variation…a lot of
them are very twisted and have respiratory problems, and
when my mum saw them as well we could just not believe
that they’ve got what I’ve got. So whilst I’m classed as type
II, that’s only ever been just a label to me, I don’t really
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think that it’s quite the same as what the others have got. I’m
a very good type II.
Prior (2003), in his discussion around the status of experiential knowledge
accumulated by patients vis-à-vis medical knowledge has suggested that
experience, as a basis for knowledge is ‘…invariably limited and
idiosyncratic. It generates knowledge about one instance, the one case, the
single ‘candidate’’ (Prior, 2003: 53). Indeed, Lily’s experiences with SMA
were contained by the circumstances of her own life and her embodiment; she
had intimate knowledge of what SMA meant for her, but these experiences
did not necessarily translate to the lives of others. Her reflections on meeting
others with SMA for the first time in her twenties reveal the distance she
perceived between her own experiences of SMA and those who shared her
diagnosis. For Fae, diagnosed with SMA type II in childhood, this lack of
similarity and the individualised nature of SMA meant that experiential
knowledge was of limited use in reproductive decision making. When
considering the relevance of her experiences to the decision someone might
make about having a child with type II SMA she commented:
…this is my thing with disability, is that just because I’m
disabled and just because the person round the corner is
disabled, doesn’t mean that we’ve got anything in common
…and I read the Jennifer Trust stuff about people who have
ventilation and things and I’ve been one of the lucky ones,
I’ve never needed that…so they could have a child, type II
SMA who could be like that. Equally, they could be ten
274
times stronger than I am. Nobody can say. You know SMA
is like an umbrella and there is so much under that, but a lot
of people aren’t aware of it. I know that the last time that I
went to the conference, there was a photograph taken and
people looked at it afterwards and said ‘why do you look
different to the rest of them?’ [other people diagnosed with
SMA] and I said ‘I don’t know, do I?’ and it is true, we don’t
look the same. You can have the same condition, but what
they go through can be nothing like what you go
through…And a person who was pregnant with an SMA
baby could look at someone with type II and think ‘ok, I
could cope with that’ but that doesn’t necessarily mean it’s
going to go that way. You just don’t know. Equally you
could have someone who has just the same level of SMA me
but who just can’t handle it, you know, people are different.
Whilst Fae’s knowledge of SMA had been expanded by her contact with
other people with SMA, she nevertheless recognised the difficulties in
assuming a universality of experience based on a genetic identity, which may
emerge from ‘biosociality’ (Rapp et al., 2001). Indeed, participants cited a
range of factors which they deemed to have been particularly central in their
ability to manage their lives with SMA which minimised any negative impact
of the condition including the positive attitude and upbringing of parents, the
maintenance of networks of social support, the receipt of adequate health and
social care as well as acceptance into the worlds of education, employment
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and parenthood without discrimination. These findings are similar to the
coping strategies of people with SMA outlined in Lamb and Peden’s (2008)
study. These relative factors are extremely important in that, like differences
with muscle tone and strength, they have the capacity to substantially
influence the way in which SMA is experienced in individuals’ lives. They
are also factors, as Lily points to, which are highly personal and variable,
calling into question the relevance of the experiential knowledge accumulated
by individuals with SMA themselves to reproductive decision making.
Conclusions
This chapter has presented the intersection of experiential knowledge with
various forms of reproductive responsibility in the context of families
affected by SMA. Through the presentation of the accounts of individuals
living with, and alongside SMA in various capacities, it has been argued that
experiential knowledge can be both a strategic tool and a complicating factor
in the negotiation and presentation of reproductive responsibilities in the
decisions faced by families affected by SMA. The experience of SMA was
reflected on and attributed meaning in different ways depending on nature of
the experience as well as the point in reproductive decision making at which
participants were being interviewed. As Nelson and Nelson (1995) have
argued, decision making is a factor in identity construction in that the
decisions we make contribute to the way in which we are perceived and
evaluated by others. Maintaining an identity as a responsible decision maker
in the context of reproduction, where powerful discourses around parenthood
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(and more specifically, motherhood), disability and inheritance both exist and
conflict, therefore, is an arena in which experiential knowledge can be
strategically mobilised to justify and support complex reproductive decisions,
as well as to deflect the felt and articulated criticisms of others. This chapter
has demonstrated that through defining experiential knowledge as ‘warning’
or ‘reassurance’ and also as a form of expert knowledge inaccessible to
others, participants are able to negotiate the tensions and conflicts between
these discourses whilst simultaneously maintaining their identities as
responsible (prospective) parents, irrespective of what decision is taken.
However, experiential knowledge is not a straightforwardly useful resource
and for many participants considering reproduction, such detailed and
intimate knowledge of the realities of life with SMA could both heighten and
personalise the tensions in reproductive decisions, contributing to painful and
impossible dilemmas, rather than offering a safeguard against future regret or
accusations of irresponsibility which had informed its use in the reproductive
decisions of others. For other participants, however, the destabilisation of
experiential knowledge as a reliable source of information on which to
ground such decisions was the most accessible means of negotiating these
tensions and ensuring the maintenance of participants’ identities. These
various ways of using and abandoning experiential knowledge in strategic
ways suggest that even in instances where its applicability and relevance were
questioned, participants’ lives and their entanglement with the experience of
SMA were always factored in reproductive decision making; they could never
simply be ignored.
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Chapter 7
Discussion
In this discussion chapter I will draw together the analysis of the previous
chapters and discuss the implications of the findings for wider debates and
practices. The findings of this research have implications firstly for debates
around the nature and status of ‘experiential knowledge’ in a variety of
contexts, and secondly to debates within the disability rights literature around
the role of experiential knowledge in relation to prenatal testing and screening
decision making. In this chapter I will highlight the contribution of my
research to these fields, as well as the points of intersection between them.
Furthermore, I will consider the practice and policy implications of my
findings, particularly around screening, testing and genetic counselling
practices. In order to achieve these aims, firstly I will restate my research
questions (as set out in Chapter 2), before moving on to present a summary of
the key points of the research which address these questions. Finally, I will
present an analysis of these findings within the context of the pre-existing
literature in order to highlight and demonstrate the contribution of my
research to it, as well as suggesting areas for further and future research.
The Research Questions
My central research question is:
In what way does experiential knowledge of SMA inform conceptualisations
of genetic risk and reproductive decision making in families medically
defined as ‘at risk’ of transmitting SMA to future generations?
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I have also considered the following secondary research questions:
1. What are the main concerns and challenges faced by families and
individuals affected by a diagnosis of SMA?
2. Is SMA perceived differently by those with a diagnosis of SMA, in
contrast to the perceptions of their family members?
3. How do families and individuals affected by SMA relate to medical
definitions of SMA?
4. To what extent are the concerns of disability rights activists about
prenatal testing and selective termination reflected in the views and
concerns of families affected by SMA?
5. How do families and individuals interpret the value of medical
knowledge vis-à-vis their experiential knowledge in reproductive
decision making?
6. How are notions of reproductive and relational responsibility
negotiated in the context of experiential and medical knowledge of
SMA in reproductive decision making?
Summary of the Key Findings
*Medical Knowledge of SMA is Uncertain and Ambiguous
Despite recent developments in clinical research which have been posited as
offering researchers new opportunities to understand the mechanisms by
which SMA occurs (Yu et al., 2008), SMA is still a relatively poorly
understood condition. Indeed, whilst research into the condition has gathered
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pace in recent years, and has become systematically organised through the
development of organisations such as Treat-NMD (a registry of all those
affected by SMA to facilitate trials) and the establishment of universal
outcome measures for SMA clinical trials, the outcomes of such
developments are yet to offer any benefit to those living with SMA. Stem cell
researchers have recently highlighted the possibility of developing treatments
which will eventually replace the inadequately functioning motor neurone
cells deemed to produce SMA (Kerr et al., 2000; DiDonato, 2003; Corti et al.,
2008). However, currently, for families and individuals affected by SMA, no
effective cure or treatments are available to alleviate the symptoms of SMA,
and for many who took part in this study, the concept of cure was no more
than an abstract hope for the future; one that may, or may not, materialise. As
writers such as Fleising (2001) have argued, this mismatch between
expectations and delivery of genetic interventions can be understood as part of
the ‘clinical genohype’ surrounding such genetic technologies.
Through an analysis of the emergence of SMA as a disease category,
and the analysis of participants’ accounts of obtaining and making sense of a
diagnosis of SMA, I have highlighted the instability of medical knowledge of
SMA. Despite the authority attributed to diagnostic categories and the
legitimating effect of such labels, the medical typology offered to classify
those diagnosed with SMA can be experienced as alienating, irrelevant and
confusing. Being unable to tally one’s experience of SMA with a diagnostic
bracket caused feelings of displacement for some, whilst for others being
given a prognosis of premature death which later proved to be inappropriate
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had devastating consequences for the individual concerned and those around
them. Whilst for many people affected by SMA, and also within the medical
profession, it is becoming increasingly accepted that the medical typology for
SMA is to be treated as a loose guide rather than a definitive classificatory
system (Dubowitz, 1991), these diagnostic brackets nevertheless held
considerable influence in terms of conceptualisations of SMA and the
identities of those living with it. Medical knowledge thus influenced the way
in which SMA was experienced by those diagnosed with it by carving out
different forms of experience associated with it. The JTSMA’s annual
conferences continue to be organised around SMA’s diagnostic types and
individuals readily identify themselves as a belonging to a particular ‘type’ of
SMA and measure their abilities alongside others attributed this same
diagnostic category: ‘I’m quite a good type II’ (Georgia), ‘I’ve noticed I’m a
lot stronger than all the other type IIs’ (Lily), ‘…even though [daughter’s
name]’s survived infancy, I still consider myself to be a mother of a type I’
(Trisha). The medical typologies of SMA, were, furthermore, used by
participants as a shorthand to express the quality of life associated with the
condition; type I, generally considered to be most the severe type was
associated with the poorest quality of life, leading up to type III, with those
so-diagnosed deemed to enjoy the best quality of life, as the symptoms are the
least severe. However, following interviews with people diagnosed with types
I, II and III SMA as well as its variant conditions, SBMA, SMARD and
ADSMA, it became clear that these assumptions, embedded within the
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medical typology of SMA, were a gross over-simplification of the lived
reality of SMA.
These uncertainties around the medical typology of SMA become
particularly problematic in the context of reproduction. It was clear, through
an analysis of the interviews, that the medical typology of SMA held
considerable sway in the way in which many participants conceptualised
SMA as a condition, and thus approached their reproductive decision making,
in spite of the acknowledged difficulties with its coherence. Participants did
not speak of wishing to avoid SMA per se, but, more accurately, certain types
of SMA, as a proxy for severity. Particular concern was expressed around the
desire to avoid the birth of a child who was unlikely to survive infancy.
However, the prospect of having a child who would be disabled, but
nevertheless survive into adulthood, elicited a far broader range of
viewpoints. These preferences were largely expressed in terms of the
undesirability of a pregnancy affected by type I SMA, with varying degrees of
concern associated with pregnancies affected by types II and III.
The desire to avoid particular forms of SMA that would lead to
particular (presumed) experiences of life, however, is not matched by the
current capacities of the medical technologies used for prenatal testing of
SMA. Prospective parents and their doctors are not able to decipher the ‘type’
of SMA a foetus is affected by from a prenatal test, but rather only whether
the foetus will develop into an infant displaying symptoms of SMA. The only
available guide by which prospective parents may index the sort of life the
prospective child could have is by reference to the type of SMA previous or
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existing family member(s) were diagnosed with, as it is assumed that the
recurrence of SMA within families groups will be of similar severity
(personal correspondence with Jane Fenton-May, Associate Specialist in
Medical Genetics, 2008). Despite this assumption, however, differences in
severity of SMA within sibling groups have continued to be observed by both
the medical profession (e.g. Dubowitz, 1991) and families living with SMA.
In terms of reproductive decision making, therefore, the uncertainties around
medical knowledge heightened many of the dilemmas and confusions
experienced by prospective parents. Despite the rhetoric of ‘informed decision
making’ that is emphasised by those working in the field of clinical genetics,
prospective parents with SMA in their families approach reproduction with
imperfect medical knowledge of what SMA might mean for future
generations.
* SMA is Associated with a Broad Range of Experiences: ‘Experiences of
Disability’, ‘Embodied Experiences of Impairment and Disability’ and
‘Experiences of Illness, Death and Bereavement’.
Whilst the medical typology of SMA carries with it an assumption that it is
possible to index the sort of life an individual will experience within a
particular ‘type’ of SMA, the accounts of those individuals living intimately
with SMA revealed a far more complex picture of how life with SMA was
experienced. The nature of each person’s SMA often defied medical
classification, extending beyond the boundaries of the diagnosed type, in a far
more chaotic manner than the medical classificatory system suggests. Some
individuals diagnosed with SMA type II died earlier than medically predicted,
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whilst those diagnosed with type I who were expected to die in infancy
survived into childhood or adulthood, blurring the boundaries of, and
throwing into disarray, the medical classifications of the condition. When
analysing the accounts of the families and individuals living with SMA, it
emerged that whilst the medical typology of SMA serves a useful heuristic
function, a sorting device that can be used as a shorthand to reference SMA in
its various guises, it was particular types of experience rather than particular
types of SMA that were being described when participants conceptualised
SMA. The reality of SMA was talked about in terms of different forms of
experience that could not readily be contained within medical classifications,
even as these classifications shaped conceptualisations of SMA.
In light of these different ways of describing experiences with SMA,
in Chapter 5 I developed an ‘experiential typology’ of SMA and marked out
the (collapsible) boundaries between the different ways in which individuals
live with SMA. These different forms of experience are ‘experiences of
disability’, ‘embodied experiences of impairment and disability’ and
‘experiences of illness, death and bereavement’.
1) I used the term ‘experiences of disability’ to describe those experiences of
SMA that are shaped primarily by social and environmental factors. Whilst
these experiences were typically explained by participants in terms of
restriction and limitation on account of the inadequacies of social and
environmental support, crucially, these experiences were also viewed as being
amenable to manipulation. Indeed, adopting a ‘positive outlook’ or attitude,
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together with the ability to ‘fight’ institutions/individuals to ensure adequate
support and access were viewed as important strategies to overcome the
difficulties associated with experiences of disability. ‘Experiences of
disability’, furthermore, in line with social model of disability theorising,
were viewed as non sequiturs; having SMA did not automatically disable a
person and many participants, (particularly younger adults with SMA), spoke
about witnessing the expansion of opportunities for their participation in a
wider range of activities that had previously been inaccessible (e.g. various
forms of sport, driving, job opportunities). This is not to say that participants
did not often regard their experiences of disability as frustrating, isolating and
discriminatory, but rather that these experiences were conceptualised as being,
at least partially, negotiable. Experiences of disability were not regarded as
primarily a product of having SMA; instead, they were externalised and
regarded as evidence of the failings of society to cater for disabled people.
2) Through an analysis of the accounts of those affected by SMA, a separate
experiential category, ‘embodied experiences of impairment and disability’
emerged. Key writers discussing the social model of disability have long
wrestled with the theoretical distinctions between ‘disability’ and
‘impairment’ and, indeed, whether social model of disability theorists have
any political interest, or obligation, to account for disabled people’s embodied
experiences. I have placed embodied experiences of impairment and disability
within a separate category on the basis that they were conceptualised in a
different way to experiences of disability, although the two are intimately
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connected. ‘Embodied experiences of impairment’ refers to those descriptions
offered by those diagnosed with SMA of what it feels like to live in a body
with weakened muscles, spinal curvature and, sometimes, compounding
respiratory difficulties. Also within this category, I have included the
embodied experiences of the family members of those diagnosed with SMA,
and specifically those undertaking care work for their relative. Care work, as
Meyer et al. (2007) have observed, is a thoroughly embodied activity, a form
of ‘bodywork’ (Twigg, 2000), and this came across strongly in the accounts
of carers, who experienced through their bodies, the physical exhaustion,
stress and strain of ‘being the muscles and strength’ (Rachel, mother of a
child with SMA) of their relative affected by SMA. By highlighting these
experiences, I have drawn attention to the conceptual differences between
‘embodied experiences of impairment’ and ‘embodied experiences of
disability’. This distinction has been highlighted in order to distinguish
between experiencing the impaired body and the more reactive embodied
experiences of disability: for example, emotional responses to experiences of
discrimination. As Reeve (2002), as well as Paterson and Hughes (1999) have
argued, disability can produce embodied experiences as well as social ones,
and experiences which may not be accommodated by the social model of
disability; oppression is not just in the social fabric, but in the ‘flesh and
bones’ of disabled people (Paterson and Hughes, 1999: 606). Unlike
‘experiences of disability’, the negative aspects of embodied experiences of
impairment and disability were conceptualised as requiring a personal, rather
than social, solution. Living in a body that deteriorates over time, or coping
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with the demands of an intense care regime, required individuals to summon
considerable personal resources in order to prevent them from becoming
overwhelmed or distressed. Participants thus elicited metaphors of ‘fighting’
and ‘battling’ to communicate the idea that these embodied consequences,
where experienced negatively, had the potential to be (at least partially)
reconciled, through personal resilience and stamina. However, the possibility
of these experiences being potentially too difficult or overwhelming for an
individual to overcome was also emphasised. Embodied experiences of
impairment and disability, therefore, carried with them the potential of
suffering and distress less amenable to social intervention.
3) The final area that participants described when narrating their experiences
with SMA were ‘experiences of illness, death and bereavement’. The overlaps
and critical distinctions between conceptualisations of ‘illness’ and
‘impairment’ have been the subject of much debate within and between the
disciplines of medical sociology and disability studies (Thomas, 2007). The
presence of ‘suffering’ has been suggested as a potential differentiating
characteristic between the two concepts by De Wolfe (2002), with ‘illness’
constituting a term reserved only for those experiences marked by wholly
negative states of embodiment. Whilst ‘impairment’ may be viewed as a
neutral or positive characteristic, and indeed is perceived so by many people
living with impairment, illness conversely, does not allow such room for the
negotiation of meaning (De Wolfe, 2002). De Wolfe (2002) has argued that
illness is a state of being that everyone would seek to avoid. Similarly, when
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describing experiences of chest infections, spinal fusion surgery, pneumonia
and the deaths of relatives from SMA together with the consequent
bereavement of the family, the notion that certain experiences invariably
involve physical and psychological suffering was used as a means to
distinguish them from experiences of impairment and disability, where
personal and social interventions may alleviate negative consequences to
varying degrees. Whilst the point at which an embodied experience of
impairment became an experience of illness appeared to be subjective, and
variable from individual to individual, there nevertheless appeared to be a
unanimous opinion that particular experiences of SMA caused people to
suffer, and, further, that these experiences traversed medically defined ‘types’
of SMA. All people with SMA live with the constant possibility of a serious
chest infection and pneumonia and this dimension of the condition, together
with the experiences of death and bereavement in the family described by
many, were regarded as universally negative experiences and ones largely
immune to social or medical remedy.
By distinguishing between different forms of experience associated
with SMA, I have demonstrated the way in which the different ‘types’ of
SMA cannot be aligned with particular levels of severity or ‘quality of life’ in
an unproblematic way. Whilst the different types of experience I have
presented were attributed hierarchical values in the stories of those living with
SMA in that experiences associated with suffering were perceived as wholly
negative and experiences to be avoided, whereas those deemed to be primarily
social experiences were more ambiguous, it was simultaneously recognised
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that people affected by SMA could move between experiential categories, or
exist in multiple experiential categories at any given point in time. Thus, by
highlighting the intersecting experiential dimensions of SMA, and their
relative susceptibility to personal, physical, or social manipulation I have
highlighted the complexity of the lived reality of SMA which is not
represented in medical typologies of the condition.
This complexity has important implications for reproductive decision
making. Through demonstrating the dispersion of experiential categories
across the medical typology of SMA, the link between types of SMA and
quality of life, to which reproductive decisions are often anchored, becomes
harder to sustain. The ability to predict and control the degree of suffering and
distress a future child would experience with SMA was extremely important
for prospective parents to determine where the boundaries of their
reproductive responsibilities lay. Prospective parents were keen to protect
their potential offspring from avoidable or intolerable suffering. However, as
has been discussed, reference to the medically defined type of SMA was not
always the most reliable basis for such predictions, and many participants had
experienced the unreliability of medical knowledge through the disjuncture
between the prognosis they were given and their actual lived experiences of
SMA. It was in this context, the realisation that medical science has limited
abilities to predict and control the nature and course of SMA in future
generations, that experiential knowledge of SMA became particularly
important for prospective parents. Whilst experiential knowledge in itself was,
at least in part, shaped by and formed through medical knowledge, these two
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forms of knowledge were often presented as juxtaposed in participants’
accounts in order to justify particular perspectives in reproductive decision
making. Prior experience with SMA, and the challenges and transformations
these experiences entailed were thus crucial in reproductive negotiations. It
determined the contours of what participants defined as an acceptable life,
even as this experiential knowledge was, in itself, both limited and
idiosyncratic; bound to the specificities of individuals’ lives with SMA and
the instability of constant revision.
* Experiential and Medical Knowledge of SMA Mediate the Negotiation of
Reproductive Decision Making for Families Affected by SMA.
Responsibility is a key theme that has been used to explore the experience of
gender, reproduction and also the uses of genetic information (e.g. Reed,
2009; Hallowell, 1999). Through interviewing families and individuals
affected by SMA, it was apparent that norms of parental responsibility,
disability and genetic responsibility coalesced, contradicted and informed one
another at different points of reproductive decision making. Experiential
knowledge of SMA, as described above, not only constituted the context of
reproductive decision making, providing a basis from which to predict the
likely suffering of future generations with SMA, but was also mobilised
strategically to negotiate the tensions inherent in discourses of (genetic)
responsibility and disability, whilst simultaneously maintaining participants’
identities as moral social actors.
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As previous research has demonstrated, couples and individuals rarely
approach reproductive decision making as autonomous individuals (Roberts
and Franklin, 2006), but instead, as Cox (2003: 262) has argued, as the
‘mothers and daughters, fathers and sons, sisters, brothers, aunts, uncles,
cousins, spouses, life partners and friends’ of others; as social beings we exist
‘in and through our social and familial ties with others’ (Cox, 2003: 262) and
with an obligation to maintain our moral identities in relation to these
connected others. Kenen (1994), through the notion of ‘genetic responsibility’
has demonstrated the way in which genetic medicine has augmented these
responsibilities by suggesting new facets of obligation in intimate
relationships, but also obligations to wider society, through the ‘quality
control’ of future generations (Rapp, 2000). These notions of responsibility
take on particular meanings in the reproductive decision making of families
where the notion of having a child with a serious condition is not based in
abstract wonderings, but instead is grounded in a lived reality. As Cox (2003)
has highlighted, for families affected by inheritable conditions, the
‘unfavourable outcome’ in reproductive decision making, the ‘worst case
scenario’, is not a depersonalised notion of disability or disease, it is a
member of the family. For such families, then, responsibilities and
reproductive risks are highly personalised. However, relatively few studies
have explored how such families conceptualise and negotiate the personal,
moral, familial and political questions that the possibilities of genetic
medicine highlight (Kelly, 2009).
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Through my interviews with families and individuals affected by
SMA, experiential knowledge emerged as a key mediator of the
responsibilities associated with reproduction. Participants in this study
approached reproductive decision making in the context of having lived with
someone with SMA or having SMA themselves, through which they assessed
their genetic risk and formulated their reproductive decisions. For some
participants, experiential knowledge was mobilised strategically to justify
particular reproductive decisions. By drawing on the suffering of previous or
existing family members with SMA and defining this experience as a warning
as to the certain suffering of future generations, participants were able to
justify their decisions (anticipated or taken) to prevent further lives with SMA
and exonerate themselves from anti-abortionist discourse which they
perceived as situating their decisions as irresponsible.
Similar strategies were adopted by those participants who opted to
avoid all use of genetic technologies designed to prevent the lives of future
generations with SMA. However, in these instances, by drawing on
(embodied) experiences of disability and impairment, participants presented
SMA not as a condition that involved suffering, but as a disability that could
be ‘overcome’, and around which a happy and fulfilling life could be
established. By recourse to their experiential knowledge of SMA, these
participants were able to circumvent the notions of parental responsibility that
would position them as irresponsible for risking the birth of another child with
SMA in the family. The use of experiential knowledge in this way had novel
benefits: it was presented as securing epistemic privilege for those who laid
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claim to it. That is, by defining experiential knowledge as a resource only
accessible to those living with SMA, participants were able to discredit the
views of those who would criticise their decisions and present their
experiences as irresponsible. The claim to ownership of experiential
knowledge additionally had other protective qualities; for many individuals
diagnosed with SMA, steps taken by other family members to prevent the
birth of another child with SMA could be extremely painful. Thus, by
claiming a privileged insight into life with SMA which was inaccessible to
their family members, and possessed exclusively by those who had been
diagnosed with the condition themselves, they could dismiss such
reproductive decisions as uninformed or misguided and thus create an
emotional buffer against the existential anxieties they experienced on account
of their relative’s actions.
Whilst the mediation of reproductive decision making by participants’
experiential knowledge of SMA allowed for a less fraught negotiation of the
tensions inherent in reproductive responsibility for some participants, for
others, this mediation introduced new complexities and anxieties. Whilst for
the former group of participants, intimate knowledge of life with SMA
presented new possibilities for the justification of perceived problematic
reproductive decisions, for the latter, this knowledge conversely sealed off
such routes of justification and thus became experienced as burdensome. For
such participants, feeling unable to cope with the support needs of another
child with SMA but simultaneously witnessing their existing child thrive in
spite of their SMA meant that it became harder to justify a decision to prevent
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the recurrence of SMA in terms of protecting the best interests of the child, a
justification which is frequently referenced by prospective parents in such
circumstances (Kaplan, 1999). In such instances, prospective parents felt
trapped by their knowledge of SMA and their belief that to prevent another
child with SMA would be tantamount to the rejection of their existing child, a
dilemma not expressed by those prospective parents who had more negative
experiences with SMA such as acute illness and death. Indeed, the difficulties
of prospective mothers, in particular, in articulating their own emotional and
physical needs in relation to these decisions points to the uneven way in
which the responsibilities of reproductive decisions were experienced. As
Reed (2009) and Dragonas (2001) have highlighted, women are more heavily
implicated in reproductive decision making than men, are held more
accountable for pregnancy outcomes and bear the brunt of work for caring for
disabled infants (Kelly, 2009). In this way, the experience of genetic
responsibility is necessarily gendered (Hallowell, 1999; Reed, 2009), which
constrained the way in which women made, and accounted for their
reproductive decisions in relation to genetic risk.
Finally, for another group of participants, experiential knowledge
introduced a further layer of complexity to reproductive decision making;
whilst on the one hand it promised a window through which to glimpse future
lives affected by SMA, the fluidity of its very nature simultaneously rendered
it an unstable basis for knowledge claims and projections. The high degree of
individual variation in experience of SMA and its constant evolution over
time and context meant that some participants felt apprehensive about using
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their experiences as a ‘yardstick’ by which to measure the anticipated quality
of life of imagined others. This perspective was reinforced by the existence of
different experiences with SMA between family members, within diagnostic
categories, and indeed within the life of a person diagnosed with SMA. On the
one hand experiential knowledge appeared to be useful resource, offering
insight and familiarity; on the other however, it was also highly uncertain and
unstable. The limited and idiosyncratic nature of the knowledge as well as its
continual revision and reframing (Abel and Browner, 1998), meant that any
decisions grounded in such knowledge were invariably contingent.
Experiential knowledge mediated reproductive decision making in
more or less helpful ways for families and individuals affected by SMA. It
was mobilised strategically to justify and support very different reproductive
decisions, and was placed on an epistemic pedestal to discredit the views of
those who would judge them as irresponsible. An examination of the uses of
experiential knowledge sheds light on the intricate web of familial, inter-
personal, social and moral responsibilities woven into the reproductive
decisions of families in the context of a known inheritable condition.
Responsibilities were not only felt toward future generations of the family,
but also past and existing relatives, the enactment of which, in recent years,
have taken on new moral dimensions in the context of increased availability
of genetic information and testing (since the 1990s for SMA). Experience of
the condition within a family is a crucial mediator of these moral decisions.
Even for those participants who felt that their experiences of SMA were
largely irrelevant to the lives of future generations affected by SMA, for all
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groups of participants, experiential knowledge of SMA personalised and
heightened the tensions and conflicts of responsibility. Experiential
knowledge was used and abandoned strategically to navigate responsibility,
and a family’s entanglement in the experience of SMA was always factored
into reproductive decisions; it could never simply be ignored.
Discussion
The findings of my research contribute to the literature that deals not only
with the status, constitution and uses of experiential knowledge, but also that
which surrounds the disability rights responses to prenatal testing, as set out
below.
Abel and Browner (1998) in their discussion of experiential
knowledge, have marked out a distinction between ‘embodied’ (i.e. that based
on sensory experience) and ‘empathetic’ (i.e. that emerging from close
relationships with others) experiential knowledge, which has been an
important point of departure for much subsequent work on experiential
knowledge, including my own. Whilst D’Agincourt-Canning (2003),
developing this concept, recognised the possibilities of these two forms of
knowledge becoming ‘intertwined’ as individuals experience caring for a
relative with cancer whilst simultaneously having the condition themselves,
this distinction is nevertheless used to mark out two different ways in which
people come to know cancer.
This distinction between ‘embodied’ and ‘empathetic’ knowledge of
SMA, however, proved difficult to sustain in relation to my own work. As
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D’Agincourt-Canning (2003) has argued, people can occupy both positions,
as embodied subject and empathiser simultaneously. Through the analysis of
the accounts of people living with and around SMA, it became apparent that
not only were the experiences of those caring for others with SMA
thoroughly embodied, but that also people with SMA themselves had an acute
empathetic understanding of the effects of SMA on those around them.
Indeed, it is over-simplistic to assume that people living with relatives with
SMA approached their understanding of SMA entirely through an
emotionally based empathy, a ‘commonality of feelings and experiences’
(Keller, 1985: 117). Writers such as Morris have indeed been keen to
disentangle such emotionally charged words from the arena of personal
assistance for disabled people on the basis that it implies a form of emotional
dependency of disabled people on those who care for them (Morris, 2002),
and many participants were keen to disassociate the care work they received
from either family members or privately employed personal assistants from
any emotional relationship with that individual. Indeed Forbat (2002) has set
out the range of emotions that ‘carework’ for a disabled person in the home
may invoke within familial relationships including stress, sadness, bitterness,
and jealousy as well as empathy. Participants thus constructed their
understandings of SMA through this range of physical, emotional, and
psychological experiences and responses, as well as by reference to broader
professional, medical and social knowledges that construct SMA in particular
ways (Good, 1994). This finding suggests that whilst a distinction between
‘embodied’ and ‘empathetic’ knowledge may be useful heuristically to
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contrast the very different types and intensity of experience associated with
having, or living alongside SMA, to suggest that these categories can
adequately account for the range of conflicting, overlapping and contradictory
experiences contained within them may be misleading and overlook the
complexity of the experience of living with SMA. Moreover, as D’Agincourt-
Canning (2003) suggests, the separation between embodied and empathetic
forms of knowledge can be seen to imply that they are of contrasting status.
Whilst it might be assumed that those diagnosed with a given condition
themselves are ‘closest’ to the experience of cancer, D’Agincourt-Canning
(2003) is keen to emphasise that empathetic knowledge can be just as
‘poignant’ or ‘real’ as embodied knowledge of cancer (p. 151).
Debates around the status of different forms of knowledge have
formed the basis of standpoint feminist theorising. Smith (1987) and
Hartstock (1983) have been among the chief proponents of feminist
standpoint epistemology which posits women’s experience as the basis for
knowledge claims. Through women’s subjugated position in society, they
argue, unique insights into the subjective experience of oppression can be
accessed, ones that offer ‘truer’ accounts of the internal workings of
patriarchy than those obtained from ‘above’. Within my own research, the
hierarchical ordering of different ways of knowing SMA emerged as an
important strategy by which individuals could position their accounts as
‘authentic’.
The contrasting ways of accessing experiential knowledge have been
addressed by previous analyses of experiential knowledge. Indeed, Etchegary
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et al. (2008) have employed a quasi-visual metaphor to explore ‘vivid’
(personal), and ‘vague’ (more distant) forms of empathetic knowledge that
pregnant women mobilise in their decisions about the uses (or otherwise) of
prenatal screening and testing technologies. For D’Agincourt-Canning (2003),
these different positions from which a person could ‘know’ cancer took the
forms of ‘tangible knowing’ (or the knowledge derived from physically living
with someone affected by cancer), ‘recent’ and ‘accidental’ knowing (which
account for the more distant ways in which people come to know about cancer
in their family, e.g. through the stories about unknown relatives). The
concepts of distance and closeness as part of the nature of empathetic
experiential knowledge, moreover, have been outlined in the work of Kay and
Kingston (2002) in their exploration of the reproductive decision making of
female carriers of X-linked conditions. Through conducting interviews with
women who had ‘close’ relatives (e.g. first degree relatives) with an X linked
condition and comparing the accounts of their reproductive decisions with
women who had more distant relatives affected by an X linked condition (e.g.
cousins, uncles), they suggest that proximity to the experience of disability
may be associated with higher levels of guilt and anxiety around reproductive
decision making.
My own research supported the findings of these studies in that
distance from, and closeness to, the experience of SMA appeared to inform
the way in which narratives were conceptualised and presented. Importantly,
however, and a factor resolutely absent from previous accounts of
experiential knowledge, is that this ordering of closeness and distance in
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experiences of SMA went beyond mere descriptions of the type of
experience, and instead was a means by which participants could check the
authenticity of each other’s accounts of SMA, and affirm the validity of their
own. Whilst Etchegary et al. (2008) have asserted that the different types of
experiential knowledge accumulated by women approaching reproductive
decision making were not necessarily ordered according to which provided
‘better’ accounts or versions of reality, there was evidence within my own
research that the hierarchical organisation of different ways of knowing SMA
was an important strategy in the justification of certain standpoints and
decisions about reproduction, as well as the discrediting of others. Being able
to claim ‘closeness’ to SMA, and thus the ability to assign oneself the status
of ‘knower’, was an important means of establishing authority on the
condition and bolstered the legitimacy of reproductive decisions, whether
anticipated or taken. Even as experiential knowledge was, by its very nature,
partial, limited and uncertain, the positioning of this knowledge as ‘authentic’
was an important means by which participants could claim a right to define
their own reality, as well as to discredit or deflect the (anticipated)
judgements of others.
The ordering of different knowledge claims according to their
proximity to so-called ‘authentic’ experience has been met with criticism
from within and beyond feminism itself. Writers such as Haraway (1988) and
Tuana (1993) have criticised feminist standpoint theorists’ preference for the
favouring of particular perspectives over others, and pointed to the dangers of
defining certain perspectives as ‘privileged’ rather than simply different.
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Critics have argued that it may be an impossible task to ever distinguish
‘truth’ claims from their discursive construction without falling into the
trappings of relativism (Ramanzanoglu and Holland, 1999), and indeed it may
not be desirable to do so. Haraway (1988) has suggested a solution to these
dilemmas in feminist epistemology by pointing to the possibility of
documenting ‘situated knowledges’; knowledges marked by the social
locations of those who produce them, but not necessarily organised
hierarchically. For Haraway (1988), the task of feminist research is not to
decide which accounts of reality are ‘better’ than others, but to understand
how complex subjectivities are expressed in the production of knowledge;
knowledge which is both marked by, and born out of, our positioning in
society.
Haraway’s (1988) theorising on situated knowledges is particularly
useful in making sense of the experiential knowledge of families affected by
SMA. My own research has suggested that whilst experiential knowledge is
‘real’ in the sense that experience has a material reality, a being, beyond our
descriptions of it; as researchers, all we have to understand this reality are the
various accounts of these experiences which our research methods elicit,
which, as Haraway (1988) has suggested, are thoroughly embedded in, or
‘marked’ by the social locations of those who produce them, both researchers
and participants. Experience may be remembered or presented differently in
various social contexts, it may be re-interpreted according to new
information, and is always as fluid, partial and incomplete as other forms of
knowledge. Haraway’s (1988) work, therefore, is useful in highlighting the
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need to treat experiential knowledge as situated knowledge and not a ‘pure’
account of reality.
Despite these various criticisms, feminist standpoint theorists have
responded by arguing that, despite the difficulties associated with the ordering
of accounts of reality, there may be ethical, social or political justifications
for the privileging of particular vantage points in certain contexts (Hartstock,
1997). By this, Hartstock (1997) had in mind the possibility of setting aside
such objections to standpoint epistemology if it is possible that more equal
social relations could be envisaged by doing so. Indeed, in the context of my
own research, this ordering of experiential knowledge could be interpreted as
a political project. Privileging particular experiences over others was not
simply about claiming a right to define their own experiences, or a means to
visualise the operation of power and disablism as they interacted with their
lives for families affected by SMA; rather many used their experiential
knowledge as a way to circumvent and challenge these very values. Fisher
(2007), through her study of parents of disabled children has argued that
experiential knowledge of disability acquired in the private sphere is central
to the creation of ‘counter-hegemonic discourses’ which challenge
individualised notions of disability and ideas of ‘normality’. The knowledge
parents acquire of their children’s abilities, through living intimately with
them, is the foundation on which parents construct alternative
conceptualisations of disability and independence as defined by dominant
discourse. In a similar way, families affected by SMA used their experiential
knowledge to co-create alternative narratives which redefined discursively
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constructed ideas of disability, parental, and genetic responsibility in ways
that incorporated their own lived realities. By reference to this experiential
knowledge as a bounded and privileged form of knowledge, they were able to
deflect the judgements imbued in dominant discourse and present their own
versions of reality. The possibility of counter-hegemonic discourses to
emerging through and out of experiential accounts of disability, impairment
and illness reinforces calls by disabled feminists for the incorporation of these
so-called private experiences into social model of disability theorising (Crow,
1996; Morris, 1991), and indeed, research has already pointed to the way in
which these experiential aspects of disability and impairment may already run
contrary to discursive constructions of them (Albrecht and Devlieger, 1999;
Young and McNicoll, 1998). Thomas (2007) has highlighted that whilst
medical sociology has been concerned with the experiential aspects of
chronic illness, social model of disability theorists have tended to write out
this crucial aspect of disablism. Further research is thus indicated that bridges
this ideological gulf between experience and the social structures and
mechanisms that disable people, between which experiential knowledge, and
the counter-hegemonic discourses and constructions of disability that emerge
from it, may provide a crucial link.
As well as having political consequences in terms of the discursive
challenging of ideas of parenthood, disability and genetic responsibility,
claims to ownership of a bounded body of experiential knowledge of SMA
also had important emotionally protective qualities for families affected by
SMA. Being able to substantiate particular reproductive decisions by recourse
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to a body of experiential knowledge that they alone could claim and possess,
individuals could exclude the interpretations and judgements of others in the
midst of reproductive decisions fraught with difficult emotions and
uncertainties. For individuals diagnosed with SMA, claims to a body of
experiential knowledge of greater authenticity than their family members’
was an important strategy by which to neutralise the emotional harm arising
from family members’ steps toward preventing SMA in future generations,
which many interpreted as a negative evaluation of their own lives. Whilst the
existence and theoretical basis of the expressivist objection to prenatal testing
and selective termination by disabled people has been described in the
literature and media (Asch, 2000; Atkinson, 2008; Kent, 2000), there is a lack
of research detailing how this objection, and the emotional consequences
associated with it, are managed in families affected by inheritable conditions,
where, as I have argued, the stakes may be heightened by the experiential
knowledge of the condition family members possess. In such situations,
claims to lack of knowledge by prospective parents as to the reality of life
with a given condition, may be an emotional safeguard unavailable to
individuals with SMA whose relatives pursue methods of preventing its
recurrence. The sense of responsibility that emerged in family members’
accounts, moreover, towards the emotional well-being of their relative with
SMA additionally suggests that the expressivist objection has consequences
not only for those individuals diagnosed with SMA, but that it can also
constrain the responses of families affected by inheritable conditions. Further
research is indicated to explore the way in which the expressivist objection is
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negotiated within families affected by other conditions to determine how
experiences of disability, impairment and illness are conceptualised in such
instances and presented in relation to prenatal testing and selective
termination.
Whilst my attention has focused so far on the way in which
participants esteem and privilege accounts of experiential knowledge, it is
important to note that a similar strategy was, paradoxically, also used by
those who adopted a more critical stance towards the relevance of their
experience with SMA to future lives with the condition. Indeed, just as
Etchegary et al. (2008) discovered that a perceived lack of experiential
knowledge and gaps in knowledge could be referenced in reproductive
decision making in a similar way to those who possessed experiential
knowledge, so the uses of experiential knowledge by those who regarded it as
an unstable or obsolete resource mirrored the strategies of those who
privileged such knowledge claims. Whether experiential knowledge was
considered a concrete resource on which to base reproductive decisions, or an
unstable basis for knowledge claims, it was the privileging of particular
versions of experiential knowledge (whatever these may be) to the exclusion
of others as a means by which to negotiate tensions in reproductive decisions
that characterised the use of experiential knowledge in these decisions. Being
able to present experience in particular ways and at particular points was a
means for participants to tell those stories which may be difficult to tell in a
society which, through the use of medical technologies and discourse, more
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or less explicitly supports some reproductive decisions over others. Cox
(2003) in her analysis of the testing decisions within families affected by
Huntingdon’s disease (HD) has furthermore suggested that the point in the
decision making process that participants are positioned at the time of
interview also influences the story they are able to tell. As she interviewed
people who had already decided to undergo testing for HD, and most were
awaiting their results, the stories she heard were far less imbued with the
‘weighing of options, the to-ing and fro-ing, and the wonderings of ‘what if’’
than she had initially anticipated to hear (Cox, 2003: 261). The interview, for
these participants, was thus an ‘occasion for justifying, rather than re-living’
their decisions, as they were reflecting on actions already undertaken (Cox,
2003: 261). As the participants in my own research were at differing stages of
reproductive decision making, and indeed, some considered themselves to
have not yet made any such decisions, this context invariably affected the
way in which their thoughts were presented. As Cox (2003) similarly
discovered, it may be unsurprising to find more certainty in the accounts of
those reflecting on reproductive decisions already taken, in comparison to the
oscillation between different possible decision outcomes that were rife in the
accounts of those participants who had not yet enacted reproductive
decisions. All were acutely aware that once taken, the decisions (and the
knowledge and experience arising from their enactment) could not be undone,
only re-represented.
A further finding of my research relates to the relationship between
experiential and medical knowledge. The literature around experiential
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knowledge, as has been discussed, has tended to focus on its status vis-à-vis
medical knowledge and dominant constructions of disability, to demonstrate
the way in which it has become an alternative source of identity construction,
as well as information in decision making and risk perception, particularly
where medical knowledge is contradictory or incomplete (Abel and Browner,
1998; D’Agincourt-Canning, 2003; Etchegary et al., 2008; Lippman, 1999;
Fisher, 2007). The research conducted by Abel and Browner (1998) in
relation to pregnancy and the experiences of carers for relatives with
dementia, as well as D’Agincourt-Canning (2003) in relation to breast and
ovarian cancer, for example, have suggested that experiential knowledge of a
given condition is a filter through which medical knowledge is passed, and
either accepted and incorporated into pre-existing conceptions, or else
rejected.
Markens et al., however, in an attempt to move beyond these
dichotomous constructions of medical and experiential knowledge have
suggested a ‘dynamic and synergistic’ (Markens et al., 2010: 52) relationship
between the two, whereby both medical and experiential knowledge
contribute to one another (p. 39). My own research confirms that experiential
knowledge was a means by which families affected by SMA could
interrogate, challenge and expand on, medical knowledge, but that further,
this medical knowledge also informed and structured experiential accounts of
SMA. For example, whilst many participants challenged the medical typology
of SMA through their experiential accounts e.g. stating they were ‘good’ or
‘poor’ compared to others with the same diagnosis, their very understanding
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of what constituted a person with any given type of SMA was nevertheless
grounded in the medical definitions they sought to challenge. In a similar
way, the experiential knowledge of participants also fed into, and contributed
to, medical knowledge of SMA. As documented in Chapter 3, the emergence
of SMA as a disease category was characterised by the challenging of, and
expansion of, medical diagnostic categories on the basis of experiential
accounts of SMA that surpassed clinical expectation (Dubowitz, 1995b).
Whilst expert and experiential knowledge are frequently presented as
oppositional within research on experiential knowledge, and indeed, there
may be political motivations to maintain such a distinction (e.g. the
juxtaposition of medical and experiential accounts of impairment by disability
rights supporters), my findings have highlighted the way in which these
knowledges were constructed and maintained in continual reference to one
another, in a fluid, ever-evolving relationship. Experiential knowledge, whilst
often used as a means by which to challenge, or even invalidate medical
knowledge, was nevertheless conceptualised through dialogue and exchange
with this very knowledge. This finding highlights the way in which
experiential and medical knowledge, rather than rigid, diametrically opposed
structures, may instead be more usefully conceptualised as mutually
constituting knowledges, existing by and through their reference to one
another.
Aside from the ontological and epistemological status of experiential
knowledge, Abel and Browner (1998) have furthermore highlighted the
tendency within research on experiential knowledge to romanticize the
308
accounts of individuals that are grounded in everyday experience and used to
challenge medical authority (p. 322). As Markens et al. (2010) have
suggested in relation to women’s experiences of prenatal testing, this has
frequently been interpreted by researchers as a cue to validate experiential
knowledge and in particular, to assert its value as a means of reassurance. In
contrast to medical knowledge from which has emerged uncertainties,
insecurities and the ‘tentative pregnancy’ (Katz Rothman, 1986), experiential
knowledge is deemed to be the site in which women come to trust their own
bodies and subjective understandings. However, my research has pointed to
the way in which experiential knowledge, akin to medical knowledge, can
similarly be experienced as highly uncertain, imperfect, and even distressing.
Indeed, whilst experiential knowledge was a resource sought out by many
families and individuals affected by SMA, for some, the knowledge they
acquired through the stories and lives of others with SMA was a deeply
unsettling experience, and threw into doubt what they had previously
accepted as certainty. Whilst the possibility of challenging medical
knowledge was sometimes welcomed, experiential knowledge could also
threaten the stability that families felt they needed following diagnosis. As
Abel and Browner (1998) discovered, at points where people feel particularly
vulnerable, being able to ‘cling’ to the perceived certainty, trustworthiness
and reliability of medical knowledge was an important coping mechanism (p.
322). As D’Agincourt-Canning (2003) notes in relation to women at risk of
hereditary breast/ovarian cancer, women both accepted and supported the
‘privileged discourse of science’ because it responded ‘where they felt most
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threatened’ (p. 157). The importance attached to medical knowledge,
therefore, should not be under-estimated despite the challenges of experiential
knowledge. As Henwood et al. (2003) have argued, despite rhetoric of patient
empowerment in the context of health, people do not always prefer to have
the control (and consequently the responsibility) over what happens to them.
Whilst genetic technologies have increased the number of reproductive
decisions presented to would-be parents, this control is not always welcome,
and sometimes self-determination includes the choice to relinquish that
control (Fisher, 1986). Accepting the authority of medical knowledge and
associated advice can be seen as one of the ways in which prospective parents
relinquished control over their reproductive decisions in contexts that were
perceived as highly uncertain and risky, as acts both of self-preservation, by
avoiding the guilt and anxiety associated with making the decisions solely
themselves, and of self-determination, by accepting advice from those
deemed to be in positions of authority (Fisher, 1986).
As has been described in Chapter 3, the development of the JTSMA
into a ‘genetic advocacy group’ (Novas, 2007), points to the centrality of the
future promises of medicine and genetic research, not only at the point of
reproductive decision making, but also in the daily reality of life with SMA.
Being able to hope for a future in which the difficulties associated with living
with SMA are resolved by medical science was an important facet of daily
coping mechanisms of many families. Moreover, medical knowledge
provided families with a definitive diagnosis, on the basis of which identities
and collectivities could be forged. Whilst experiential knowledge of SMA
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often called these diagnoses into question, medical classifications
nevertheless provided families with socially sanctioned labels with which to
understand their experiences; the importance of having a seemingly stable
diagnostic badge with which to explain and understand one’s experiences
should not be underestimated, and could offer a sense of security to families
living with SMA.
Families and individuals affected by SMA, therefore both challenged
and endorsed medical knowledge of SMA even as that knowledge contributed
to, and disrupted, their conceptualisations of the condition. The relationship
between medical and experiential knowledge of SMA is complex and multi-
faceted; experiential knowledge did not offer an alternative to medical
knowledge in any straightforward way. Instead the two forms of knowledge
existed as parallel sources, crossing, intersecting and weaving together at
various points, but nevertheless representing two distinct bodies of
knowledge that were strategically drawn upon in different contexts to
construct and maintain ways of approaching, and conceptualising, SMA.
Practice and Policy Implications
My research has implications for practice and policy on a range of different
issues. Firstly, my research has contributions to make to the call, made
primarily by disability rights supporters, for more knowledge about
conditions that are currently screened and tested for in the UK to be made
available to would-be parents (Fletcher, 2002; Patterson and Satz, 2002). As
the number of conditions which are screened and tested for increases, these
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demands seem set to increase, and moves to make such information available
have already appeared (AnSWeR, 2009). Whilst population screening for
SMA is not yet offered in the UK, there have been moves more recently to
make this screening available in the USA (‘new born screening programme’,
FSMA, 2008; Prior, 2008 ), and it seems feasible that this type of intervention
will at some point be available in the UK. Indeed, a similar programme to
identify those babies affected by, but, critically, also those who are carriers
for, CF has already been implemented in the UK through the newborn heel
prick test (2007, although no carrier screening for adults is currently
available). This screening will mean that an increasing number of individuals
will be growing up with the knowledge that they are a carrier of a recessive
condition, without necessarily having a known affected family member,
which previously was the means by which a family came to know about CF
(NHS Choices, 2008). These developments have implications for a discussion
of experiential knowledge, and its usefulness as a resource for prospective
parents identified as being genetically at risk by antenatal screening tests
(Patterson and Satz, 2002).
In the first instance, as Kaplan (1999) has argued, one of the key
motivators for people to use prenatal testing and selective termination is an
erroneous belief that disability is a necessarily negative trait and one
associated with a poorer quality of life than might otherwise have been
expected for an able-bodied child (p. 132). Whilst this motivation may be set
alongside others, Kaplan (1999), along with other disability rights supporters,
has argued that this assumption is highly problematic. She observes that this
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justification for using prenatal testing and selective termination is frequently
deployed as it can easily be presented in terms of altruism; prospective
parents can claim they are preventing harm to a future life, rather than acting
out of self-interest, and many participants in my study mobilised this
justification in accounting for their own reproductive decisions. Whilst some
writers in the field of medical ethics have argued strongly that disability does
inflict some degree of harm on future lives and consequently would-be
parents are justified in enacting their responsibility to protect future lives
from such an outcome (Purdy, 1996; Harris, 2000; Harris, 1998), there have
been many dissenting voices in the field of disability studies who have
questioned this assumption and presented alternative visions of life with
disability (Edwards, 2001; Asch, 1999; Saxton, 1984; Hubbard, 2006). Whilst
for some writers, the negative assumptions described above are seen as
emerging from a medical model of disability (Asch, 2001) and the
presentation of unbalanced information about conditions in medical
encounters at the point of prenatal testing and selective termination decisions
(with an emphasis on medical complications rather than opportunities for
successful living (Williams, 2002)), it has been suggested that an appropriate
way to challenge them is for more information about the experiences of those
living with disability to be made available to would-be parents (Fletcher,
2002; Patterson and Satz, 2002). Etchegary et al. (2008) amongst others (Kay
and Kingston, 2002; Chandler and Smith, 1998) have argued that women’s
experiential knowledge of, and associated attitudes towards, disability, illness
and impairment may have a significant impact on their attitude towards
313
selective termination; and indeed there appears to be evidence to suggest that
those individuals who have a genetic condition in their family, and thus
experience of the condition, may approach the issue of selective termination
in a different way to those for whom the condition is simply a medical label
(Gow, 2000; Wertz et al., 2002; Green, 1993). A key concern of disability
rights supporters, therefore, who draw on the positive experiences reported by
many of the families of disabled children to support their argument (Asch,
2001), is how to make the sort of knowledge about life with disability
acquired through close contact (such as within a family) available to those
who are making such decisions without this insight. This knowledge is
sometimes presented as a counter-balance to medical information about
disability (Fletcher, 2002; Patterson and Satz, 2002), with the implicit
suggestion that this experiential knowledge can challenge prevailing
assumptions about disability.
The findings of my own research contribute to these suggestions by
writers from within the disability rights community, as well as the movements
to introduce novel ways of presenting information about different conditions
to would-be parents (such as AnSWeR, 2003). My research supports the
findings of other research such as that by Gow (2001) and Kelly (2009),
which document the way in which attitudes towards disability can be
transformed by the birth of an affected family member, and that this attitude
can be a guide in future reproductive decisions. Indeed, it is noteworthy that
nearly all of the able-bodied siblings of people diagnosed with SMA reported
that their experiences with SMA made them feel more at ease with the
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prospect of having a child with SMA themselves than may otherwise have
been the case. Moreover, it was also reported that their experiential
knowledge of SMA not only had an impact on attitudes towards future
pregnancies diagnosed with SMA, but also towards other disabilities,
impairments and illnesses. As was argued in Chapter 4, the experience of
SMA was conceptualised in terms of the experiential categories of
‘experiences of disability’, ‘embodied experiences of impairment and
disability’ and ‘illness death and bereavement’ rather than according to
diagnostic label, which may account for the transferability of this knowledge
to other disabilities, impairments and illnesses. This finding calls into
question the way in which information is currently presented to prospective
parents on websites such as AnSWeR (on the basis of medical diagnoses),
and suggests that people draw on multiple sites of experience when
evaluating a prenatal diagnosis including that of both the diagnosed condition
as well as other conditions, particularly if there is concordance with the
associated experiential categories between the two conditions. Future research
is indicated that would explore the reproductive decisions of those with
inheritable conditions in their family and the uses of this knowledge in
prenatal screening and testing decisions relating to conditions other than the
one affecting their family.
As well as highlighting the transferability of experiential knowledge
in the context of prenatal screening and testing decisions and the insights this
offers to an understanding of the innovative ways in which prospective
parents approach and use their experiential knowledge in this context, the
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research I have conducted also points to the constraining effects of
experiential knowledge. Whilst disability rights supporters have been keen to
emphasise the reassurance or change in attitude which can be derived from
experience with disability, it appears that through the championing of
experiential knowledge, such writers have the promotion of particular
reproductive decisions in mind. For those participants who chose to opt out of
prenatal testing or carrier testing to prevent the recurrence of SMA in their
family, there was evidence that such participants found their experiential
knowledge to be a valuable resource with which to challenge prevailing
discourses of disability and responsibility. However, for other participants,
this knowledge heightened existing dilemmas and even introduced new ones.
As has been highlighted in Chapter 6, experiential knowledge can
constrain the responses of those making reproductive decisions in families
affected by SMA by removing the possibilities of using the justification of
altruism, suggested as a common motivation by Kaplan (1999) for
undergoing prenatal or carrier testing. For individuals whose experiences with
SMA were largely positive, the notion that prenatal testing and selective
termination prevents future suffering becomes harder to sustain. Disability
rights supporters have celebrated the removal of this assumption as
progressive. However, my research suggests that for would-be parents, and
particularly for would-be mothers facing reproductive decisions, this
knowledge can paradoxically be experienced as oppressive, increasing
uncertainties around reproduction and rendering them trapped between
competing concerns and demands. Having insight into what life with SMA
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could be like, therefore, was not always a helpful resource and had the
potential to disrupt relationships within the family, particularly with members
diagnosed with SMA themselves. My research points, therefore, to the
difficulties as well as the benefits associated with the advancement of
experiential knowledge as a means by which to ‘give voice’ (Bricher, 1999)
to the perspectives of those with disabilities in the prenatal testing and
screening debate, highlighting the agenda underpinning the advancement of
such information in this context. It highlights the high degree of sensitivity to
the needs and concerns of would-be parents that is required in the
advancement of such information, as well as those of people diagnosed with
inheritable conditions who may require support to manage the emotional
consequences of the reproductive decisions of others.
Despite the disputes about the coherence of the expressivist objection
to prenatal testing (Shakespeare, 2008; Sparrow, 2008; Edwards, 2004;
Stainton, 2003), individuals diagnosed with SMA nevertheless reflected on
the emotional consequences of the reproductive decisions made by their
relatives in ways that highlighted the possibilities for, and actual emotional
harm that resulted from the perceived suggestion that others would want to
prevent the birth of another person with the same condition as themselves.
Many experienced this as a personal rejection on the basis of their
impairment. The possibility of emotional harm emerging from the
expressivist objection (Asch, 2001) to prenatal testing in families affected by
inheritable conditions has largely been ignored in the genetic counselling
literature, and my research points to a need to acknowledge this experience,
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not only in terms of offering support to those diagnosed with the condition,
but also acknowledging the constraints the possibility of an expressivist
objection may place on the reproductive decisions of others. Wishing to avoid
the perception of rejection on the part of an affected relative was indeed
described as a motivating factor for many participants who opted to decline
carrier and prenatal testing for SMA. Despite the importance of the
relationship to family members diagnosed with the condition, genetic
counselling research has largely overlooked the attitudes and responses to
genetic testing of those with disabilities and genetic conditions (Chen and
Schiffman, 2000). Little is known about the way in which the expressivist
objection to prenatal, and also carrier testing, is experienced and expressed
within families affected by inheritable conditions and the consequences it has
for perceived reproductive options and responsibilities. My research has
highlighted the emotional consequences of the expressivist objection within
families and the way in which it can both constrain and clarify reproductive
decisions. However, further research is indicated to inform future genetic
counselling practices and highlight the need for sensitivity in dealing with this
issue.
Despite the emphasis on informed decision making, rational choice
and patient autonomy, which currently preside over clinical practice in the
fields of genetic medicine and beyond, research is increasingly calling into
question individualised notions of autonomy, and underlining the importance
of understanding the relational nature of responsibility and the way in which
experiences shape medical decision making (Burgess and D’Agincourt, 2001;
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Cox, 2003; Werner-Lin, 2007; Babb et al., 2002; Hallowell, 2006; Roberts
and Franklin, 2004; Shiloh, 1996), an element Fischhoff et al. (1978) refer to
as the ‘human factor’ in decision making. The consequences of the
expressivist objection are but one example of the way in which ‘relational
responsibilities’, or those grounded in experiences of everyday life (Burgess
and D’Agincourt, 2001), unevenly shape and constrain reproductive
autonomy within family groups, and point to an interdependent notion of self
emerging from mundane everyday experience. The reproductive decisions
made by those families affected by SMA cannot be usefully understood as
rational, outcomes-based decisions made by autonomous and isolated
individuals. The decisions made by the families affected by SMA who took
part in this research were instead born out of, and marked by shared familial
experience with SMA, by wider social discourse around disability, genetic
disease and parental responsibility and the complex interplay between these
factors. An emphasis on rational decision making overlooks the highly
emotive relationship individuals have with their history with the condition,
which can transform, or even render obsolete, statistical measures of genetic
risk (Shiloh, 1996; Werner-Lin, 2007). These findings suggest that it may be
useful for genetic counsellors to explore experiential knowledge when
counselling families affected by inheritable conditions, including the
experiences of those diagnosed with the condition, the experiences of
caregivers and the resulting conceptualisations of the condition. Such an
exploration, as highlighted by Etchegary et al. (2008) may help counsellors
identify those individuals most likely to experience distress in the prenatal or
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carrier testing counselling process and who might benefit from additional
support (p. 123). Furthermore, such an exploration may verify such
experiential knowledge as a valid form of knowledge about SMA which can
be drawn upon to make sense of, and challenge medical knowledge.
Conclusions
My research has addressed the question of how experiential knowledge and
responsibility are negotiated in the reproductive decisions of families affected
by SMA. From an analysis of the accounts of the anticipated, and completed,
reproductive decisions of 64 people from such families, it was apparent that
the negotiation of such responsibility, and the accompanying moral, social
and ethical dilemmas, could be found in the processing, and accounting for
these decisions, rather than in the decision outcomes themselves. Whilst much
research has focussed on the different decisions people make according to a
variety of variables (Wertz et al., 1992; Sagi et al. 1992), those facing
genetically ‘risky’ reproductive decisions may reach the same end decision
through very different means, and it is these accounting processes which are
the most useful for examining the negotiation of competing norms and values.
Experiential knowledge was of particular importance to families
affected by SMA, a condition for which medical knowledge is both imperfect
and uncertain, and the prospect of cure or treatment remain distant. Medical
classifications of the condition remain unsatisfactory in their ability to
account for all experiences of SMA, and thus medical knowledge of SMA, in
its current form, has limited potential in predicting the sort of life a future
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person with SMA may have. The families who took part in this study thus
existed in a space where genetic risks and the possibility of disability became
highly personalised; they were not considering a disability unknown to them,
but instead the recurrence of a disability that affected their sibling, their
parent, their child, themselves, and consequently many considered themselves
to be the best experts on the impact of SMA for their family. Experiential
knowledge of SMA, therefore, could not be ignored when approaching
reproductive decision making; it was at the very core of how genetic risk was
conceptualised. Medical statistics of risk were not objectively evaluated, but
instead interpreted through this lens of experience, and through interpretations
of the responsibilities and ‘moral risks’ that emerged from these experiences:
to family members past, present and future, to partners, to other families
affected by SMA, to wider society and to themselves. Experiential
knowledge, moreover, was not static, but instead in a constant state of flux,
meaning that genetic risk could be conceptualised differently at different
times and contexts; it could be mobilised retrospectively to account for
previous reproductive decisions, or projected into the future to justify
decisions not yet made; presented as either a certainty or an unstable resource
respectively to solidify particular versions of genetic risk at particular times,
and furthermore to present them as conforming to overarching notions of
relational, and reproductive responsibility. These strategies highlight the
highly precarious, and often impossible, position of such families and
individuals approaching reproduction. Positioned within the uncertainties of
experiential and medical accounts of SMA and prevailing expectations of
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reproductive responsibility, such individuals must weave a path through the
various moral, social and ethical dilemmas surrounding reproduction and
genetic risk, which, as this research has demonstrated, may ultimately never
be resolved, only re-represented
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Appendix II: Consent Form
CONSENT FORM
DISABILITY AND GENETICS RESEARCH PROJECT
Name of Researcher: Felicity Boardman
Name of Participant:……………………………………………………………
I confirm that I agree to participate in the above study. I understand that my
participation is entirely voluntary and I am free to withdraw at any time
without giving a reason.
Signature Date
……………………………………………………………………………
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Appendix III: Interview Guide
Interview Guide
N.B. These questions were used as a loose guide and were adapted as
appropriate for each interview. Participants further had considerable freedom
to direct the interviews.
1) Can you tell me a bit about yourself? (Age, occupation, living
arrangements, family, hobbies/interests, diagnosed with SMA or
relative of someone with SMA?)
2) How would your friends/family describe you?
3) If I was a biographer writing up the story of your life, what would I
write as being the important events/experiences that have shaped it?
-Prompt for story of diagnosis and responses to genetic diagnosis including responses of
family
4) How have these events/experiences affected who you are today and
your life in the present?
5) How would you describe SMA to someone who has never heard of the
condition before?
-prompt for descriptions of different experiences associated with SMA
6) What do you understand by the term ‘quality of life’? What do you
think you need to have to enjoy a good ‘quality of life’? Can people
living with SMA enjoy a good ‘quality of life’? Why (not)?
7) Are you a member of the JTSMA? Why? What involvement, if any,
have you had with the JTSMA? Do you find it helpful? Why?
8) Do you think genetic testing for families affected by SMA is
useful/important? (Carrier testing, prenatal testing, PGD) Why? Do
you see any draw backs or difficulties with testing? Why?
9) Do you think prenatal testing and screening for other conditions, e.g.
Down’s Syndrome is a useful option to have? Why?
10) How/when might you/have you used genetic testing yourself? Why
(not)?
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11) In what situations would you consider genetic testing to be particularly
appropriate? When is it less useful?
12) How do you feel about the possibility of carrier screening of the whole
population for SMA? Do you see it as important? Why?
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Appendix IV
Diagram Showing the Inheritance of SMA for Two Carrier Parents
(Taken from ‘The Genetics of SMA’ information sheet and reproduced with
the kind permission of ‘Families of SMA’ (FSMA), 2010)
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Appendix V
Forms of Genetic Testing Available to Families
Affected by SMA
Forms of Genetic Testing Available to Families Affected by SMA
Since the linking, in the early 1990s of SMA to particular genetic mutations,
there has been a rapid expansion in the number of options available for families
affected by SMA to gather information about the genetic status of their
members, present and future. In 1990, through the use of DNA markers,
prenatal testing became available, to determine whether or not future
generations of families affected by SMA would similarly display symptoms of
SMA (Zerres et al., 1997). This testing could be done through either chorionic
villus sampling (CVS) at 10-12 weeks of pregnancy or amniocentesis at the 15th
week of pregnancy (Simard, 2007). CVS involves the extraction and genetic
testing of samples of the chorionic villi that form the placenta, whereas
amniocentesis involves the extraction and testing of amniotic fluid to determine
whether or not the foetus has two copies of the deleted SMN1 gene. Following
the results of prenatal testing, either by amniocentesis or CVS, prospective
parents have the option of terminating or continuing with the pregnancy.
Diagnostic, Prenatal and Carrier Testing
In early 1995, the gene candidate SMN was identified, which further expanded
the possibilities for genetic testing of families and individuals (Zerres et al.,
1997). In the first instance, the sequencing of the gene led to the possibility of
genetic testing for diagnostic purposes. As the vast majority of instances of
SMA are deemed to be linked to mutations and changes in the SMN1 gene,
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molecular analysis could supplant more invasive diagnostic tests that were
being used prior to this date, such as muscle biopsy (Van Der Steege et al.,
1995). Furthermore, the possibility for carrier testing became available. This
test was of particular use to the siblings of individuals affected by SMA, as well
as extended family members who wished to ascertain their likelihood of having
a child expressing symptoms of SMA and the results could be obtained through
a simple blood sample. This form of testing is designed to detect the number of
copies of the SMN1 gene a person has on each chromosome, but due to the
possibility of an individual having two copies of the gene on one chromosome
and none on the other (making them a medically defined ‘carrier’), carrier
testing is unable to detect 2-3% of carriers with this variation (Simard, 2007).
If prospective parents are both known to be carriers, they may opt to undergo
prenatal testing of their pregnancy, however if only one prospective parent is a
carrier, they are unlikely to have a child displaying symptoms of SMA, they
may, however, have a child who is also a carrier of SMA. All children born to
parents where one parent is diagnosed with SMA will be carriers of SMA,
whilst children born to parents who are both diagnosed with SMA will similarly
have SMA themselves (Ogino and Wilson, 2002).
Carrier screening of the general population is not currently available for SMA
in the UK, however there have been recent moves to promote such screening in
America (Prior, 2008), and patient organisations such as the JTSMA support
the development of such programmes in the UK context. It has also been
suggested that neonatal screening for SMA may become justifiable as therapies
become available (Wirth et al., 2006).
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Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis
In 1998, a further possibility became available for prospective parents known to
be carriers of SMA. A Dutch team, led by Dreesen (1998), conducted the first
pre-implantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) of SMA for a couple whose first
child had died at 9 months of age from SMA type I. A pregnancy was
established after the second cycle of PGD, and this development was heralded
in the medical community as offering an alternative to prenatal testing and the
possibility of selective termination for families affected by SMA (Dreesen et
al., 1998). PGD works by undertaking genetic testing at the embryonic stage of
foetal development, rather than 10-14 weeks into an established pregnancy, as
is the case for CVS and amniocentesis. This testing is made possible by the
creation of embryos through in vitro fertilisation (IVF), whereby gametes are
taken from the couple and fertilisation occurs extra corporeally. The resulting
embryos are subsequently tested for the specific genetic mutation which the
prospective parents are known to be carriers of, and embryos found not to carry
the genetic mutation are transferred into the woman’s body for gestation. As
Franklin and Robert’s (2006) ethnography has shown, for some couples who
are carriers of SMA, the possibility of undergoing PGD can be experienced as a
welcome alternative to prenatal testing and selective termination (p. 118), in
spite of its low success rate. Indeed, Guys and St. Thomas’ clinic in London is
one of the main sites for PGD for SMA, and between 1997 and 2000, 51% of
referrals for single gene disorders to this PGD clinic were for couples who are
carriers of SMA (Pickering et al., 2003), compared to 38% for Cystic Fibrosis
(a more common condition), suggesting that PGD is an option that is being
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taken up such families. Whilst PGD is not currently available for all of the
variants of SMA, e.g. SMARD and ADSMA, in 2001, PGD also became
available for SBMA (Georgiou et al., 2001).
Amniocentesis
Amniocentesis is a diagnostic prenatal test that can be carried out between 15
and 21 weeks of pregnancy. It is offered to women whose pregnancies are
considered to be at ‘high risk’ of being affected by a particular condition. The
procedure involves removing a sample of amniotic fluid (the fluid
surrounding the foetus) via a needle. This fluid contains foetal cells which can
then be tested for chromosomal disorders such as SMA. Amniocentesis is
associated with a slightly increased risk of miscarriage (1-2%) (NHS Choices,
2009).
Chorionic Villus Sampling (CVS)
Chorionic villus sampling is a diagnostic prenatal test carried out between 10
and 12 weeks of pregnancy. It is offered to women whose pregnancies are
considered to be at ‘high risk’ of being affected by a particular condition. The
procedure involves the removal of a small sample of the developing placenta
(the organ that connects the woman’s blood supply to the foetus), which is
then tested for chromosomal disorders. The procedure is associated with a
slightly increased risk of miscarriage (1-2%) (NHS Choices, 2009)
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Appendix VI
Variant forms of SMA
Spinal Muscular Atrophy with Respiratory Distress (SMARD)
SMARD is a condition affecting infants which has very similar features to
severe SMA, however it is not linked with the SMN1 gene. Whilst having
many overlapping features with severe SMA including generalised muscle
weakness, SMARD is associated with diaphragm paralysis (not seen in
children and infants with severe SMA), and the weakness begins with the
distal muscles (those furthest away from the body), moving inwards. In severe
SMA however, the muscle weakness presents in reverse order with the
proximal muscles (those closest to the body) being affected first, and more
severely. With SMARD, there may also be sensory disturbances which have
been excluded from the diagnostic criteria for SMA. SMARD is inherited in
the same way as SMA, through an autosomal recessive inheritance (see
appendix IV).
Spinal Bulbar Muscular Atrophy (SBMA)
SBMA is an adult onset form of SMA (with onset generally between 20 and
40 years of age) which shares many features with ‘classical’ SMA, including
generalised muscle weakness, however it is not linked to the SMN1 gene.
Instead, SBMA is X linked, which means it affects males, but the gene is
transmitted by females. Women who are carriers of SBMA may experience
mild symptoms of the condition. SBMA may furthermore involve symptoms
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which are not associated with SMA including hormonal changes (Fischbeck,
1997).
Autosomal Dominant Spinal Muscular Atrophy (ADSMA)
Autosomal Dominant Spinal Muscular Atrophy is an adult onset form of
SMA with onset between 30 and 50 years of age. It is considered to be milder
than the ‘classical’ forms of SMA, but involves what have been described as
the key features of SMA including generalised muscle weakness. This adult
onset form of SMA is not linked with the SMN1 gene and is inherited in an
autosomal dominant manner, which means that only one copy of the gene is
needed to pass on ADSMA, unlike recessive SMA which requires both
parents to be ‘carriers’.
